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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The r o l e  of Cordel l  Hull i n  the  developmnt of tha  
Good Neighbor po l icy  towards La t in  America has been unclear  
and i s  t he  problem f o r  t h i s  thes ia .  I n  much h i s t o r i c a l  writing, 
t h i s  r o l e  does not seem t o  emerge c l e a r l y ,  There a r e  explan- 
a t i o n s  f o r  t h i s .  There haa been a tendency t o  overlook o r  
completely neglect  Hul l ta  ro l e .  Authora who have d e a l t  with 
t h e  sub j ec t  of New Deal fo re ign  r e l a t i o n s  mention Hull, but 
they  do not a c t u a l l y  analyze h i s  philosophy o r  t h e  ex t en t  t o  
which h i a  philosophy of fo re ign  affairs was implemented i n  
t h e  conduct of diplomacy, This is e spec i a l l y  t r u e  i n  t h e  
case of the development of the Good Neighbor pol icy ,  This 
negleut  has been r e f l e c t e d  i n  a number of waya. 
F i r s t ,  t he r e  a r e  those writera who a t t r i b u t e  t he  naw 
policy t o  S u m s r  ~ e l 1 s s . l  This I s  understandable. Smmer 
Wslles wae t h e  ambassador t o  Cuba during t h e  c r i a i a  t h a t  de- 
veloped t h e r e  l a t e  i n  1933, a c r l a i a  t h a t  was a e t t l e d  i n  a 
manner which was consistent with t h e  new La t in  American 
' ~ u b e r t  Herring, A Ria tor  of La t in  America (second 
ed i t i on ;  New York: A l f r ~ d d p f ,  m, pp, 533-4: Hubert 
Herring, America and the  Americas (Claremont, Cal i fornia :  
~ l a r a m o n t i ; o l l e g e ~ 9 ~ ,  pp. 6, 8-9; and Samuel F. B a d a ,  
The L a t i n  ~rnerican Pol ic  03 t h e  United S t a t e s ,  A ~ i a t o r i c a l  
Intarpretation ( N e w 4  -%rcour t ,    ram c5mpany, i?Q3) ,  
p4 259. 
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pol icy which w i l l  be discussed shor t ly .  He was a180 a mem- 
b e r  of the delegation t o  Montevideo t o  a t tend  the  Seventh 
Pan-American Conference. Later  on a s  Ass i s tan t  Secretary  of 
S t a t e  and peraonal "trouble shooter" f o r  President  Roosevelt 
he was very ac t ive  i n  La t in  America a s  well as i n  Europe. 
However, it must be remembered t h a t  during the Cuban c r i s i s  
of 1933-34, H u l l  was the  Secretary of S t a t e  i n s t ruc t ing  
Welles. A t  Montevideo H u l l  was t he  delegation chairman; 
and i n  the  l a t e r  period of the development of t he  Good 
Neighbor policy he was a t i l l  the head of the  S t a t e  Depart- 
ment, 
There a r e  those who f e e l  t h a t  the  new era  i n  r e l a -  
t lona a c t u a l l y  began before H u l l  became Secretary  of Sta te ,  1 
These author8 point t o  I so l a t ed  cases of r e s t r a i n t  i n  the  
uae of in tervent ion.  They a l s o  point out agreements t o  
withdraw some troops a s  showing a  change from the  previous 
"Dollar Diplomacyw and "Roosevelt Coral laryn days. However, 
so  f a r  ae Lat in  h e r l o a n  reac t ion  was concerned, it appears 
t h a t  no new f e e l i n g  or  optimism developed in Lat in  America 
' ~ l exande r  DeConde, Herbert Boovert a La t in  American 
Polic (s tanford,  California:  Stanford i in ivers i ty  Press, 
'd pp. i x ,  x i i ;  and J. Lloyd I:echam, United S t a t e s  
and I n t e r  American Securi tg,  1889-1960 (Austin, Texas: 
m v m y  of Texas Press, 1 9 m  Chapter V. 
I 
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u n t i l  1934 following the Cuban se t t lement  and the  Montevideo 
I 
Conf erence. 
Some h i s to r i ans  a t t r i b u t e  the  Good Neighbor policy t o  
Pres ident  ~ o o s e v e 1 t . l  Again it i s  easy t o  understand this.  
Roosevelt was the chief .  However, the praaident  was so  pre- 
occupied i n  h i s  e a r l y  years with domestic matters,  t h a t  he 
l e f t  H u l l  r a t h e r  f r e e  t o  run the  S t a t e  Department according 
t o  H u l l ' s  own policies. H u l l t s  r o l e  i s  a l l  the more con- I 
apicuoua when i t  i a  r ea l i zed  t h a t  c e r t a i n  of h i s  po l i c i ea  
had t o  compete with the  economic nationalism of t he  New Deal. 
This w i l l  be discussed i n  the  t h e s i s  and the  f a c t  t h a t  R u l l  
1 
preva i l s  over many of the  New Deal advisors shows the  g rea t  I 
I 
, 
influence t h a t  H u l l  had on Rooasvelt. 
It o f t en  happens t h a t  when a  dynamic person i a  i n  the  
White House, achievements by subordfnates a r e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  
t h e  chief  executive. This i a  a h p l y  the r e s u l t  of executive 
domination and i s  l i k e l y  t o  be all the more t r u e  when it is 
r e a l i z e d  that H u l l  was of a  r e t i r i n g  nature. The l a t t e r  
tendsnag i s  increased when it  i s  r ea l i zed  t h a t  t he  La t in  
Amerioans tend p a r t i c  u l a r ly  towards t h i s  "strong manw 
l ~ d w a r d  0 .  Guerrant, Rooseveltl s Good Nel hbor Policy + (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University o f 5  A-exico r e s s ,  
19SO), p. 8; and J. P. Gavit, "Minding H i s  Own Xeighborfs 
B u ~ i n e s s , "  Survey Graphic, 3CXV (December 19361, 675. 
Image i n  p o l i t i c s ,  
A l l  the  more c r e d i t  f o r  the  development of a new 
pol icy  towards La t in  America i s  given t o  Roosevelt because 
of his  famous statement i n  his f i rs t  inaugural  addreas i n  
which he promised n. . . t o  dedicate t h i a  nat ion t o  t he  
pol icy of the good neighbor, the neighbop who r e so lu t e ly  
reapects  himself and, because he does so, respects  the  r i g h t s  
of o thers  . . . Obviously t h i s  phrase o r  statement doea 
not conta in  any spec i f ic  course of act ion.  Roosevelt had 
only a general  philosophy of peace, f r iendship ,  cooperation, 
and world recovery i n  mind. The statement was not d i rec ted  
a t  any p a r t i c u l a r  sec t ion  of the  world, but a t  the  world i n  
gsiMnl.l It would t a b  act& actions to girs substance 
te -&ha gmllcj of %Be G a d  %%@&or, 
I n  rd&-sssfng Ut3.a S3plosmks short;lg aztsr U s  in- 
augumtiea, R w a s r s l %  bagaa to gfvs mr;a sabatsacs t o  the  
G m d  3efghbar p l f a g  when ha skated: %Each one of nus (Lat in  
~clpxzblfcr) h b  Zasrnad %ha glorflss of im3ependanca. Let 
saeh of as %tarn tba glories af in%szdspeadsw=e, a2 
%he raFy lie% of statssants defining or reflecting 
rrq sgw5ffe f a ~ s i g n  pregmkm prompts -is statsment. 
'GZYXW B. Strurt, Ut ia  h a r i c a  aad the United Sta tes  
(r~wtb ~dttPon; Sen Ysl+kz P, Xpria%on - Ceoturp ?ospr;p,  
r9i+3ls pz ~ 6 .  
Interdependence, t h i s  word descr ibes  the Good Neighbor 
po l icy  a8 well a s  any one word can. It was t h e  acknowledg- 
ment t h a t  t h e  United S ta tea  would regard t h e  La t in  Republics 
a s  equals  and would consul t  with them on question8 which 
might t h r ea t en  the s ecu r i t y  of t h e  weatern hemisphere, In- 
terdependence meana t h a t  a l l  the Pan-American coun t r i e s  have 
the  ob l iga t ion  t o  respec t  each o the r ' s  sovereignty, and a l s o  
t o  r e s t r a i n  themselves from taking u n i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n  which 
might be t o  the  detriment of any of i t s  neighbors, On 
December 28, 1933, during the Seventh Pan-American Confer- 
ence a t  Montevideo, Roosevelt sen t  the following message 
which r e f l e c t s  t he  new United S t a t ea  a t t i t u d e  towards i t s  
r e l a t i on8  with La t in  America. 
The d e f i n i t e  pol io7 of the United S t a t ea  from now 
on is  one oppoeed t o  armed in tervent ion.  The main- 
tenance of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  government i n  o ther  nat ions 
i a  not a saored ob l iga t ion  devolving upon the  United 
S t a t e s  alone. The maintenance of law and order ly  pro- 
ceaa of government i n  t h i a  hemiaphere is the  concern 
of each ind iv idua l  nat ion within i t s  own borders f i r s t  
of a l l .  It i a  only Ff and when the  f a i l u r e  of o rder ly  
process a f f e c t s  the o ther  nations of t h e  cont inent  
t h a t  i t  becomea t h e i r  concern; and t h e  point  t o  s t r e ~ a  
i s  t h a t  i n  auch an event it becomes t h e  j o in t  concern 
of a whole cont inent  i n  which we are a l l  naighbors.l 
During the  f i r s t  four  years of t he  Roosevelt rdmin- 
' ~ u l i a  Johnson, United S t a t e s  Foreign Policy; Isolm- 
t i o n  o r  All ianoe (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1938), 
-- 
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i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  years  i n  which t h e  Good Neighbor p o l i c y  was 
formed, the  United S t a t e s  would unequivocally renounce t h e  
use of u n i l a t e r a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  I n  i t s  p lace ,  agreements 
c a l l i n g  f o r  m u l t i l a t e r a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n  t o  d i s c u s s  j o i n t  a c t i o n  
which might be taken t o  meet t h r e a t 8  were s igned by t h e  
L a t i n  American Nations a t  t h e  Montevideo and Buenos A i r e s  
Conferenoes t o  be d iscussed  l a t e r .  The United S t a t e s  Govern- 
ment would not a c t  a s  a  c o l l e c t o r  f o r  i t s  f i n a n c i e r s  any 
longer ,  un less  it would be done wi th  t h e  agreement of t h e  
o t h e r  L a t i n  Republics. A s  s h a l l  be seen, t h e  United S t a t e s  
would r e f r a i n  from tak ing  a c t i o n  i n  Cuba, would te rminate  
t h e  P l a t t  Amendment, would g ive  up t h e  r i g h t  of i n t e r v e n t i o n  
i n  Panama, and would cooperate  with t h e  League of Nationa 
i n  a e t t l i n g  t h e  Chaco War and var ious  border  h o s t i l i t i e s .  
Non-intervention a l s o  meant having r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  
d o c t r i n e  of a e l f  de terminat ion  of t h e  L a t i n  peoples.  No 
longer  would t h e  United S t a t e s  a t tempt  t o  in f luence  t h e  r e -  
moval of L a t i n  governmanta by r e f u s i n g  them recogn i t ion ,  
Governments t h a t  would prove themselves a t a b l e  and i n  con- 
t r o l  would r e c e i v e  r e c o g n i t i o n  from t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
O f  equa l  importance t o  t h e  development of t h e  Good 
Neighbor p o l i c y  were economic a d  juatments concerning i n t e r -  
hemispheric t rade.  The modifications were necessary s o  t h a t  
t he  La t in  Americans could p a r t i a l l y  co r r ec t  t h e i r  unfavor- 
able  balance of t rade .  By reducing t a r i f f s ,  making b i l a t e r a l  
t rade  agreemente and encouraging such agreements between 
Lat in  countr ies ,  t he  United S t a t e s  hoped t o  improve the  whole 
i n t e rna t iona l  economic situation. '  Improving the  economies 
of La t in  America i n  t h i a  manner, by increas ing  t h e i r  fo re ign  
t r ade ,  was an  important p a r t  of the  pol icy  of convincing the  
Latina t h a t  the United S t a t e s  was a c t u a l l y  concerned about 
them. Later  i n  t h i s  s tudy i t  w i l l  be seen t h a t  Secre ta ry  
H u l l  f e l t  nothing was more important t o  good r e l a t i on8  be- 
tween s t a t e s  than those p o l i c i e s  which allowed the  g r e a t e s t  
amount of t rade  under the  moat equ i tab le  condit ions.  
Another important charac t e r i s  t i c  of the Good Neighbor 
po l icy  waa a  r e spec t fu l  a t t i t u d e  on the  p a r t  of the  United 
Sta tea .  Thia a t t i t u d e  was t o  be manifested i n  respec t  f o r  
the  equal  sovereignty of a nation, respect  f o r  t r e a t y  ob l i -  
gat ions ,  and reapect  f o r  the  people themelvaa .  This l a s t  
item, respec t  f o r  the  people, would be r e f l e c t e d  by t h e  
c u l t u r a l  and s tudent  exchanges. 
The United S t a t ea  uas juat  a s  anxious as ever t o  see 
l n ~ e w  Era i n  Pan American Relations, '  Foreign Af fa i r s ,  
Xv (Apr i l  1937) P 444. 
her  i n t e r e s t 8  i n  La t in  America protected and expanded. How- 
ever the  S t a t e  Department came t o  f e e l  t h a t  peace, a t r u s t -  
f u l  a t t i t u d e ,  and prosper i ty  among the nations of the  western 
hemisphere would r e s u l t  i n  the  l a r g e s t  ove ra l l  b e n e f i t s  f o r  
the United S t a t e s ,  If peace exis ted,  if the volume of t rade  
were high, and i f  f r i c t i o n  could be reduced t o  the  minimum, 
the  United S t a t e s  would be i n  t he  bes t  poss ible  posi t ion.  
This new concept could in one sense be described as  a 
change from the  o ld  u n i l a t e r a l  concept of "In t o  the new 
m u l t i l a t e r a l  concept of "wen. The Lat ins  now began t o  
change t h e i r  previous h o s t i l i t y  and f e a r  i n t o  an a c t i v e  de- 
a i r e  t o  cooperate with each other  a s  well a s  with the  United 
S ta tea .  Thia attempt by Secretary  H u l l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  more 
cooperation between the  La t in  e t a t e s  was an important p a r t  
of the program aince h o s t i l i t i e s  which might break out  be- 
tween La t in  American countr ies  had i n  the  pas t  sometimes l e d  
t o  ac t ion  on the  p a r t  of the  United S ta tes .  Now i t  was 
hoped t h a t  the  unif ied  opinion of the  La t in  Americans would 
be a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h i a  act ion.  This f e e l i n g  developed 
slowly and even today i s  s t i l l  developing, but  i t  has been 
bringing t h e  des i red r e s u l t  nevertheless.  
The Good Neighbor policy, tharef  ore, involves p o l i t l -  
c a l ,  soc i a l ,  and c u l t u r a l  change, It represen ts  both 
p o a i t i r e  ac t ions  on t h e  p a r t  of t he  United S ta tea ,  and a 
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corresponding change i n  a t t i t u d e s  by t h e  L a t i n  American 
count r lea .  
Obviously Corde l l  H u l l ' s  philosophy would have t o  
correspond t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of t h e  Good Neighbor once he 
had been appointed S e c r e t a r y  of S t a t e .  However, I n  a very 
r e a l  aenae, t h e r e  was a l r eady  a c l o s e  c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
h i s  i d e a s  and thoae i d e a s  i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  Good Neighbor 
po l i cy .  Hul l  d i d  not have t o  change h i a  views t o  conform 
t o  t h e  p r e s i d e n t ' s  new pol icy ,  r a t h e r ,  H u l l ' s  views did 
much t o  ahape t h a t  pol icy .  
Hul l  was a Wilsonian i n  his philosophy of i n t e m t l o n a l  
a f f a i r a ,  He  b e l i e v e d  i n  thoae sometimes i d e a l l a t i c  g o a l s  of 
f a i r n e a s ,  l i b e r t y ,  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  cooperat ion.  I n  his  
memoirs he speaks of ". . . t h e  urgent need of a n  awakening 
and r e v i v a l  i n  the  paop le la  minds and h e a r t 8  of t h e  doct r ine8  
. . . of human r i g h t a ,  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y ,  and freedom. . . . 
There had t o  ba a r e v i t a l l z a t i o n  and r e s t o r a t i o n  of h igher  
l e v e l s  of morals,  t r u t h ,  r e s p e c t ,  and t r u s t  among na t ions .  
. . .  This  philosophy was based on H u l l ' s  confidence i n  
popular  opin ion  a s  a means of keeping pace. If t h e  people 
of the  world were content ,  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  
peoples  of o t h e r  na t ion8 were on an equal  b a s i s ,  t h e n  
l ~ o r d e l l  Hull ,  The Memoirs of C o r d e l l  Hul l  (New vork: 
-Maomillan Company, 1948), I,- 
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na t ions  would e x i s t  peaceful ly  a s  s t a t e s .  H u l l  be l ieved i n  
t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of an organizat ion of s t a t e a  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
t h e  f r i e n d l y  d iscuss ion and peaceful  so lving of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
quest ions.  Aa e a r l y  aa 1916 he was p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  d ie-  
cuseiona concerning the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  such a n  
organizat ion.  He s t rong ly  supported Wilson's at tempt t o  g e t  
the  Senate t o  accept  t h e  League of Nations. A s  Secre ta ry  of 
S t a t e ,  H u l l  cooperated with the  League t o  t h e  f u l l e a t  ex ten t  
poss ib le  i n  s e t t l i n g  a border  d ispute  between Columbia and 
Peru i n  1933 and i n  mediating t h e  Chaco War i n  1934, 
Natural ly H u l l ' s  philosophy would oppose imperialism 
and in tervent ion.  These two ac t i ons  a r e  the a n t i t h e s i a  of 
self-determination o r  popular sovereignty because they rep- 
resen t  one power impoaing i t a  w i l l  upon another ,  usua l ly  
with l i t t l e  regard f o r  the  l a t t e r ' s  wishes. H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  
t h i s  would then l ead  t o  f r i c t i o n  on the p a r t  of t h e  people 
and thnrefora  on the  p a r t  of t he  nation. Hence war1 B u t  if 
r e l a t i one  were conducted i n  an a i r  of g r e a t e r  e q u a l i t y  and 
juat ice ,  i l l - f e e l i n g  would not r e s u l t .  
H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  a  primary b a s i s  of t h e s e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s ,  r e l a t i o n s  which would spr ing from the  s a t i s f a a -  
t i o n  of t h e  people and t h e i r  de s i r e  f o r  peace, was aconornic. 
Those p rac t i ce s  which r e s u l t e d  i n  the  h ighes t  l eva1  of 
soonomic a c t i v l t  y both  doma t i o a l l y  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
would promote peace. If populations r a i s e  themselves t o  a  
high l e v e l  of subsistence,  it would be more l i k e l y  t h a t  they 
would want peace. The chief means t o  b r ing  th i s  about was 
t o  be t h e  e l iminat ion of r e s t r i c t i o n s  t o  fo re ign  t rade ,  
name1 y high t a r i f f  a m  
A s  a  Southern Congressman and Senator it would not be 
surpr i s ing  t h a t  H u l l  favored the  t r a d i t i o n a l  low t a r i f f  
policy. B u t  H u l l ' s  de s i r e  went f a r  beyond simple t r a d i t i o n .  
To him, lowering t a r i f f s  was a pos i t ive  ac t ion  toward i m -  
proving in t e rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s .  I n  a  House speech i n  1916 
H u l l  s ta ted:  "It i s  undoubtedly t r u e  t h a t  t r ade  r e l a t i o n s  
w i l l  b r ing  nations c lo se r  together  o r  dr ive  them f u r t h e r  
apar t  than any o ther  ( r e l a t i o n s )  . . . . "1 
Soma count r ies  r e l y  more heavi ly  on fo re ign  t r ade  f o r  
t h e i r  p rosper i ty  than do others ,  but a l l  count r ies  a r e  a f fec -  
t ed  adversely by r e a t r i c t i o n e .  When a  nat ion o r  group of 
nat ions begin engaging i n  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  economic war, f r i c -  
t i o n  developes which br ings  on war. Because of t he  widely 
d lve ra i f l ad  condit ions i n  countr iee ,  t he  g r e a t e s t  m u l t i -  
l a t e r a l  agreement on t a r i f f  which could be reached would be 
the  moat des i red .  I n  the  case of Lat in  America i n  par t i cu-  
l a r ,  the  g rea t  a i m l l a r i t y  of temperate a r eas  and products 
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made m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r ade  a l l  the  more necessary. Further ,  
c e r t a i n  resources and production capac i ty  were s o  l ack ing  
t h a t  the  e n t i r e  a rea  lacked the  condit ions neceesary t o  a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  l e v e l  of prosper i ty .  Conversely, they  tended t o  
s p e c i a l i z e  i n  products which could only be exported, There- 
fo r e ,  f o r e ign  t r ade  was very important t o  them. H u l l  f e l t  
t h a t  many count r ies  were economically i n  a  pos i t i on  of being 
s p e c i a l i s t s .  If a l l  t he  s p e c i a l i a t s  exchanged t h e i r  
a p e c i a l i t l e a  f r e e l y ,  the  g r e a t e s t  l e v e l  of p rosper i ty  could 
be a t t a i n e d  and h o s t i l e  f e e l i n g s  would be diminished, 
H u l l  recognized, on the  o ther  hand, t h a t  h o s t i l i t i e s  
might break ou t .  What then? Action m u s t  be taken t o  s t o p  
the  spread of aggression, bu t  t h i s  ac t i on  should be on a 
j o in t  baaia a f t e r  due conaul ta t lon  a s  t o  which be l l i ge ren t  
l a  t he  aggressor. Following a pol icy  of peace and ju s t i ce  
does not bind a  country t o  paci f ic ism and i n a c t i v i t y .  
+Further spread of h o a t i l i t i a s  and f a i l u r e  t o  meet the  hos- 
t i l i t y  will l ead  t o  enlarged h o s t i l i t i e s  and genera l  war. 
Guiding a  nat ion by these  p r inc ip l e s  i s  a pos i t i ve  
aot ion.  I n  terms of the goala aought, r e f r a i n i n g  from in-  
t e rven t ion  o r  o the r  h o s t i l e  ac t6  i a  a c t u a l l y  a  p o s i t i v e  
ac t ion ,  not negative a s  it might appear. It i a  pos i t i ve  
jue t  aa dlaarmament, mobil izat ion of public  opinion, o r  
the holding of i n t e rna t i ona l  and regional  conferences t o  
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d i s c u s s  mutual concerns i s  pos i t ive .  
I n  summary then, Hull1 s f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s  philosophy 
may be sumned up a s  inc luding  a  d e s i r e  f o r  t h e  es tabl i shment  
of t r u s t  and j u s t i c e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  It was t h e  
a t tempt  t o  do those  th ings  which would c r e a t e  f r i e n d l y  
a t t i t u d e s  based on t h e  p r o s p e r i t y  of the  people,  These were 
p r i m a r i l y  i n  t h e  a r e a  of increased  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r ade ,  b u t  
a l s o  i n  t h e  r ecogn i t ion  of t h e  d o c t r i n e s  of popular  sov- 
e r e i g n t y  and se l f -de terminat ion ,  
The phi losophies  of Corde l l  H u l l  a s  manifested i n  t h e  
Good Neighbor pol icy  become more v i v i d  when c o n t r a s t e d  with 
t h e  United S t a t e s '  r e l a t i o n s  with L a t i n  America i n  t h e  dec- 
a d e ~  be fo re  1933. Before t h a t  year, r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  
United S t a t e s  and t h e  L a t i n  American r e p u b l i c s  were c o o l  and 
a t  t imes t h e  L a t i n  Americans were openly h o s t i l e ,  A f i r s t  
source of complaint was a  gr ievance t h a t  had grown ou t  of 
t h e  Monroe Doctr ine,  It was t h e  charge t h a t  t h e  United 
S t a t e a  pursued a  p a t e r n a l i s t i c  a t t i t u d e  towarda L a t i n  America. 
This  pa terna l i sm had evolved i n t o  t h e  h a t e d  p r a c t i c e  of 
in te rven t ion .  1 
I n t e r v e n t i o n  had taken d i f f e r e n t  forms a t  dFff e r e n t  
t imes.  The most d i r e c t  was n ? i l i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  During 
l n ~ s w  Era i n  Pan Amsrican Re la t ions ,  9. G., p. 443. 
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t h e  decade of t h e  twent ies ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  had marines 
i n  Nicaragua and H a i t i  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  of  
those  c o u n t r i e s .  When i n t e r n a l  d i s o r d e r s  had e rup ted  which 
endangered U. S. i n t e r e s t s  o r  c i t i z e n s ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  
d i d n ' t  h e s i t a t e  t o  qu ick ly  in tervene ,  Often t h i s  m i l i t a r y  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  grew i n t o  economic o r  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
such a s  c o n t r o l l i n g  customs revenue t o  repay investments,  
E l e c t i o n s  and normal processes  of government were overseen 
by t h e  United S t a t e s .  The f a m i l i a r  " d o l l a r  diplomacyn of 
t h e  United S t a t e s  was a l s o  regarded as i n d i r e c t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
because t h e  United S t a t e s  could dominate t h e  economy of a 
count ry  through l o a n s  and investments. 
A second source of complaint was t h a t  t h e  L a t i n  repub- 
l i c e  s u f f e r e d  from an unfavorable balance of trade.' This 
t h e  L a t i n  Americana blamed on t h e  high t a r i f f s  of t h e  United 
S t a t e s ,  t h e  dominant economic p o s i t i o n  of t h e  United S t a t e s  
i n  t h e  hemisphere, end t h e  inf luence  of U. S, corpora t ions  
i n  L a t i n  America. High American t a r i f f s  not only  r e s t r i c t e d  
L a t i n  t r a d e  with t h e  United S t a t e s ,  b u t  a l s o  a c t e d  t o  f o r c e  
European t a r i f f a  up i n  defense. There was t h e  f e e l i n g  t h a t  
t h e  United S t a t e s  companies exp lo i t ed  t h e  L a t i n  Americans 
and prevented na t ive  competi t ion from developing. Legi t imate 
~ M N ~ W  Era i n  Pan American R e l a t i ~ n a , ~  =. G., p. 444. 
o r  not,  these  complaints were powerful movers of La t in  
American public opinion and porred d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  U. S. - 
Lat in  American re la t ions .  
I n  1922, Charles E. Hughes, then Secretary  of S t a t e ,  
s t a t e d  t h a t  t he  United S t a t e s  had no imper i a l i s t i c  sentiment 
and wanted t o  see a prevai l ing s p i r i t  of jus t iae  and coo 
operation. He even went t o  the  extent  of withdrawing marines 
from the  Dominican Republic, B u t  t h i s  was only one a c t  and 
it take0 many aot ions  and attempts a t  reform t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a 
whole new pol icy towarda another country o r  countries.  
Following World War I, the  United S t a t e s  had been 
wi l l ing  t o  give the  Lat in  Americans more ac t ive  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  the structure of the Pan-American Union, However, the  
chairman and most of the  employees continued t o  be U. S. 
c i t i t a n s .  The United S t a t e s  waa wil l ing t o  l e t  the  La t in  
Americans make more demnda and broadcaat t h e i r  grievances 
becauae there  was not much f e a r  from Europe t o  prompt the 
United S t a t e s  t o  adopt a  tough l i n e  i n  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  with 
La t in  ~merica . '  However, the  same basic p a t e r n a l l a t i c  
a t t i t u d e  t h a t  spawned in te rven t ion  and domination continued 
ao t h a t  t he re  uaa nothing t o  prevent the United S t a t e s  from 
taking any ao t ion  it desi red toward La t in  America. 
The La t in  countr ies  themselves had f a i l e d  t o  oonault  
o r  a c t  together  i n  a  m u l t i l a t e r a l  manner during t h e  war and 
a f t e r .  The only exception being the  ABC mediation of the  
U. 5 .  - Mexican dispute i n  1914. The United S t a t e s  was 
equal ly  a s  unwilling t o  consult  o r  cooperate w i t h  the  La t in  
American countr iee a s  these  countr ies  were r e luc t an t  t o  do 
the  same with each other. The only cooperation the  U, 3, 
would recognize was along the  l i n e s  of a Peruvian proposal 
which s ta ted:  ". . . t h a t  the  pol icy  on t h i s  cont inent  
should be one with t he  po l ic iea  of t h e  United S t a t e s .  . . . n l  
T h i s  waa the  admisalon of dominance by the  United S ta tes ,  and 
a l s o  an i n v i t a t i o n  t o  u n i l a t e r a l  ac t ion.  It was aga ins t  
t h i s  u n i l a t e r a l  emphasis I n  hemispheric r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  t he  
Good Neighbor po l icy  was t o  move with i t s  aggreas i re  em- 
phaaia on m u l t i l a t e r a l  e f f o r t ,  
A f e e l i n g  of continentaliam s imi l a r  t o  t he  U. S. 
f ee l ing  of i sola t ionism developed i n  Lat in  America a f t e r  
World War I. Lat in  Americans did  not f e e l  t h a t  they should 
have a r o l e  i n  European o r  Orienta l  a f f a i r s .  I n  t he  mid- 
twenties they began t o  th ink  about cooperation and a b e t t e r  
pos i t ion  with the  United state..* The United S t a t e s  chose 
t o  draw the  l i n e  a t  ac t ive  pa r t i o ipa t ion  i n  such a move. 
h i d  PP. 85-6. 'Ibid., - pp. 92-3. 
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However, it ahould be noted t h a t  t he  i s o l a t i o n i s t  sent iment  
t h a t  ex i s t ed  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  was n o t  he ld  toward L a t i n  
America. One major th ing  t h a t  prevented t h e  L a t i n  Americana 
from g e t t i n g  the  United S t a t e s  t o  agree t o  any mutual secur-  
i t y  arrangements was the  r e a l i z a t i o n  by t h e  l a t t e r  of i t s  
1 
supar io r  pos i t ion .  For example, t h e  U. S, r e j e c t e d  t h e  
Gondra Treaty  of peace which would have e s t a b l i s h e d  tempo- 
r a r y  i nves t iga t ing  committees t o  look i n t o  ques t ions  which 
might d i s t u r b  hemispheric peace Acceptance of  this t r e a t y  
would have forced a depar ture  from t h e  u n i l a t e r a l  po l i cy  
t h e  United S t a t e s  had followed, 
The growing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  of t h e  L a t i n  Americans 
became more obvious a t  the  1928 Havana Conference where the 
United S t a t e s  r e f  uaed t o  denounce i n t e r v e n t i o n  u n e q u i v o c a l l ~  
o r  j o i n  i n  inter-American s e c u r i t y  plans. Such th ings  as 
a r b i t r a t i o n  and i n v e s t i g a t i n g  committees were d i scussed  b u t  
with no a c t i o n  taken, 
During the  arme period, however, t h i s  h o s t i l i t y  was 
somewhat reduced by t h e  r e l e a s e  of t h e  C la rk  Memorandom r e -  
pudia t ing the  Roosevelt Cora l la ry  t o  t h e  Monroe Doctr ine.  A 
new explanation of t h e  Cora l la ry  simply s t a t e d  t h a t  it had 
bean intended a s  a  meana of keeping t h e  Europeans from i n t e r -  
i d . ,  p. 86. 'Ibld Po pp. 99-100. 
vening i n  L a t i n  America, and t h a t  t h e  Americans had no im- 
p e r i a l i a t i c  p lans  based on t h e  pre tense  of p r o t e c t i n g  L a t i n  
America, 
There were c e r t a i n  changes i n  t h e  United S t a t e t a  
a t t i t u d e  towards L a t i n  America under t h e  Hoover Administra- 
t i o n .  Whereas Hoover d i d  not  launch t h e  p o l i c y  of t h e  Good 
Neighbor, his a c t i o n s  d i d  he lp  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  i t s  base,  
Hoover's view on i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  r e f l e c t e d  by t h e  fo l lowing 
statement:  
I can say a t  once t h a t  it never has been and ought 
not t o  be the  p o l i c y  of t h e  United S t a t e s ,  t o  in te rvene  
by f o r c e  t o  secure o r  maintain c o n t r a c t s  between our  
c i t i z e n s  and f o r e i g n  s t a t e s  o r  t h e i r  c i t i z e n s . 1  
These were no t  mere words and under Hoover s t e p s  were 
taken t o  prove t h a t  he was s incere .  R e s t r a i n t  was p r a c t i c e d  
i n  t h e  f a c e  of f i v e  r evo lu t ions  i n  Cen t ra l  America. I n  pre- 
vious years  t h e s e  r evo lu t ions  would probably have r e s u l t e d  
i n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  by t h e  United S t a t e s .  Hoover f u r t h e r  agreed 
t o  place t h e  queat ion  of i n t e r v e n t i o n  on the  1933 Pan- 
American Conference agenda. 
2 
Unf'ortunately f o r  the  development of Hoover'a po l i cy ,  
c e r t a i n  economic a c t i o n s  were taken t h a t  tended t o  mainta in  
t h e  f r i c t i o n  be tusen  L a t i n  America and t h e  United S t a t e s .  
F i r a t  t h e r e  was t h e  Hawley-Smoot t a r i f f .  T h i s  t a r i f f  a c t  
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had r a i s e d  t rade  b a r r i e r s  around the United S t a t e s  with a  
r e s u l t i n g  in ju ry  t o  La t in  America's a b i l i t y  t o  a e l l  goods on 
the  fore ign market. Some of the  increases  were not great ,  
bu t  a  p a r t i a l  i n ju ry  t o  t h e i r  t rade  plus t he  offense t h a t  
Lat in  Americans took t o  the higher t a r i f f ,  served t o  stimu- 
l a t e  h o s t i l i t y  towards t he  United Sta tes .  1 
A t  t h e  same time, the  United S t a t e s  was doing nothing 
of a  pos i t i ve  nature t o  help  the  Lat in  Americans economically. 
There was no fore ign a id  nor any debt moratorium (although 
some de fau l t s  were allowed) .2 Again the f a c t  t h a t  the  debts  
were p r iva t e  and beyond reach of the United S t a t e s  govern- 
ment's con t ro l  d idn ' t  s a t i s f y  the Lat in  Americans a s  a n  ex- 
planation.  
Hoover did des i re  peace and f r iendship ,  but  he was 
simply not successful  i n  winning over t he  La t in  Aamricans. 
One explanation might be t h a t  h is  f ee l ings  were r e f l e c t e d  t o  
t he  La t in  Americans negatively r a the r  than pos i t ive ly .  
Sumner Wellee s t a t e s  I n  an evaluat ion of Sooverls  r o l e  t h a t  
Hoover had good in ten t ions  and s teps  were taken i n  the  r i g h t  
d i r ec t ion ,  but  he f a i l e d  because he had been i n  Hardlug's 
and Coolidge's cabinets  and was t inged with i n t e rven t ion i s t  
b i d  0, PP. 76-70 
21bid -* J pp. 70-2, 125. 
r e l a t i o n a h i p s  growing out of events  of t h e  twent ies ,  
Furthermore, t h e  depreaeion and t h e  Hawley-Smoot T a r i f f  made 
t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t  years  f o r  U. S. - L a t i n  American t r ade .  1 
Eventual ly ,  however, a change i n  p o l i c y  d id  t ake  
p lace  and r e l a t i o n 8  with the  L a t i n  Americans d i d  improve i n  
t h e  1930 t s  with t h e  establ ishment  of t h e  Good Neighbor 
po l i cy  under F rank l in  D. Roosevelt.  It i s  t h e  purpose of 
t h i s  a tudy t o  make c l e a r  t h e  r o l e  of Sec re ta ry  of  S t a t e  
Corde l l  H u l l  i n  t h e  development and execut ion of t h a t  pol icy .  
%e Conde, x. g.. 
CHAPTER I1 
HULL'S ROLE THFlOUGH 1934 
I n  the period between the  e lec t ions  of 1928 and 1932, 
H u l l  began t o  make h i s  p o l i t i c a l  presence f e l t  on the  nation- 
a l  level .  He d i rec ted  h i s  e f f o r t s  primari ly a t  s t ee r ing  the  
par ty  away from the  control  or  A 1  Smith of New York. Hull1a 
memoira ind ica te  t h a t  hia main complaint with t he  Smith- 
dominated par ty  was t h a t  it d idn ' t  ea tab l iah  enough d i f f e r -  
e n t i a t i o n  between the two major pa r t i e s ,  e spec ia l ly  on the  
t a r i f f  The Smith group was committed t o  high 
t a r i f f  po l i c i e s ,  whereas H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  economic r ev iva l  
would come from increasing the  amount of i n t e rna t iona l  
commerce. 
During these  years H u l l  contacted numerous pa r ty  lead- 
e r s  and ta lked with the nat ional  cornitteemen when they were 
i n  Washington. H u l l  a l so  began t o  have more and more conver- 
aationa with Governor Rooaevelt when Rooaevelt was passing 
through Waahington on the  way t o  Warm Springs. H u l l  conatant- 
l y  expressed h i s  a t t i t u d e s  on varioua iaauea t o  Governor 
Roosevelt, p a r t i c u l a r l y  on commerce, Gradually t h e  two men 
found themaelves c lo se r  together  on i s sues  whioh faced t h e  
'cordell  H u l l ,  The Memoirs of Cordel l  H u l l  (New Yorkt 
Maomillan Company, 1 9  1 4 0 - 2 y  
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pa r ty ,  H u l l  began t o  attempt t o  r a i s e  p o t e n t i a l  support  f o r  
Rooaevelt a s  t h e  1932 presidential candidate .  He was i n  an  
advantageous p o s i t i o n  t o  do t h i s  s i n c e  he waa s o  I n f l u e n t i a l  
i n  Congress. Within t h e  framework of t h e  par ty ,  t h e r e  a rose  
oppos i t ion  t o  Smith's  c o n t r o l  and philosophy. . 
The showdown over t h e  p o l i c i e s  of t h e  p a r t y  and con- 
t r o l  of t h e  p a r t y  i n  1932, c a m  i n  March of ,1931. The Smith- 
dominated management of t h e  p a r t y  c a l l e d  f o r  a meeting t o  
t ake  place on March 5 ,  a t  which they  intended t o  e s t a b l i s h  
t h e  f u l l  l i e t  of p a r t y  p o l i c l e a  f o r  t h e  coming year.  Hul l  
opposed th is  f o r  it meant i n c l u s i o n  of a h igh  t a r i f f  p o l i c y  
and a l s o  because he f e l t  t h a t  t h e s e  a c t i o n s  should be those 
of the  Nat ional  Convention i n  1932, 
I n  t h e  weeks be fo re  t h e  meeting, Hull  lasued a nmdber 
of publ ic  s ta tements  a t t a c k i n g  t h e  proposals  of t h e  Smith- 
dominated National Committee. H u l l  s t a t e d  i n  h i s  memoirs 
t h a t  . . I wanted the  Democratic f i g h t  i n  1932 t o  be 
waged on economic i s sues ,  Including low t a r i f f s  and cammer- 
o i a l  pol icy.  . . ."l Up t o  thls poin t ,  Rooasvelt  played no 
Important r o l e ,  B u t  then,  two days before  t h e  meeting, 
Roosevelt c a l l e d  H u l l  and a t a t e d  t h a t  he was sending Jamea 
Far l ey  and two a s s i s t a n t s  t o  a i d  H u l l  i n  his oppos i t ion  t o  
t h e  Smith group. It was then  apparent  t h a t  Roosevelt  was i n  
agreement with H u l l  and i n  oppos i t ion  t o  Smith. 
A t  t h e  meeting a t  the  Mayflower Hotel  on March 5 ,  
Hull met with suppor ters  of Smith and d iscussed  t h e  i s s u e s  
with them. He a l s o  a t r eased  t h e  need f o r  harmony i n  t h e  
p a r t y  while a t  t h e  same time a t t a c k i n g  t h e  previous ly  men- 
t ioned  Smith p o l i c i e s .  A t  t h e  formal meeting H u l l  and 
Far l ey  a a t  together ,  and i n  his t a l k ,  Hull  f u r t h e r  a t t a c k e d  
t h e  Smith p o l i c y  of high t a r i f f . '  The meeting was not  p a r t i -  
c u l a r l y  dramatic however, The d e s i r e  of t h e  Smith-dominated 
National Committee t o  determine the  p a r t y  po l i cy  on t h e  
previous ly  mentioned iasuea  o r  any i s s u e  f a i l e d .  Not only  
d id  the  National Committee f a i l ,  but  t h e  obvioua s p l i t  of 
Roosevelt away from Smith, a s  r e f l e c t e d  by t h e  former ta  
aupport  of Hull ,  weakened the  c o n t r o l  of Smith on t h e  par ty.  
To those l i k e  H u l l  who opposed Smith, t h e  s p l i t  now of fe red  
a r a l l y i n g  po in t ,  F rank l in  Roosevelt. 
O f  t h e  per iod between t h i s  meeting and t h e  Democratic 
Convention of 1932, Hull  s t a t e s  i n  h i s  memoirs: 
Although I had now achieved my g o a l  of be ing  i n  the 
United S t a t e s  Senate,  my r o l e  i n  t h a t  body was l e s s  im- 
p o r t a n t  than  my e f f o r t s  toward s t e e r i n g  t h e  Democratic 
Pa r ty  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  I thought it should fol low i n  
1932.2 
I n  a apeech t o  t h e  Senate on February 5 ,  1932, Hull  
continued h i s  oppos i t ion  t o  t h e  Democratic Pa r ty  fo l lowing 
a h igh  tar i f f  policy: 
There 18 no d i sgu i s ing  the  f a c t  t h a t  powerful in-  
f luences  a r e  a t  work, e i t h e r  t o  commit t h e  Democratic 
Pa r ty  t o  h igh  t a r i f f s  and t r a d e  i s o l a t i o n ,  o r  s o  t o  
chloroform it t h a t  i n  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  it w i l l  be  handi- 
capped i n  i t s  e f f o r t s  t o  f i g h t  f o r  the  economic p o l i c i e s  
i n  which i t s  overwhelming rank and f i l e  be l i eve .  The 
two o l d  p a r t i e s  must not be merged on economic p o l i c i e s .  1 
I n  t h e  same speech H u l l  c a l l e d  f o r  t h r e e  needed r e -  
f o r m .  He c a l l e d  f o r  a world economic congress,  a t a r i f f  law 
whioh would allow t h e  president t h e  power t o  nego t i a t e  t r a d e  
agreements, and f i n a l l y ,  the  lowering of tariffs.2 These 
t h r e e  items, e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  f i r s t  and l a s t ,  were not  cons is -  
t e n t  with t h e  economic nat ional iam of the  New Deal, and y e t  
a l l  would be r e a l i z e d  wi th in  f i v e  years.  T h i s  i n  I t a e l P  
i a  evidence of H u l l l s  in f luence ,  
Severa l  weeks be fo re  the  1932 convention, Rooserel t  
asked H u l l  t o  be t h e  chairman of t h e  p la t fo rm committee a t  
t h e  convention. H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  he oould a c t u a l l y  be more 
e f f e c t i v e  if he were f r e e  t o  work behind t h e  scenea. H u l l  
d i d  become a member of the  committee however. I n  t h e  weeks 
before the  convention, former Attorney General  A. Mi tche l l  
Palmer had come t o  Washington and he and H u l l  prepared a 
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complete d r a f t  of the  platform desi red by the  group support- 
ing Roosevelt. It contained H u l l ' s  i n t e rna t iona l  views. 
Roosevelt approved the  d r a f t  h i m e l f ,  and the convention 
adopted the  d r a f t  platform of H u l l  and Palmer, except f o r  a 
plank which advocated turning over the quest ion of prohibi- 
t i o n  t o  t he  s t a t e s .  The fore ign  a f f a i r 6  plank read l i k e  an  
echo of H u l l ' s  philosophy and a preview of t h e  Good Neighbor 
policy.  It s ta ted:  
We advocate a f i rm fore ign  policy, including peace 
with a l l  the world and the  set t lement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
d i spu tes  by a r b i t r a t i o n ;  no in te r fe rence  i n  the  i n t e r n a l  
a f f a i r s  of o ther  nat ions;  the  s a n c t i t y  of t r e a t i e s  and 
the maintenance of good f a i t h  and of good w i l l  i n  
f i n a n c i a l  obligat ions;  adherence t o  t he  World Court 
with appending reservat ions;  t he  Pact of Par i s  aboliah- 
ing war a s  an instrument of nat ional  policy, t o  be made 
e f f e c t i v e  by proviaions f o r  coneul ta t ion and conference 
i n  case of threatened v io l a t i ons  of t r e a t i 9 s . l  
During the  ba l lo t i ng  f o r  the  candidate,  H u l l  and 
Daniel Roper went t o  William McABoo, chief  of t he  Ca l i fo rn ia  
delegation,  and arranged t o  have t h a t  delegat ion awing i t s  
votea t o  Rooaevelt t o  give the  l a t t e r  the  nomination. 
Although the  platform contained the  plank c a l l i n g  f o r  
lower t a r i f f s ,  during the  campaign Rooaevelt p o l i t i c a l l y  was 
forced t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  a s  r ec ip roc i ty  with some continued 
pro tec t ion  f o r  farmera and c e r t a i n  ~ n d u s t r i e s . ~  T h i s  pre- 
L Samual I. Rosenman, E.E.S., Public Pa e r s  and 
Addresaea (New York: Random House. m 9 ' h , - i j 4 - 2 6 .  
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viewed one of the  problems involved i n  adopting H u l l ' s  
t a r i f f  policy. To a nation'  deep In depression, Hul l la  
t a r i f f  policy which approached f r e e  t rade  would not be 
H u l l '  s preconvention r e l a t i o n s  with Rooaevelt had 
been a matter  of p o l i t i c a l  agreement r a the r  than personal 
fr iendship.  T h i s  continued t o  t yp i fy  t h e i r  r e l a t i on8  and 
H u l l  admits t h a t  he and President Rooaevelt never became 
c lose  personal f r i ends .  B u t  the  two were i n  agreement on 
many bas ic  i ssues ,  and i n  February, 1933, Roosevelt offered 
Hull t h e  head cabinet  posi t ion,  According t o  some, H u l l  was 
a c t u a l l y  the  second choice behind Owen D. Young, but  Young 
was repor ted t o  have begged off ,' If t h i s  was t rue ,  it 
could not be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  differences i n  t he  philosophies 
of Young and H u l l .  Anyone fami l ia r  with the Young Plan f o r  
European recovery would recognize a s i m i l a r i t y  with Hull's 
pol ic iea  of i n t e rna t iona l  economic interdependence. 
When the  job was offered t o  H u l l ,  he was a t  first un- 
decided about taking it. H u l l  feared t h a t  t he  Secre tary  of 
S t a t e  might be a figurehead and do nothing, and ye t  he f e l t  
t h a t  Rooaavelt would be primari ly concerned with domestic 
l n ~ e w  Cabinet, Newsweek, I (March 4, 1933) 9 
p o l i t i c s  and would have l i t t l e  i nc l ina t ion  f o r  d i r ec t ing  
ex te rna l  a f fa i r s . '  Only when he was assured t h a t  he would 
be ac t ive  i n  making fore ign policy did  he give up the  pres- 
t i g e  of t he  Senate f o r  the  S t a t e  Department, He f i n a l l y  
acceptad the job, determined t o  s t a y  out of domestic p o l i t i c s  
and t o  devote a l l  of h i s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  e s t ab l i sh ing  h i s  ph i l -  
osophy a s  the baa i s  f o r  U. S. policy, 
Because of La t in  Amarica, H u l l  was very apprehensive 
about h i s  new job. He was aware of t he  troubled her i t age  of 
United Sta tes-Lat in  r e l a t i ons .  The Pan-American Conference 
had been scheduled t o  meet i n  Montevideo i n  1932, bu t  it had 
been delayed because prospects were so dim. Furthermore, 
H u l l  faced t h e  proapect of reconci l ing and implementing h i s  
p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  shadow of the  n a t i o n a l i s t  economic environ- 
ment of t he  New Deal. Re d id  not allow theas  discouraging 
prospect8 t o  d e t e r  him and on February 21, 1933, Roosevelt 
announced t h a t  H u l l  had accepted the appointment. 2 
On Apr i l  5 ,  H u l l  f i r s t  began his formal contact  with 
La t in  America and a t  the same t h e  repeated his philosophy 
t h a t  a r ev iva l  of i n t e rna t iona l  t rade  was t he  b e s t  insurance 
-- 
l ~ a r o l d  Hlnton, Cordell  H u l l ,  A B io~raphy  (New York: 
Doubleday, 19421, pa 2 0 7  
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f o r  good r e l a t i o n s  among nations, The occaaion was h i e  
acceptance of the chairmanship of the Pan-American Union, 
I have f o r  many years pas t  f e l t  the deepest i n t e r e s t  
i n  the  establishment of c lo se r  c u l t u r a l  and economic 
t i e s  between the  Republics of America, and i n  cementing 
the  bonds of f r i endsh ip  between them. I have alwaye 
bel ieved t h a t  you can measure the p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l  and 
o ther  standards of a people by the  amount of commerce 
they produce . 1 
I n  t h i s  statement H u l l  previews the  f a c t  t h a t  he would em- 
phasize increas ing the  commerce between the  U, S. and La t in  
America. He  would a l s o  take ac t ions  which would r e s u l t  i n  
g r e a t e r  fo re ign  t rade  f o r  the  Lat in  Americans i n  general  a s  
a b a s i s  f o r  improving hemispheric r e l a t i ons ,  
However, t he  Lat in  Americans needed more than words 
t o  be convinced t h a t  the  Good Neighbor pol icy  was r e a l  and 
Hull a t a r t e d  a t  once t o  convert the  worda i n t o  ac t iona,  A 
border diapute had broken out between Columbia and Paru. 
The dispute,  which centered around Peruvians occupying some 
Columbian t e r r i t o r y ,  was typ ioa l  of those h o s t i l i t i e s  t h a t  
con so  e a e i l y  spr ing up i n  La t in  America, The League of 
Nations was concerned i n  the diaputs ,  and out o r  respec t  f o r  
t h e  Monroe Doctrine aaked the United S t a t e s  t o  join with i t s  
adviaory committee i n  handling the  matter.  The U, So agreed 
t o  l a y  as ide  i t a  policy of u n i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n  I n  t he  Western 
Hemisphere by cooperating i n  s e t t l i n g  the  dispute.  The 
event i t se l f  was small, but it did r e f l e c t  a new United States 
approach t o  ac t ions  threatening peace i n  t h a t  t he  U, S. was 
williw t o  cooperate i n  a mu l t i l a t e r a l  approach t o  the  danger. 
O f  g rea te r  importance t o  the betterment of r e l a t i o n s  
with La t in  America, however, was the Pan-American Conference 
t o  be he ld  a t  Montevideo. A s  previously mentioned, it had 
a l r eady  been delayed once, It was now s e t  f o r  December of 
1933. By the  aumner of t h a t  year, a very bad a t t i t u d e  was 
i n  evidence towards the  conf'erence by many i n  La t in  America 
and i n  the  United Sta tes .  I n  White House conferences between 
H u l l  and Roosevelt, the  two agreed t h a t  prospects were dim. 
Due t o  b i t t e r  a t t i t u d e s  of Lat in  Americana towards the  United 
S t a t e s ,  there  seemed l i t t l e  chance f o r  ac~omplishrnent a t  t he  
proposed cosference. However, they both f e l t  t h a t  t h e  
United S t a t e s  ahould not take tb r s apons ib i l i t y  f o r  post- 
poning the  conference. After  due considerat ion,  H u l l  
announced t h a t  the  United S t a t e s  would favor  t h e  December 
meeting i n  Montevideo. If the conference were t o  be post- 
poned again, he f e l t ,  the r e s u l t s  might be even worse than 
a n  unsuccessf u l  oonference. 2 
l ~ u l l ,  9. e., pp. 310-11. 
pp. 318-19. 
The Pan-American Conference was a l l  t he  more important 
conaidering the f a i l u r e  of the  London Economic Conference in 
e a r l y  1933. That conference had f a i l e d  t o  reach agreement 
on the  break down of the  walls of economic nationalism. 
During tha conference Roosevelt had allowed his c lose  ad- 
v i so r s  t o  make radio  broadcasta i n  which they c r i t i c i z e d  
what was being attempted a t  the  London Conference. Roosevelt 
a l s o  declined t o  push Congress f o r  t he  power t o  negotiate 
rec iproca l  t rade agreements a s  H u l l  wished.' The conference 
was f u r t h e r  doomed when Roosevelt allowed Raymond Moley, an  
adviaor,  t o  come t o  London as a l i a s o n  man. Moley then be- 
gan t o  meet o f f i c i a l s  away from the  conference and make car- 
t a i n  f i a c a l  promises t h a t  Roosevelt was forcad t o  r e j e c t ,  
namely temporary currency stabilization, This r e  jec t ion 
coming i n  a conference where countries were very hes i t an t  t o  
abandon the  tendency toward economic nationalism, l i t e r a l l y  
had the  e f f e c t  of k i l l i n g  the conference, 
H u l l  now became convinced t h a t  economic cooperation 
between countr ies  m u s t  grow out of a regional  baas r a t h e r  
than an in te rna t iona l  basem2 He therefore  looked a t  La t in  
America and the  proposed confaronce a t  Montevideo a s  an  
f u l l .  s. G., p. 251. 
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opportunity t o  put his po l ic ies  of i n t e rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  
i n t o  p rac t ice .  
I n  preparat ion f o r  the conference, t h e  S t a t e  Depart- 
ment had in s t ruc t ed  i t s  Latin Ameriaan missions t o  aurvey 
the  f e e l i n g s  i n  Lat in  America t o  determine the  a t t i t u d e  to-  
wards the  U. S. and the reaaona f o r  it. They had reported a 
wide range of a t t i t u d e a .  The two most widespread f e a r s  were 
those concerning in tervent ion and economic domination. 1 
These two items were the  very th ings  t h a t  H u l l  himeelf 
opposed. H i s  philosophy of fo re ign  r e l a t i o n s  would not 
allow these  two items t o  e x i s t ,  and H u l l  was i n  a pos i t i on  
now t o  implement t h a t  philoaophy and thereby i n i t i a t e  a new 
e ra  of f ee l ings  i n  La t in  America. The inves t iga t ion  a l s o  
.. 
repor ted dissatisfaction with the  t a r i f f s ,  c u l t u r a l  conf'licta, * 
.. 
contsmptuoua a t t i t u d e  or the United S ta tea ,  and some ill * '. 
B 
.. 
f e e l i n g  and d i a t r u a t  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  propaganda from the  4 < 
European press. 
With t h i a  background i n  mind it i s  no wonder t h a t  
Hull la  f r i ends  advised him againat  going t o  the  conference. 
B u t  H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  i f  the  United S t a t e s  wanted in t e rna t iona l  
cooperation, it should s t a r t  now. The countr ies  of the  world, 
including the  United S t a t e s ,  were moving more and more toward 
(New York: 
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economic nationalism. 1 
I n  hope of assur ing maximum p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  the  con- 
ference by a l l  La t in  Republics, and i n  order  t o  show the  Im- 
portance with which the United S t a t e s  viewed t h e  conference, 
H u l l  decided t o  l ead  the U, S. delegation personally,  This 
had never been done by a Secretary of S t a t e  before I n  a con- 
ferenoe with the  Lat in  Americans. Roosevelt allowed H u l l  t o  
pick the  delegat ion t h a t  Hull would lead  t o  Montevideo i n  an  
e f f o r t  t o  insure  H u l l t s  control  over t h a t  delegation.2 An 
outstanding delegation was chosen, including: Ass i s tan t  
Secre tary  Sumner Welles ; J, Ruben Clark, f o m e r  ambassador 
t o  Mexico; J. But le r  Wright, the  min is te r  t o  Uruguay; 
Ambasaador t o  Argentina, Alexander Weddell; and S p r u l l l e  
Braden of New York, a businessman with La t in  American exper- 
i e n ~ e . ~  The very q u a l i t y  and capab i l i t y  of the  delegation 
revealed t o  the Latin Americana the importance t h a t  the  
United S ta te8  a t tached t o  the  Montevideo meeting. A s  a re-  
a u l t ,  most of the  o ther  delegations were a l s o  l e d  by chief  
min is te r s  of fo re ign  a f f a i r s ,  
The Pan-American Conference was t o  be held i n  the  
l ~ u l l ,  zm Gm, pp. 316-7. 
2 ~ b i d . ,  p. 318. 
3 ~ i n t o n ,  x. a*, p. 244. 
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shadow of Roosevel t l s  uncertain a t t i t u d e  towards in te rna t iona l  
quest ions.  I n  a  statement made i n  the  spr ing of 1933 a t  a 
White House meeting of representa t ives  from various nat ions  
d iscuss ing i n t e rna t i ona l  questions, he had indicated  t h a t  
t he  United S t a t e s  would be wi l l ing  t o  abandon economic 
nationalism.' However, a t  o ther  times his ac t i ons  i n  allow- 
ing c e r t a i n  New Deal advisors  freedom i n  c r i t i c i z i n g  t h e  
reduction of t r ade  b a r r i e r s  brought doubts. Before i t s  de- 
pa r tu re  f o r  Montevideo, Roosevelt ins tpucted the  delegat ion 
t o  break down the b a r r i e r s  t h a t  prevented good i n t e r -  
American r e l a t i o n s  .2 B u t  when the  t i m e  of departure for 
Montevideo came, the White House re leased a  statement by 
Rooaevelt i n  which he s a i d  t h a t  unstable i n t e rna t i ona l  con- 
d i t i ona  made it des i rab le  f o r  the  United S t a t e s  t o  forego 
any diacuasion of matters  per ta in ing t o  currency s t a b i l i z a -  
t i o n  o r  t r ade  ba r r i e r s .  3 
T h i s  uncer ta in  a t t i t u d e  of Rooaeveltls seemed t o  
a f f e c t  H u l l  Ia po l i c i e s ,  He was s t i l l  determined t o  apply 
thoaa convict ions which he had always held  concerning i n t e r -  
l n ~ x p o n e n t  of Economic In ternat ional ism,n Newsweek, 
I (May 20, 1933) 5 4. 
'~dward 0. Guerrant, Rooaevelt' a  Good Nei hbor Po l ic  J F-F-T (Albuauerque, New Mexico: un ive r s i t y  - of=  ex co r e s s ,  
na t iona l  economics and peace. H u l l  re leased t h e  following 
statement won the  departure of the  delegation,  
A more s u b s t a n t i a l  s t e p  forward i n  Pan American 
uni ty  can and, I bel ieve,  w i l l  be taken at the  Montevideo 
Conference than a t  a l l  others  within two decades, I am 
speaking of t he  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of mutual economic nation- 
a l  and in t e rna t iona l  planning. While se r ious  impediments 
do e x i s t ,  t h  need and opportunity a r e  f a r  g r e a t e r  than 
ever before, ? 
The con t r a s t  between Rooseveltta pessimism and H u l l ' s  de te r -  
mination i s  c lea r .  H u l l  was r i g i d  i n  h i s  philosophy, and 
intended t o  make every attempt t o  implement t h i s  philosophy 
regardless  of the outlook. 
Also of g rea t  concern t o  H u l l  was a t h r e a t  t o  the  
peace of the hemisphere and the world. This t h r e a t  was t he  
Chaco War raging between Paraguay and Bolivia over a t e r r i -  
t o r i a l  diaputee2 There were f i r e  separa te  peqce pacts  c i r -  
cu l a t i ng  I n  La t in  America, some signed by most but  none by 
a l l .  Argentina was the chief  rese rva t lon ia t .  The moat h- 
por tent  of these  pacts  were the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the  
Llmaa Anti-war Pact. H u l l  wished f o r  a l l  t o  be r a t i f i e d .  
The f a c t  t h a t  Bolivia and Paraguay had signed none of the  
pacts  was l ikewise of concern t o  H u l l .  3 
'united S t a t e s  Department of S t a t e ,  Peace & War - 
United S t a t e s  Forei  n Polic  , 1931- 1 (wash-n? Govern-  % mnnt p r = ; i i d  pp. 25- . 
35 
On the sh ip  t o  Montevideo, H u l l  informed the  delega- 
t i o n  t h a t  he planned t o  v i s i t  other  delegations upon a r r i v a l  
i n  Montevideo, before they might v i s i t  t h a t  of the  United 
S t a t e s .  Most of the delegation disagreed, f e e l i n g  t h a t  t he  
United S t a t e s  should simply receive v i s i t o r s .  B u t  R u l l  f e l t  
t h i s  o ld  idea should be changed i f  the  United S t a t e s  was t o  
implement the  new pol icy  of friendship.'  H u l l  met of t e n  and 
informally with t he  other  delegations which were on t h e  sh ip  
en  route  t o  Uruguay. 
Roosevelt wired H u l l  several  times while R u l l  was en 
rou te  and these messages seamed t o  i n s t r u c t  R u l l  t o  avoid 
any agreements or  t r e a t i e s  t h a t  would endanger any of t h e  
provisions of t he  Nation Indus t r i a l  Recovery Act o r  the  Agri- 
c u l t u r a l  Adjus tmnt  Act. Instead,  the president  suggested 
t h a t  attempt8 be mads t o  make a s e r i e s  of b i l a t e r a l  t rade  
t r e a t i e s  s ince conditions were so unstableO2 This i n  e f f e c t  
would put  the same l imi t a t i ons  on t h i s  conference a s  on the  
London Economic Conference. H u l l  feared t h i s  program simply 
because he knew he would have l i t t l e  success taking a l a r g e  
number of t rade  t r e a t l e a  before the Senate. Instead,  H u l l  
informed President  Roosevelt t h a t  h i s  suggestiona would make 
' ~ u b e r t  Herring, A Ristor  of La t in  America (second 
ed i t i on ;  New York: A l t r ~ d d p f ,  ' m , n .  
2 ~ u l l ,  s. c i t  9 p. 321. 
the  economic pol icy  too narrow, and t h a t  it would be much 
wiser t o  keep a l i v e  the  broad proposals t h a t  he had always 
favored. He defended the l a t t e r  on the grounds t h a t  the  
United S ta tea  m u s t  c e r t a i n l y  intend t o  r een te r  world t rade  
a t  some time and 80 the  delegation should continue towards 
t h i s  long range goal. 1 
Roosevelt rep l ied  t h a t  he agreed with H u l l ' s  long term 
goals  and encouraged him t o  go ahead with them, B u t  he again 
mentioned t h a t  provision8 f o r  temporarily guarding the  pro- 
v i s ions  of the NRA and the  AAA would be necessary. To H u l l  
t h i s  was l i b e r t y  enough t o  pursue the goals he had i n i t i a l l y  
eatablished.  
Hull f e l t  t h a t  domestic recovery depended on in ter -  
nat ional  recovery. The problem was t h a t  t he  United S ta tes ,  
including Rooaevelt, was a t  the time more in t e r e s t ed  i n  
nat ional  a f f a i r s  than in te rna t iona l ,  and many of H u l l ' s  
colleagues were isolationists, 2 
There l a  f u r t h e r  evidence t o  support t h e  claim t h a t  
H u l l  intended t o  use the Good Neighbor policy a s  a n  example 
f o r  the r e s t  of the  world. He s t a t e d  i n  h i s  memoira: 
 orma man A.  Graebner (ed. ) , An Uncertai 
I n  ca r ry ing  out our po l ic ies  toward Lat in  America, it 
was never my wish t o  make them exclusively Pan American. 
I always had the  hope t h a t  what was accomplished i n  t he  
New World could be achieved i n  the  Old a s  wel1.l 
However, H u l l  f e l t  t ha t  no success would be r ea l i zed  
a t  Montevideo i f  there  was any ac t ion  taken t o  make t he  re -  
so lu t ions  t h a t  t he  conference might adopt apply on a world 
wide bas i s e2  There was strong League sentiment a t  t he  con- 
ference  with s ix t een  pa r t i c ipan t s  being League members. The 
Chairman of t he  conference, a  Uruguayan, favored making the  
conference a regional  meeting of the  League. The U. S. 
opposed t h i s  bu t  not openly.3 This corresponded t o  H u l l ' s  
d e s i r e  t o  avoid any open sign o r  attempt on the  p a r t  of the  
United S t a t e s  t o  exer t  pressure on the  La t in  Americans. He 
worked t o  t h i a  end behind the scenes by convincing President  
Gabriel Terra of Uruguay of the  advantages of Pan-American 
settlement of I t s  own problem, and by showing the  ineffec-  
t i v e  record of t h e  League. 4 
When the  United S t a t e s  delegation a r r ived  a t  Monte- 
video, i t  was greeted by a  hos t i l e  press,  auspicious and 
anti-0.  S, headlines,  and s t o r i e s  suggesting t h a t  the  United 
S t a t e s  had a e l f i s h  purposes and was a b i g  bul ly .  They were 
l ~ u l l ,  - -  loc .  c i t e  
3 n i d .  -
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saying i n  e f f e c t ,  "we have heard of the Good Neighbor policy, 
and it sounds f i n e ,  but we have heard s imi l a r  t a l k  before." 1 
H u l l  c a l l e d  on all delegations f i r a t  before they could 
begin c a l l i n g  on the  U. S. delegation. The delegations were 
surpr ised.  They saw t h a t  H u l l  was not a s  amug and pon t i f i -  
c a l  a s  Charles Hughes had beenO2 H u l l  would t e l l  a delega- 
t i o n  t h a t  it was a s  much h i s  duty t o  c a l l  upon them a s  i t  
was f o r  them t o  c a l l  upon him, and t h a t  t he  people of t h e  
United S t a t e s  f e l t  t h a t  way too. H u l l  would then confer  f o r  
t h i r t y  o r  f o r t y  minutes. He attempted t o  assure  them t h a t  
t h e  U, S, only wanted t o  cooperate f u l l y  with a l l  La t in  
American countr ies  i n  promoting the p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
idea l a  I n  which they were a l l  equally and mutually i n t e r -  
H u l l  wanted t o  convince other  delegations t h a t  the 
New Deal meant a new Pan-Amerlcan policy, 
H u l l  planned t o  atny i n  t he  background where he would 
be f r e e  t o  function i n  much the  same manner a s  he had i n  h i s  
yeara i n  Congress. There he had learned the  use of the  
ncloakroom, " and behind the  scenes negotiat ions a s  a means 
of accomplishing des i red  object ives.  He had no in t en t ion  of 
L 
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dominating the  conference. H u l l  wished t o  r e f l e c t  the  a t t i -  
tude t h a t  the  United Sta tea  was just  one of a  twenty-one- 
member club, even though he rea l ized  t h a t  the  United S t a t e s  
was i n  a  super ior  posi t ion,  1 
Before the United S t a t e s  delegation had l e f t  Washing- 
ton, the  Argentine Ambassador had ca l l ed  on Secre tary  H u l l  
t o  advise h i m  t h a t  it would be absolute ly  necessary t o  have 
the  support of the  leader  of the  Argentine delegation,  
Saavedra Lamas. H u l l  was well aware of t he  f a c t  t h a t  the  
conference would not be a success without Argentinare support. 
That country was the t r a d i t i o n a l  South American leader .  It 
had always a l igned agains t  the United states. '  To win Lamas 
aimply meant t o  support the  l a t t e r r a  Anti-war Pact. H u l l  
f e l t  no need of a f i g h t  because he agreed with everything i n  
the pact.  Alao, Argentina and the United S t a t e s  now agreed 
on qusst iona of intervention,  economice, peace, and a n t i -  
European philoaophy.3 Since they were i n  agreement on 
cur ren t  questions, it simply became important t o  diminish 
the  h o s t i l e  f ee l ing  t h a t  had ex i s ted  previously. 
As soon ae Argentina's delegation arrived, H u l l  ad- 
vised an a i d  t o  c a l l  the ho te l  and inform the  Argentine 
L H u l l ,  z. c&., pp. 326-7. 
delegat ion t h a t  H u l l  was on hia way over. Re found the  
Argentine delegation very excited by h i s  sudden and surpr i s -  
ing v i s i t .  R u l l  and Lamas met a t  once and began conversations. 
R u l l  d idn ' t  come t o  the  point  a t  f irst ,  but  t a lked  i n  gener- 
a l i t i e s ,  assur ing Lamas t h a t  the  United S t a t e s  wanted t o  
implement the  Good Neighbor policy and explaining t o  him 
what the  new policy meant. 
Lamas remained very courteous but  aloof and even some- 
what akept ica l .  He acted very nervous during a l l  the  conver- 
s a t i on ,  H u l l  attempted t o  put him more a t  ease and win his 
a t t e n t i o n  by approaching him i n  a  very complimentary manner. 
Re s t a t e d  t h a t  Lamas was recognized a s  t he  g rea t e s t  Lat in  
diplomat and defender of peace. H u l l  asked his council  and 
help  i n  leading the conference i n  the  r i g h t  d i rec t ion ,  1 
H u l l  suggeated t o  Lama t h a t  two broad propoaala be 
brought before the  conference. The f i r s t  was a program f o r  
economic recovery including the  p r inc ip les  which have been 
previously mentioned. The second was t o  bu i ld  peace by en- 
couraging the  aigning of a l l  peace proposals. H u l l  suggested 
t h a t  Lamas should introduce a peace proposal a s  the  g rea t  
defender of peace, and H u l l  would introduce the  economic 
r e s o l u t ~ o n . ~  H u l l  described how Lamas could d e l i v e r  a r ing-  
ing  speech, and begin a  r e a l  peace revival .  H u l l  went f u r -  
t h e r  t o  say t h a t  Lamas was the  l og i ca l  man as  author of t he  
Anti-way Pact which the  United S t a t e s  planned t o  sign.' He 
completed h i s  v i s i t  by saying: 
M r .  Minister ,  we want t h i s  program t o  be achieved. 
We want t o  support it and we w i l l  support it. We want 
t he  bes t  man down here t o  put it forward s o  t h a t  we 
can give i t  our aupport. Now M r .  Minister,  i f  you 
don ' t  do it, we a r e  going t o  ge t  the  next bes t  man t o  
do i t . 2  
Lamas informed H u l l  t h a t  he would advise him within twenty 
four hour8 . 
Lamas returned Hullla c a l l  the  next day, corning t o  
the  Parque Hotel where the United S t a t e s  delegation waa s tay-  
ing, Re amounted t o  9 u l l  that he would agree t o  o f f e r  t h e  
peace resolution and aupport Hul l la  economic resolut ion.  
H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  Lamas was extremely co rd i a l  and cooperative 
on a l l  matters  from this time on. Later  H u l l  would help  
Lamaa win the Nobel Peace Prize f o r  Lams1 act ion.  3 
These preliminary meetings resu l ted  i n  t he  necessary 
atop of uni t ing the  Argentinians with the  r e s t  of the coun- 
t r i e s  a t  the  conference t o  accomplish some work. From the  
Montevideo Conference on, t he  United S t a t e s  was wi l l ing  t o  
' ~ u l l ,  - -  loc. c i t ,  
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work with Argentina a s  a coequal i n  La t in  American diplomacy. 1 
When the conference f i n a l l y  opened, the tensions of 
the  delegates  had been relaxed and there  was l e a s  animosfty 
i n  the  a i r  than there  had been a few days e a r l f e r m 2  I n  keep- 
i ng  with the  policy H u l l  wished t o  follow a t  the  conference, 
none of t h e  United Sta tea  delegates sought any committee 
chairmanships. They wanted t o  avoid pushing t h e  country o r  
themaelves forward. H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  the  conference would be 
wrecked if nationa t r i e d  t o  obta in  narrow o r  s e l f i s h  goals.  
The United S t a t e s '  ro le  became very inc onspicuous, leaving 
the  l eadersh ip  t o  Argentina, 3 
One f i n a l  matter of g rea t  concern which had t o  be 
a e t t l e d  before the conference could claim grea t  success was 
t he  Chaco War. A t  the time, a League of Nations invea t i -  
ga t ing  team was i n  Uruguay attempting, unsuccessfully, t o  
work ou t  an armietlce. H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  t he  conference should 
work ou t  a settlement r a the r  than the  League. This would be 
an  example of regional  s o l i d a r i t y  t o  the  r e s t  of the  worl0. 
H u l l  explained t h a t  the League had f a i l e d  t o  keep the  
peace and t h a t  the  world was watching Montevideo t o  see i f  
they would win o r  f a i l O 4  The war was p r a c t i c a l l y  going on 
within hear i% diatance. 
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The p res iden t  of Uruguay, t h e  conference hos t ,  was 
t h e  key t o  success .  Pres ident  Terra was much i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
t h e  success  of t h e  conference. He f e l t  t h a t  what H u l l  would 
do would a f f e c t  i t s  success,  and he agreed with H u l l  i n  t h e  
hope t h a t  t h e  conference would g e t  t o  work and so lve  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  problems, A s  previous ly  mentioned, Uruguay was 
very  pro-League. Through a number of p r i v a t e  informal  meet- 
ing,  H u l l  was ab le  t o  ga in  T e r r a t s  cooperat ion i n  working 
f o r  a Pan-American se t t lement  of the  problem.1 Terra  con- 
t i n u e d  t o  g ive  f u l l  support  t o  H u l l ' s  propositions through- 
out  t h e  conference.  The two men met p r i v a t e l y  q u i t e  of ten.  
Both Bol iv ia  and Paraguay a c t e d  b e l l i g e r e n t l y  towards 
t h e  o t h e r  a t  t h e  pre-conference meetinga and i n  e f f e c t  s a i d  
t o  the  conference t h a t  each would wreck it if t h e  conference 
d i d  not  aupport  i t s  pos i t ion .  H u l l ' s  answer t o  this was t o  
suggeat  using a tough l i n e  by t e l l i n g  t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  t o  
aubmit t h e  war t o  a conmiasion (no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  League) 
o r  t o  be thrown out  of the  conference. 2 
Negotiatione f o r  a n  a r m i s t i c e  weye success fu l .  The 
two c o u n t r i e s  agreed t o  a cease f i r e  s h o r t l y  before  Chr i s t -  
mas. Although the  war broke out aga in  i n  a s h o r t  time, t h e  
armia t ioe  had the  e f f e c t  of reducing t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  d e s i r e  
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t o  s u s t a i n  a  t o t a l  war any f u r t h e r .  9 u l l f s  r o l e  i n  t h e  
a c t u a l  a r m i s t i c e  i s  clouded because of a n  unaccountable 
p e r i o d  of a  few hours  j u s t  b e f o r e  t h e  a r m i s t i c e  was ag reed  
on. During this  pe r iod  Ru l l  was miss ing  from t h e  h o t e l  and 
no one knew where he had gone. L a t e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  by  h i s  
p r e s s  o f f i c e r  shows t h a t  he had been  with T e r r a  and a  few 
o t h e r  f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r e ,  and t h a t  H u l l  h imself  had d r a f t e d  
t h e  t e l eg rams  which brought t h e  armist ice. '  The u i l l i n g n e s s  
of t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  t o  coopera te  i n  t h i s  m u l t i l a t e r a l  
a c t i o n  t o  so lve  a  mutual problem was unprecedented,  
During t h e  f i rs t  p l e n a r y  meeting, t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  
was denounced over  and ove r  a g a i n  f o r  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Even 
Lamas gave a b r i e f  speech. B u t  h i s  speech was not  t o o  
s t r o n g l y  worded, and when he f i n i s h e d  he came t o  Hull and 
apo log ized  t h a t  he had t o  s ay  something. Hul l  unders tood,  
T u l l f s  e v e n t u a l  answer t o  t hese  a t t a c k s  would be  t h e  s i g n i n g  
of t h e  non- in te rven t ion  convent ion at t h e  c l o s e  of t h e  con- 
f e r e n c e .  
Lamas proposed h i s  peace p a c t  which he and Hu l l  had 
worked ou t .  Hu l l  seconded t h e  p roposa l  and gave a  long 
speech  on t h e  n e c e s s i t y  of peace, and encouraged the s i g n i n g  
of t h e  p r e v i o u s l y  mentioned peace t r e a t i e a .  R u l l  t hen  i n t r o -  
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duced h i s  economic r e s a l u t i o n ,  The de lega tes  were s t a r t l e d  
a t  i t s  sweeping proposals of t a r i f f  reform and economic co- 
opera t ion .  Lamas then  proceeded t o  g ive  a glowing speech i n  
seconding H u l l ' s  proposals.  1 
The next day, Pres ident  Rocsevelt s a i d  i n  a  news con- 
f e rence  t h a t  the  economic r e s o l u t i o n  was an ob jec t ive ,  and 
if not soon p o s s i b l e  t o  accomplish, perhaps a t  l e a s t  b i l a t e r a l  
t r e a t i e s  could be arranged. Re doubted t h e  success  of a r r i v -  
ing  a t  a  genera l  t r a d e  t r e a t y .  This d i d  not seem t o  dampen 
t h e  s p i r i t s  a t  Montevideo a s  a  s i m i l a r  s ta tement  by Rocsevel t  
had done a t  t h e  London Economic Conference. Roosevelt  wired 
Rul l  t o  adv i se  h i m  t o  o f f e r  money t o  L a t i n  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  the 
purpose of b u i l d i n g  a i r p o r t s .  B u t  H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  no o f f e r  
of money was favorable  because the  La t in  a t t i t u d e  was s o  
suapicioua t h a t  they would look with susp ic ion  on any loans  
o r  advance a s  " d o l l a r  diplomacy. "2 
R u l l  cont inued t o  pursue the  same course d e s p i t e  
Rooaevs l t ta  expressed pessimism. To f u r t h e r  s a t i s f y  t h e  
pro-European b loc ,  H u l l  included i n  h i s  r e s o l u t i o n  a pro- 
poaal  c a l l i n g  on the  American Republics t o  lower t h e i r  t r a d e  
b a r r i e r a  and t o  i n v i t e  the  o the r  na t ions  of the  world t o  do 
l i k e u i ~ s . ~  H u l l  pressed f o r  lowering t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  and 
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reducing t a r i f f s  i n  accordance with a moderate t r ade  policy. 
He proposed the  f ami l i a r  philosophy t h a t  recovery depended 
on the r e s t o r a t i o n  of in te rna t iona l  t rade .  He s ta ted:  
. . . t h a t  the governments of the American Republics 
should promptly undertake t o  promote t rade  among t h e i r  
respec t ive  people and other  nations, and reduce b a r r i e r 8  
through the negotiat ion of comprehensive b i l a t e r a l  
r e c i p r o c i t y  t r e a t i e s  based on mutual concessions.l 
H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  a l l  formal positions taken by the  con- 
ference m u s t  show a unanimous f r o n t  t o  the world. Issues  
which might des t roy unanimity m u s t  be reconciled i n  t he  
background t o  avoid an anti-United S t a t e s  outburst  on the 
f l o o r  of the conference. 
Issues  d id  a r i s e  such a s  those H u l l  feared. The 
delegat ion from Mexico brought up the  quest ion of debts  t o  
buaineaa concerns i n  t he  United States.  The head of the  
delegat ion proposed a aeven t o  t en  year moratorium on debts  
a t  a th ree  per cent  r a t e .  The problem, a s  H u l l  explained, 
waa t h a t  the debts  were not t o  the  U, S. government but t o  
p r iva t e  c r e d i t o r s .  Lamas auggeated t h a t  t h i s  quest ion be 
postponed because of the  nature of the  debts  and lack of 
t h e  t o  give t o  the  The Haitiana a l s o  complained 
t o  the conference t h a t  they d id  not have con t ro l  of t h e i r  
l ~ p o l i c y  Se t  Forth by F. DO Re." s m  Y PO 34. 
2 ~ u l l ,  SD G. 9 PPe 335-6 l 
47 
f i s c a l  a f f a i r e .  Hull agreed t o  work out a plan t o  r e s t o r e  
i t s  f i s c a l  con t ro l .  
H u l l  d id  take strong stands when he f e l t  t h a t  the  
United S t a t e s  was being unjus t ly  accused. He would fu r ious ly  
a t t a c k  accusat ions agains t  the motives and in t en t ions  of t he  
United Sta tea .  An example was when it was s a i d  i n  a confer- 
ence t h a t  Roosevelt was j u s t  a debt co l l ec to r  f o r  i n t e r -  
nat ional  bankers; A u l l  b las ted  t h i s  a s  untrue.' He appeared 
before  sub-committees on in tervent ion and defined the  United 
S t a t e s '  pos i t ion  a s  being opposed t o  intervention.  He f u r -  
t h e r  declared from the  f l o o r  of the  conference t h a t  the  
United S t a t e s  would not intervene. After  t h i s  speech, dele-  
ga t e s  reported t o  t h e i r  governments t h a t  perhaps t he  United 
S t a t e s  d id  mean i t s  promises.2 One delegate from Columbia 
aa id  t h a t  H u l l  had erased '. . . a l l  t he  causes of complaint, 
of d l a t r eae  and suspicion which the imper i a l i s t i c  pol icy  of 
America had managed t o  awaken . . during the  l a s t  century, n3 
A s  the  Montevideo Conference came t o  a conclusion, 
the  conference, with the U, S. concurring, declared: abso- 
l u t e  respect  f o r  the  sovereignty and common democracy of the  
American natione; agreement t h a t  every a c t  d i s tu rb ing  t h e  
peace of any American na t ion  a f f e c t s  a l l  of America, and 
j u s t i f  i e s  the  i n i t i a t i o n  of consul ta t ion;  t h a t  t e r r i t o r i a l  
a c q u i s i t i o n s  through violence w i l l  not be recognized; t h a t  
a l l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  be condemned; t h a t  f o r c i b l e  c o l l e c t i o n  of 
d e b t s  i s  i l l e g a l ;  and t h a t  arguments a r e  t o  be s e t t l e d  by 
c o n c i l i a t i o n  o r  f u l l  a r b i t r a t i o n ,  1 
The United S t a t e s 1  s igna tu re  of t h e  neonvention on 
t h e  Rights  and Dut ies  of S t a t e s n  could have been n u l l i f i e d  
by H u l l ' s  r e s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  the  United S t a t e s  would fo l low 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law.2 This  simply meant t h a t  H u l l  was r e se rv -  
ing  t h e  r i g h t  t o  intervene t o  p r o t e c t  American l i v e s  and 
property.  This d i d n ' t  a c t u a l l y  mean a  g r e a t  dea l ,  because 
f u r t h e r  events  were t o  show t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  d i d  not  
i n t e n d  t o  in te rvene  i n  any manner. I n  1936, a t  t h e  Buenoa 
Al res  Peace Conference, th i s  f i n a l  t e c h n i c a l i t y  would b e  
Ironed ou t ,  
I n  r e p o r t i n g  from the  Montevideo Conference, one Amer- 
i c a n  j o u r n a l i a t  a c c u r a t e l y  descr ibed what had taken p lace  i n  
L a t i n  American r e l a t i o n s ,  
S e c r e t a r y  H u l l ' s  obvious s i n c e r i t y  and s i m p l i c i t y ,  
h i s  genuine kindness . . . have had t h e i r  e f f e c t  i n  
l n ~ e w  Era i n  Pan American  relation^,^ Foreign A f f a i r s ,  
xv ( A p r i l  1937 1, 443-54 
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Montevideo. . There was a l o t  of evidence a t  t h e  
o u t s e t  t h a t  a l o t  of dynamite was l y i n g  around l o o s e  
which would be exploded a g a i n s t  t h e  u n i t e d  S t a t e s  i f  
it  t r i e d  any domineering and Lord of C r e a t i o n  t a c t i c s  
of t h e  p a s t .  No one could  p o s s i b l y  accuse  ?lr. Hul l  
of any th ing  of  t h e  kind.1 
The f i r s t  c r i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  had 
t o  f a c e  concerning t h e  new L a t i n  po l i cy  involved  Cuba. The 
Cuban q u e s t i o n  involved  a number of t h e  very  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of p rev ious  Uni ted S t a t e s  p o l i c y  towards L a t i n  America tha t  
had caused  f r i c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  L a t i n  Americans. These were 
I n t e r v e n t i o n ,  non-recognit ion,  and t h e  high t r a d e  r e s t r i c -  
t i o n s .  The p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  P l a t t  Amendment which was c r e -  
a t e d  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  Spanish-American War, had g lven  t h e  G. S. 
t h e  r i g h t  t o  i n t e r v e n e  i n  Cuban affa i rs  t o  keep t h e  govern- 
ment f r e e  from e x t e r n a l  c o n t r o l ,  and t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  l i v e s ,  
p rope r ty ,  and l i b e r t y  of t h e  people i f  t h e  Cuban government 
proved I t s e l f  unable t o  do so. 
When Hul l  became S e c r e t a r y  o r  S t a t e ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
Cuba was c h a o t i c .  Ria r e c e n t  p redecessors  had fo l lowed a 
non- In t e rven t ion  p o l i c y ,  b u t  t he  tu rbu lence  was growing o u t  
of p r o p o r t i o n  by 1933. This cond i t ion  was caused by  what 
could  b e a t  be c a l l e d  c i v i l  o r  g u e r i l l a  warfare  between t h e  
p r e s i d e n t ,  General  Machado, and groups t h a t  were t r y i n g  t o  
remove him from o f f i c e .  The complaint  of t h e s e  l a t t e r  groups 
l r l ~ o l i c y  S e t  F o r t h  by F. Dm R.9" &* 
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was t h a t  General  Machado was becoming a d i c t a t o r  and n o t  
l ook ing  a f t e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  people  of ~ u b a . '  The 
f a i l u r e  t o  a c t  on t h e  t e r r i b l e  s i t u a t i o n  b e f o r e  Hul l  took  
o f f i c e  seemed t o  a c t u a l l y  i nc rease  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  t o  i n t e r -  
vene. The P l a t t  Amend-ment had been in t ended  a s  a means t o  
f o s t e r  democrat ic  government and s t a b i l i t y  i n  Cuba, b u t  t h i s  
had no t  occurred.  In s t ead ,  t hose  g o a l s  were v e r y  remote. 
H u l l  d i d  n o t  p l a n  t o  i n t e r v e n e  i n  Cuba. He and 
Rooseve l t  ag reed  t o  send t h e  man t h a t  t h e y  b o t h  ag reed  was 
t h e  most capab le  man t o  handle t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  Cuba, Sumner 
  el lea.' He f e l t  t h a t  it would be much mope b e n e f i c i a l  t o  
hand le  t h e  problem i n  a d ip lomat ic  manner with Welles, t h a n  
us ing  t h e  army t o  i n t e rvene .  A t  a  p r e s s  conf'erence on 
A p r l l  15, 1933, Hu l l  a t a t e d  h i s  a t t i t u d e  on what should  b e  
done : 
No c o n s i d e r a t i o n  . . . has  been  g iven  t o  any  movement 
i n  t h e  n a t u r e  of i n t e rven t ion .  Nothing whatever is  
go ing  on t h a t  would c a l l  f o r  t h e  s l i g h t e s t  d e p a r t u r e  
from t h e  o r d i n a r y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and c o n t a c t s  between 
two a e p a r a t e  and sovereign na t ions  . 3  
H u l l  gave Welles h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  b e f o r e  t h e  l a t t e r  
l e f t  f o r  Cuba i n  which H u l l  s t a t e d :  'You w i l l  always b e a r  
i n  mind t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  and t h e  
Cuban government a r e  those e x i s t i n g  between sovereign, inde- 
1 pendent, and equal  powersen The i n s t r u c t i o n s  were genera l .  
Welle~i  was t o  b r i n g  an end t o  the t e r r o r i s m  and repress ion  
by n e g o t i a t i n g  a  t ruce .  B u t  these  a c t i o n s  were t o  be c a r r i e d  
o u t  i n  t h e  s p i r i t  of t h e  p r i o r  statement t h a t  no t h r e a t  of 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  would be used, 
Welles spent  the  summer of 1933 t r y i n g  t o  a r range  a 
t r u c e  i n  Cuba, bu t  he was unsuccessful. By August, Welles 
was s u r e  t h a t  Machado m u s t  go t o  b r i n g  peace t o  t h e  i s l a n d .  
Welles sought Rooseve l t t s  and H u l l ' s  publ ic  support  f o r  his 
a c t i o n s .  Welles put himself i n  a  precar ious  p o s i t i o n  by 
saying  i n  e f f e c t  t h a t  the  United S t a t e s  would in tervene  and 
assume the r o l e  of the deposer of Machado. T h i s  was ob- 
v ioue ly  I n  v i o l a t i o n  of E u l l ' s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  and the  a b i n -  
i s t r a t i o n l a  w i l l .  2 
By l a t e  Auguat of 1933, Wellea gained t h e  aupport  of 
t h e  Cuban army leadera .  They gradual ly  withdrew t h e i r  sup- 
p o r t  from Machado and t h e  l a t t e r  decided t o  take  a  "leave of 
absence. *  The leave  amounted t o  f l e e i n g  t h e  country,  The 
day a f t e r  Machado's departure ,  Carlos de Cespedes formed a 
new government. A t  t h i a  po in t  Welles f e l t  h i s  mission was 
completed and asked t o  be re turned  t o  Washington. H u l l  and 
'~~11, - -  ~ O C .  c l t .  *wood, %e s., p. 6 3 .  
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Roosevelt  i n s t r u c t e d  h i m  t o  s t a y  a s  ma t t e r s  were s t i l l  not 
s e t t l e d .  
Within one month d i so rde r s  and a t t a c k s  aga in  broke ou t  
i n  Cuba. H u l l  followed h i s  pol icy  of c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  by 
having f requent  conversat ions with L a t i n  American ambassadors 
concerning t h e  Cuban s i t u a t i o n .  T h i s  had t h e  e f f e c t  of r e -  
ducing t h e  resentment t h a t  L a t i n  Americans had h e l d  toward 
t h e  United S t a t e t  s  previous po l i cy  of u n i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n .  
H u l l  cont inued t o  s t r e s s  t o  these  L a t i n  l e a d e r s  the  unwill-  
ingness  of t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  intervene.  
On September 7, r e v o l t i n g  reached such propor t ion  
t h a t  Ceapedes was overthrown. A t  t h i s  po in t  Welles s e n t  
Hul l  a te legram i n  which he s t a t e d  t h a t  a  f o r c e  should be 
landed i n  Havana and o the r  c i t i e s  of Cuba t o  r e t u r n  s t a b i l i t y  
t o  t h e  i s l a n d ,  The Cespedes government would be r e s t o r e d  
and allowed t o  funct ion ,  and the  American f o r c e s  could a c t  
a s  a p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  the  goverment  u n t i l  t h e  goverment  
could  p r o t e c t  i t s e l f ,  Welles f u r t h e r  s t a t e d  t h a t  i f  t h e  
situation was explained t o  the  La t in  Americans they  would 
not  p r o t e a t  t h e  ac t ion .  1 
H u l l  immediately went t o  t h e  White House and t o l d  
Rooaevelt t h a t  he opposed any in te rven t ion .  H e  expressed 
t h e  opinion t h a t  Welles d i d n ' t  r e a l i z e  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which 
'~~11, OJ. G., pp. 315-16. 
t he  a c t i o n  would i n c i t e  Lat in  America. Argentina and Mexico 
had al ready informed the  United S t a t e s  t h a t  they would oppoae 
in te rven t ion  of any kind I n  Cuba. Therefore H u l l  prepared a 
r ep ly  t o  Welles' message. H e  s ta ted:  
We f u l l y  apprecia te  the  various viewpoints s e t  f o r t h  
i n  your telegram. However, a f t e r  mature considerat ion,  
the  pres ident  has decided t o  send you the  following 
message : 
We f e e l  very s t rongly  t h a t  any promise, implied o r  
otherwise, r e l a t i n g  t o  what the United S t a t e s  w i l l  do 
under any cfrcumstances is  impossible; t h a t  i t  would 
be regarded a s  a breach of neu t ra l i ty ,  a s  favoring one 
f a c t i o n  out of many, a s  attempting t o  s e t  up a govern- 
ment which would be regarded by the  whole world, and 
e spec i a l l y  throughout Latin America, a s  a c r ea t ion  and 
c rea tu re  of t he  American government. . . . "1 
Ships of t h e  United S t a t e s  Navy did p a t r o l  the  waters 
around Cuba however, but  no landings took place. Even a t  
Montevideo, La t in  American delegates expressed the  r ea l i za -  
t i o n  t h a t  the  United Sta tea  d id  have a t r e a t y  right t o  in-  
tervene, even i f  they did  oppoae it, They respected t h e  
United S t a t e s  f o r  not using it. 2 
From September through January of 1934, the new 
government of Fulgencio B a t i s t a t s  f r o n t  man, Grau San Har t in ,  
was i n  o f f i ce .  During t h i s  period, Welleat pos i t i on  under- 
went a complete change and he reported t o  H u l l  t h a t  he no 
h o o d ,  9. PP. 73-4. 
longer  favored in tervent ion.  Ins tead he expreased agreement 
with H u l l  I s  pos i t i on  of watchful expectancy.' One s ign i f  i- 
can t  th ing about t h i s  period was the r e f u s a l  t o  recognize 
t h e  San Martin government. This was the only a c t i o n  t h a t  
gave La t in  Americans any suspicion of United S t a t e s  in ten-  
t i o n s  t o  i n t e r f e r e m 2  However the  pos i t ion  of the  United 
S t a t e s  was t h a t  t he re  usually was a waiting period before 
extending diplomatic recognit ion t o  be sure of the s t a b i l i t y  
of a new regime. Hull  a l s o  j u s t i f i e d  the  delay because 
recogni t ion  might have had the  e f f e c t  of s trengthening t h e  
Cuban government above i t s  a c t u a l  support. The same reason- 
i n g  appl ied  t o  Hul l ' s  decis ion not  t o  r a i s e  the  sugar quota 
f o r  Cuba. 9s f e l t  t h a t  it was needed, bu t  again he did  not 
want San Martin t o  rece ive  any undeserved pra lae ,  
The United S t a t e s  policy became one of withholding 
recogni t ion  u n t i l  the  government could ahow i t s  s t a b i l i t y .  
This was normal procedure. Since Walles continued t o  r e p o r t  
t h a t  t h e  government d id  not represent  the  people but was 
j u s t  an unorganized mob, the United S t a t e s  followed i t s  
po l i cy  of non-reoognition. The San Martin government made 
2WhitneT A. Shepardaon, The United S t a t e s  i n  World 
Affa i rs ,  1 9 3 4 - 5  (New York & ~ o x n :  Published fz t h e  Coun- 
c i l  of Foreign Relat ions by Harper Brothers,  1935), p, 121. 
every attempt t o  convince Washington t h a t  it d id  represen t  
t he  people of Cuba, bu t  with no success. Welles seems t o  
have f e l t  t h a t  the  government would f a l l  due t o  non-recog- 
n i t i on ,  while R u l l  wanted the  government t o  prove s t a b i l i t y  
and ga in  recogni t iono 1 
San Martin continued i n  con t ro l  of the  government and 
a c t u a l l y  increased h i s  power through November. R u l l  main- 
t a ined  the  same requirements f o r  recogni t ion but  Welles 
continued t o  inform H u l l  t h a t  they had not been met, B a t i s t a  
continued t o  back the  government because he f e l t  t h a t  the 
United S t e t e s  was witb~Ilolding recogni t ion only t o  prevent 
embarrassment t o  Welles, However, a f t e r  J e f f e r son  Caffrey 
replaced Welles i n  December and s t i l l  no recogni t ion came, 
Rntls ta  began t o  withdraw h i s  support.2 I n  January San 
Martin resigned. S a t i s t a  gave hi8 aupport t o  t h e  San Yar t i n  
governmentle chief  opponent who was a  man who had a chance 
of gaining recogni t ion,  T h l a  was Carlos Nendieta. 
On the  r e t u r n  t r i p  from Hontevideo, H u l l  stopped i n  
Havana f o r  an informal meeting. During t h i s  b r i e f  v i s i t ,  
H u l l  was impressed by the  apparent popular i ty  of the  Mendieta 
regime, and a l a o  the  f e e l i n g  of r e l i e f  t h a t  p reva i led  i n  
Cuba. The l a t t e r  f e e l i n g  was an outgrowth of t he  r e f u s a l  of 
'wood, z. c&., p. 82. 
t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  intervene t o  e s t a b l i s h  a new government. I 
T h i s  added t o  the  new a t t i t u d e  held towards t he  United S t a t e s  
by the  Lat ins  waa a p a r t  of the Good Neighbor policy. 
H u l l  returned t o  Washington a l t e r  the  s top  i n  Havana. 
TWO days following his re turn ,  a f t e r  he had conferred with 
Roosevelt and gained his agreement, H u l l  wired the  embassy 
i n  Havana t o  extend recognit ion,  T h i s  was preceded by a 
meeting between Roosevelt and Latin leaders  a t  the  White 
Rouse i n  which they conferred on the  recognit ion question. 2 
T h i s  was i n  l i n e  with the  policy H u l l  had followed during 
t h e  period of t he  San Martin government during which he had 
a l s o  conferred with Lat in  American leaders ,  T h i s  will ing- 
ness t o  confer  plus t he  r e s t r a i n t  shown towards in te rven t ion  
i n  Cuba was an important pa r t  of the new Lat in  American 
pol icy* 
Following the  Pan-American Conference a t  Montevideo 
and then the  establishment of an acceptable government i n  
Cuba, H u l l  was convinced tha t  the  P l a t t  Amendment had t o  be 
abrogated i n  a  new t r e a t y  with Cuba. Its exis tence  was ob- 
v iously  a g l a r ing  exception t o  the policy of non-intervention 
whether the  United S ta te8  used i t  or  not,  Since non-inter- 
vent ion was such an important p a r t  of the  Good Neighbor 
policy,  any r i g h t  t o  intervene waa i n  e f f e c t  a  b a r r i e r  t o  
f u l l  implementation of the  new policy. H u l l  s e t  t o  work on 
a  new t r e a t y .  He had the  cooperation of Sumner dJelles. The 
new t r e a t y  uas signed by the Secretary on May 29, 1934, and 
r a t i f i e d  by the  Senate on June 9. The only r i g h t  t h a t  the  
United S t a t e s  re ta ined  i n  Cuba from the new t r e a t y  was t h e  
r i g h t  t o  maintain a naval base a t  Guantanamo Bay. The r a t i -  
f i c a t i o n  by the  Senate brought on a three day f i e s t a  i n  Cuba 
t o  ce lebra te .  
This  pol icy  of the  United S t a t e s  towards Cuba involv- 
i n g  r e s t r a i n t ,  m u l t i l a t e r a l  consultat ion,  and t h e  abrogation 
of the r i g h t  of in tervent ion,  convinced even the  most a n t i -  
American elements t h a t  the new policy described by H u l l  a t  
Montevideo and i n  o ther  statements was a c t u a l l y  a  r e a l i t y  by 
t h e  end of 1934.l Other ac t ions  such as the  return of con- 
t r o l  of i t a  own a f f a i r s  t o  Hait i ,  and the  withdrawal of 
Marines from Nicaragua added t o  this optimism. 
Another favorable ac t ion  i n  1934-35 t h a t  added t o  the  
development of t h e  Good Neighbor pol icy  was the r ev i s ion  of 
r e l a t l ona  with Panama. A t  Montevideo H u l l  had conferred 
with t he  Panamanian delegates concerning t h e i r  complaints 
t h a t  t h e i r  sovereignty was not protected from United S t a t e s  
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infringement. On the re tu rn  t r i p  from Montevideo, H u l l  a l s o  
v i s i t e d  with Panamanian leaders  i n  Panama, He became con- 
vinced t h a t  a  new t r e a t y  was necessary with Panama t o  improve 
the  r e l a t i o n s  with t h a t  country and ~o1umbla. l  Therefore 
during 1934, negotiat ions f o r  a  new t r e a t y  were c a r r i e d  on. 
I n  1935 a new t r e a t y  guaranteeing Panamanian sovereignty 
was signed, There was opposition t o  the t r e a t y  i n  the  Senate 
by some, bu t  H u l l ' s  influence on h i s  old colleagues was 
s t rong  enough t o  br ing about the r a t i f i c a t i o n .  2 
Therefore i n  l e s s  than two years, the United S ta tea  
had taken no ac t ion  which the Latin Americans could point  
t o  a s  h o s t i l e  o r  aggressive. Instead,  a l l  of H u l l ' s  a c t i ons  
i n  d i r e c t i n g  the  a f f a i r s  of the  United S t a t e s  i n  La t in  
America had r e su l t ed  i n  increased t rus t  i n  t he  United S t a t e s  
by the  La t in  Americana. 
CHAPTER I11 
ROLE, 
The point  has been s t ressed  t h a t  H u l l  f e l t  economic 
b a r r i e r s  such a s  t a r i f f s  were the fundamental b a r r i e r  t o  
harmonious i n t e rna t iona l  re la t ions .  Since his i n i t i a l  a t t a c k  
on h igh  t a r i f f 8  and economic nationalism i n  1916, H u l l  had 
continued t o  f i g h t  f o r  the  lowering of t rade  b a r r i e r s ,  
Hull had enjoyed l i t t l e  success i n  r ea l i z ing  h i s  aim 
while a  member of Congress, b u t  now a s  Secre tary  of S t a t e  he 
would see  hia goal  achieved. The Trade Agreement Act of 
1934, designed t o  increase the  volume of i n t e rna t iona l  t rade ,  
was the  most sought a f t e r  goal of H u l l ' s  career .  H e  viewed 
i t  a s  t he  moat a f f ec t ive  weapon t h a t  could be used t o  pre- 
The economic warfare which reached euch enormous 
proport ions during the  depression years haa been i n  
l a rge  measure reaponsible f o r  the alarming d i s i n t e -  
g r a t i o n  of a l l  i n t e rna t iona l  re la t ionsh ips  which the  
world has r ecen t ly  witneassd. . . . O u r  t r ade  agree- 
ment program i s  a  determined e f f o r t  t o  promote economic 
appeasement and aecur i ty  through the  expansion of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r ade  .l 
H u l l  admitted t h a t  the United S t a t e s  had l e d  the  way 
L~aymond L. Buell ,  The H u l l  Trade Pro ram and the  
American S stem (New ~ e r i e n o x  &I?~wPork: 
doreign Po 3- i c y  Association Incorporated i n  cooperation with 
the  National Peace Conference, 19381, pp. 32-3; 
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t o  the  danger t h a t  ex i s t ed  i n  the uorld by following the  
po l icy  of high t a r i f f  and i so la t ion .  Now those t a r i f f s  
must be reduced i f  the  danger were t o  be el iminated and good 
r e l a t i o n 8  restored.  Because the United S t a t e s  was such a  
world economic power, any move t o  s t imulate i n t e rna t iona l  
t r a d e  had t o  begin with United S t a t e s  leadership.  I n  June 
of 1935, the  United S t a t e s  Chamber of Commerce declared tha t :  
nCommercial nat ions of the uorld i n v i t e  sure d i s a s t e r  i f  a 
po l icy  of nat ional  s e l f  suff ic iency i n  general i s  pursued. 
. . . a l l  appropriate methods (should) be u t i l i z e d  a s  f u l l y  
a s  poss ible  f o r  the mi t igat ion of ex i s t ing  b a r r i e r s  t o  
t r ade ,  n l  
Concurrent with the  des i r e  f o r  general  world peace 
and recovery, the lowering of t rade  b a r r i e r s  was a  pos i t i ve  
s t e p  towards formulating the Good Neighbor policy. The 
g r e a t  decl ine  i n  fo re ign  t rade  a f fec ted  Lat in  America j u s t  
aa much as any o ther  a r ea  and more than moat. Because of 
t he  spec ia l i zed  nature and l imi ta t ions  on d ive r s i t y ,  the  
La t in  America a r ea  depended on a  high l i v i n g  standard, I n  
l i n e  with Hul l fa  philosophy a s  described e a r l i e r ,  i f  the  
l i v i n g  standard was r a i aed  and people became more s a t i s f i e d  
k e o r g e  P. Auld, Rebuildin Trade Q Tariff  Bargain- 
% (New York: National r'ore gn Trade < o u n c ~ c . ,  1330), 
pp. 12-13. 
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t ha t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  were not being h u r t  by t h e  a c t i o n s  of 
ano the r  na t ion ,  good f e e l i n g s  should r e s u l t ,  This f e e l i n g  
tha t  t h e  United S t a t e s  was no longer  fo l lowing a c t i o n s  i n -  
jur ious  t o  L a t i n  Americans was a  s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t  i n  the  de- 
velopment of t h e  Good Neighbor policy.  It i s  obvious then, 
that  commercial r e v i s i o n s  with t h e  goa l s  of peace and pros- 
p e r i t y  would be p a r t  of the  Good Neighbor policy.  
A s  a n  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of t h e  importance of commercial 
r e v i s i o n  t o  t h e  Good Neighbor pol icy,  it should be noted 
t h a t  by  1932, t h e  United S t a t e s '  share  i n  t h e  t o t a l  t r a d e  of 
t h e  L a t i n  American c o u n t r i e s  had dec l ined  t h i r t y  one p e r  
c e n t  from t h e  average l e v e l s  of the  twenties, '  When it i s  
r e a l i z e d  t h a t  t h e  f o r e i g n  commerce which t h e  L a t i n  c o u n t r i e s  
have with t h e  United S t a t e s  i s  g r e a t e r  than  commerce with 
each  o t h e r ,  t h e  damaging e f f e c t s  a r e  obvious. Any a c t i o n  
that  could  b e  taken  t o  f o r c e  this t r end  i n  t h e  oppos i te  di- 
r e c t i o n  must b r i n g  b e n e f i t  t o  L a t i n  America. This d e c l i n e  
roughly p a r a l l e l e d  t h e  t o t a l  United S t a t e s  t r a d e  d e c l i n e  
which measured i n  volume was down f i f t y  two pe r  cent.  
Measured i n  va lue ,  t r a d e  was down t h i r t y  two pe r  cen t  from 
' ~ e r a l d  H. Smith, ttEconomlc T ies  Linking the  United 
S t a t e s  and L a t i n  America, B u l l e t i n  --- of t h e  pan-~mer ican  
Union, WOE (March 1936),  270. 
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1929 isrels.' The L a t h  b r i o a n s  f i n d  i t  necessary t o  ax- 
mrt - over o w  turd of t h e i r  production Mhel~eas it i s  only 
necessary for the United States t o  export about t e n  per cen t  
of its production.2 All types of Let in  American products 
fiad i3.em.and soalawha~e* 
A t  the s m  t h e ,  however, i t  m u s t  be r ea l i zed  t h a t  
supporters of the Tmde A c t  which lowered tariffs hoped that 
the aataon would afd the American domestic economy. The 
Ua3t;sd S a t e s  emnolag was fn bad condit ion too.  There was 
disagmemant i n  ths a d d n l a t m t i o n  a s  t o  methods t o  be em- 
ployed so br ing  Paaovssg, The discussion of H u l l ' s  s t ruggle  
wi%h the eco&c n a t i o n a l i s t s  of the  New Deal w i l l  be de- 
layed %o a l a t e r  page. 
Some c r i t i c s  aay t h a t  the  e f f e c t  of t a r i f f  r ev i s ion  
on t he  volume of La t in  t rade  is tempered by the  f a c t  t h a t  
many La t in  American goods enter  the  United S t a t e s  on the  f r e e  
l l a t  and are not a f f ec t ed  by t a r i f f s .  E u t  it m u s t  be r e a l -  
i z ed  t h a t  Europe and o ther  areas a re  a l s o  involved i n  - t i n  
t rade .  The La P l a t a  a rea  buys much more from the  United 
l u ~ t  the Observation Post, L i t e r a ry  Digest, CXVII 
(March 17, 1934), 13. 
L ~ i o h a r d  F. Behrendt, I n t e r  American Economic Rela- 
-t ions ,  Problema and ~ r o s ~ e c t s ( N e w  kork:  The Corni t tee  on 
-In t e rna t iona l  jiconomic policy, 1948), p. 6. 
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S t a t e s  than they s e l l  t o  i t ,  This i s  only possible i f  the  
count r ies  of the  La P l a t a  area a re  able t o  s e l l  somewhere 
e l s e ,  England f o r  example. However, t h i s  means t h a t  i t  i s  
necessary f o r  England t o  be able t o  export goods t o  another 
a r ea ,  t he  United S t a t e s  p e r h a ~ s ,  i n  order t h a t  it can buy 
more from the  La P l a t a  area than it s e l l s  t o  it. This goes 
on and on from country t o  country. Therefore i f  one country 
e r e c t s  barriers, o r  i f  a l l  e r ec t  bar r ie r s ,  the  e f f e c t  i s  t h a t  
commerce i s  hindered and reduced, For example, England 
might buy from Argentina but  only i f  England could export 
something t o  the  United S ta tes .  The l a t t e r ' s  t a r i f f  would 
a f f e c t  this a b i l i t y  d i r e c t l y .  Therefore the La t in  Ameri- 
cans have a two fo ld  problem: f irst ,  t h a t  none of t he  i n -  
d u a t r i a l  producta needed i n  Lat in  America i s  made there ;  and 
second, t h a t  what i s  made there i a  only needed i n  i n d u s t r i a l  
countries. '  Therefore the Latin Americans muat r e l y  on 
fore ign  t r ade  f o r  prosper i ty ,  
I n  one aense, t h e  nonoculture economy of La t in  Ameri- 
cn f i t a  we11 i n t o  the p r inc ip le  of the i n t e rna t iona l  d iv i -  
s i on  of labor  i n  which each area maximizes i t s  advantages, 
B u t  a war or  depression t h a t  hurts  fore ign t rade  causes 
g r e a t  economic hardahlp i n  Lat in  Amerioa. I n  leading t rade  
countries of L a t i n  America auch as Cuba, Uruguay, o r  
Venezuela, per -capi ta  t r a d e  f i g u r e s  may average from f o r t y  
f i r e  t o  over one hundred d o l l a r s  .' Any f l u o t u r t i o n  t h e n  
w i l l  have 8 b i g  e f f e o t  nhere personal  income i s  bu t  a few 
hundred d o l l a r s  a year. 
Cuba, B r a z i l ,  and Columbia rank f irst, f i f t h ,  and 
e l e v e n t h  I n  t h a t  o r d e r  a s  s u p p l i e r s  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s ;  
and e i g h t r  p e r  cent of t h e  import was i n  a cash  crop.2 T h i s  
again shows the impact which American t r a d e  p o l i c i e s  can  
have on L a t i n  America, and a l s o  on t h e i r  a b l l i t r  t o  buy from 
t h e  United S t a t e s .  By 1933, t h i s  f i g u r e  was down t o  f i f t y  
t h r e e  p e r  cen t ,  More important,  t h e  d o l l a r  va lue  was one 
e i g h t h  of tha previouis pmount.3 Likewise, t h e  amount of 
Cuban sugar  a rop  that t h e  Americans were w i l l i n g  t o  t a k e  
d e a l i n a d  from e i g h t y  t o  s i x t y  p e r  eent.4 Theas very b r i e f  
f i g u r e s  r e f l o o t  the  e f f e c t  t h a t  e c o n o ~ ~ % c  warfare had on 
inter-American t rade.  
It w i l l  be r e o a l l e d  t h a t  a t  the Pan-American Confer- 
ense  a t  Montevideo, H u l l  had introduced an economic reso lu -  
t i o n  proposing sweeptag revisions i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e ,  
primarily t a r i f f  rev ia ion .  H i s  p roposa ls  had been heard  
S e h r e n d t ,  9. - e i t . ,  p* ism 2 ~ u l d ,  QJ. G., pp. 44-7- 
31b i d .  
- b i d .  -
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e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  and with surpr i se  s ince i t  w i l l  a l s o  be r e -  
c a l l e d  t h a t  President Roosevelt had been very pess imis t ic  
about economic revis ions  i n  h i s  pre-conference statement.  
Even Roosevelt I s  statement which followed H u l l  I s  introduc- 
t i o n  of h i s  economic resolution had s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  contained 
wonderful i deas  but  t h a t  they were sometimes d i f f i c u l t  t o  
obtain.  Nevertheless, t he  conference had been favorably  
i nc l ined  toward rev i s ion  when H u l l  s t a t e d  a d e s i r e  f o r  such 
t r a d e  t r e a t i e s .  
I n  view of t he  s take  t h a t  the  Latins had i n  fo re ign  
t r a d e  and t h e  enthusiasm w i t h  which they had gree ted  H u l l ' s  
Montevideo reso lu t ion ,  i t  is not d i f f i c u l t  t o  see why any 
pol icy  OP program which s e t  aa  its goals  the  reduction of 
b a r r i e r s  t o  t rade ,  c e r t a i n l y  m u s t  be c l a s s i f i e d  a s  a n  impor- 
t a n t  po r t  of the Good Neighbor policy. Also it should be 
repeated t h a t  H u l l  viewed r e l a t i o n s  with La t in  America as a 
p a t t e r n  f o r  world vide r e l a t i ons .  H u l l  had s t a t e d  on the  
way t o  Montevideo: "In our own i n t e r e s t  we m u s t  look t o  our 
r e l a t i o n s  with these countr ies  down here. Among the  Americas 
we may be ab l e  t o  work out a  p a t t e r n  of l i f e  which w i l l  i n -  
ep i r e  the  whole world t o  follow. . . . "' H u l l  s biographer,  
l ~ a r o l d  Hinton, Cordell  H u l l ,  A BiograpQ 
- (New Pork: Doubleday, 19421, p. 2. 
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Harold Hinton, s t a t e s  t h a t  the broad ou t l i ne  of Hu l l ' s  
fo re ign  po l icy  was t h a t  the United S t a t e s  should t ake  the  
l e a d  i n  breaking down excessive t rade  b a r r i e r s  which cause 
f r i c t i o n  and should r e e s t a b l i s h  p rospe r i t y  which would m i t i -  
g a t e  aga ins t  war. 1 
There had been groups from 1900 on t h a t  favored down- 
ward t a r i f f  r ev i s ion ,  pr imar i ly  the  Democratic pa r ty .  B u t  
a f t e r  World War I, some republicans such a s  Hoover, and 
Stimson had a l s o  supported modification. However, s ince  t h e  
end of t h e  C i v i l  War, t a r i f f s  had continued t o  r i s e  and be- 
come p r o t e c t i o n i s t  i n  nature.  H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  this t rend was 
due p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  the  manner i n  which t a r i f f s  were s e t .  
Congress was very recept ive  t o  pressure  from business  and 
l abo r  lobbyis t s .  T a r i f f s  were s e t  through vo t e  t r a d i n g  and 
bending t o  l o c a l  i n t e r e s t s  r a t h e r  than consider ing t he  gen- 
e r a l  economic welfare of the  country. 
Roosevelt and H u l l  were not c e r t a i n  how f a r  t h e i r  
econornio po l icy  would ca r ry  them. Roosevelt was always pes- 
s i m i s t i c  about complete t a r i f f  r e v i s i o n  f o r  two important  
reasona: f irst  t h a t  he heard so many suggest ions  from various 
souress,  some of which were qu i t e  economically n a t i o n a l i s t i c ;  
and second, he waa very oonscious of what r e v i s i o n  might 
i n  the  sense t h a t  he had t o  have Roosevelt 's  support f o r  any I 
program he i n i t i a t e d .  H u l l ' s  problem was t h a t  he had t o  i m -  I 
plement a  program t h a t  m u s t  be passed by Congress, a  Congress I 
t h a t  was suscept ib le  t o  the  whims of public  opinion and 
pressure.  Even though the  Congress was con t ro l led  by Demo- I 
c r a t s ,  they were from areas  i n  which there  was l i t t l e  i n t e r -  I 
e s t  i n  fo re ign  a f f a i r s .  They h e s i t a t e d  t o  make depar tures  I 
from t r a d i t i o n a l  po l i c i e s  since t h e i r  e l ec t ions  i n  1932 had 
come on an anti-Hoover wave i n  republican areas .  1 
H u l l ' s  program waa based on the  theory of comparative 
advantage, each nat ion producing those th ings  it does b e s t  
a 
-. 
and export ing the  surplua f o r  the  surplus  of another country.* t 
1 
The resources of the  world a r e  not evenly d i s t r i bu t ed .  The 
r e s u l t  of a  n a t i o n l s  attempt t o  become s e l f  s u f f i c i e n t  i s  
then a reduotion o r  a t  bea t  the  maintenance of a  cons tan t  
l e v e l  i n  the  standard of l iv ing .  H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  high l i v i n g  
standard8 a re  founded on t h e  interchange of a r t i c l e s  economi- 
c a l l y  produced in volume by the app l i ca t ion  of the  previously  
mentioned d iv i s ion  of labor  or spec i a l i za t i on  of production.3 
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This i s  t r u e  of both individuals  and nations. Because of 
h igh  t a r i f f s ,  fo re ign  countr ies  a r e  forced t o  buy from o ther  
count r ies  with l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  production methods, with a  r e -  
s u l t i n g  decl ine  i n  t he  l i v i n g  standard. The La t in  American 
count r ies  were highly specia l ized.  They had a g r e a t  com- 
para t ive  advantage i n  t r o p i c a l  items and o ther  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
i tems which a re  favored by the  s o i l  and cl imate of L a t i n  
America. B u t  they m u s t  export these  t o  g e t  many items which 
they need bu t  which they can not produce domestically.  
I n  applying t h i s  program, H u l l  had favored the  m u l t i -  
l a t e r a l  agreement ap2roach t o  t a r i f f  rev i s ion .  Bowever, 
a f t e r  t he  London Economic Conference, he d id  not be l ieve  a 
wide r ev i s ion  would be possible.1 I n  a world i n  which the re  
were ao many cont ro l led  economies, such a s  Russia, Germany, 
o r  I t a l y ,  a  country l i k e  tha United S t a t e s  could not t h ink  
of opera t ing on a  f r e e  t rade  bas i s .  If it d id ,  it would be- 
come a  dumping ground f o r  fo re ign  production. Therefore Hull 
favored b i l a t e r a l  agreements which would in su re  equal  compen- 
s a t i o n  between the  countr ies .  g u l l  hoped t h a t  t h i s  g radua l ly  
would l ead  t o  x u l t i l a t e r a l  agreements by the  inc lus ion  of 
% o r d e l l  H u l l ,  The Memoirs of Cordel l  H u l l  (New York: 
Macmlllan Company, 1948!, I,- -
t he  "most favored nat ionn clause .' H u l l ' s  d e sc r ip t ion  of 
t h i s  c lause  and i t s  e f f e c t  was: "1 won't t r e a t  you any worse 
than the  person I t r e a t  the bes t  of a l l ,  provided you don ' t  
t r e a t  me any worse than the  person you t r e a t  be s t  of a 1 l O n 2  
Natural ly Roosevelt had t o  agree with H u l l ' s  program 
before i t  could be enacted. H u l l  s t a t e s  i n  h i s  memoirs t h a t  
i n  t a l k s  with Roosevslt before the  l a t t e r ' s  e lec t ion ,  
Roosevelt seemed favorable t o  E u l l f s  t a r i f f  proposals and 
even approved t h e i r  inclus ion i n  t he  1932 platform. 3 0 w -  
ever  as the  adminis t ra t ion had begun, the  economic adv isors  
around Roosevelt who es tabl ished the  and the  AAA began 
t o  abandon the l i b e r a l  t rade  methods H u l l  f a v o ~ e d . ~  H u l l  
f u r t h e r  s ta ted :  
m e  president ,  s t i l l  pursuing the  theory of r e t a i n -  
ing  f u l l  d i sc re t ionary  au thor i ty  t o  f i x  t a r i f f  r a t e s  a t  
any height  deened necessary f o r  the successful  opera- 
t i o n  of the AAA and NRA, was slow t o  embrace any l i b e r a l  
t rade  proposals a t  Montevideo. B u t  the success i t  
achieved among the  Lat in  American count r ies  and i n  t h e  
praas a t  home mads him f r i e n d l y  toward i t .4  
H u l l  f e l t  that a regular  campaign t o  ga in  support f o r  
the t a r i f f  program was necessary. Throughout 1933, E u l l  de- 
l i v e r e d  speechea and gave out statements t o  b u i l d  support ;  
he kept c lose  contact  with the  appropr ia te  i n f l u e n t i a l  mem- 
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b e r s  of t h e  Commerce and Treasury Departments and t h e  Tar i f f  
Commission. 1 
H u l l  found it necessary t o  mold the  t a r i f f  program 
and then force  t he  administrat ion i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n  i n  s p i t e  
of t h e  New Deal advisors .  After  Montevideo, H u l l  found t h a t  
Roosevelt was somewhat more receptive t o  the idea  of the  re -  
c ip roca l  t rade  program, bu t  Roosevelt s t i l l  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  it 
be  f l e x i b l e  enough t o  e x i s t  with the econonic n e c e s s i t i e s  of 
t h e  NRA which required some planning, 
B u t  a t  t h e  same time when i t  appeared t h a t  Roosevelt 
was changing h i s  a t t i t u d e  toward t a r i f f  revis ion,  he a p ? o i n t  
ed George Peek t o  head a committee t o  coordinate fo re ign  
trade.  Peek had been adminis t ra tor  of the AAA and was an 
opponent of t a r i f f  reduction while favoring a  p ro tec t ive  em- 
bargo. E a s a n t i a l l ~  the  only di f ference  which ex i s ted  be- 
tween H u l l  and the p ro tec t ion ia t  advisors  l a y  i n  t he  l a t t e r f a  P 
f ee l ings  t h a t  t he  economic breakdown which had taken place 
waa due t o  def ic ienc ies  i n  the present  economic system and a 
new approach was needed. H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  the  system was okay, 
the  problem was t h a t  t he  operators of the  system were f a u l t y .  
The ayatem was not being given enough freedom t o  operate,  
freedom from t a r i f f  r e a t r i c t i o n .  2 
l ~ u l l ,  s. G., p. 353. 
2 ~ i n t o n ,  OJ. G., pp. 230-32. 
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New Deal p o l i c i e s  were p ro tec t lon ia t .  The AAA, r e l i e f ,  
and t h e  PWA were designed t o  i n f l a t e  the  economy. To lower 
t a r i f f s  would be inconsis tent .  H u l l  recognized t he  necessity 
of p ro t ec t i on  aga ins t  abusea and unfa i r  competit ion and f e l t  
t h a t  they  were j u s t i f i ed .  B u t  he d i d  not  f e e l  t h a t  protec-  
t i o n  which works t o  banef it i n e f f i c i e n t  opera t ions  was 
j u s t i f i e d .  Ins tead It tends t o  cu t  down on the  a c t u a l  pro- 
duct ion of wealth and purchasing power and c r e a t e s  an  un- 
s t a b l e  economy, 1 
H u l l  f e l t  t h a t  i t  was a f a l l a c y  t h a t  imports damage 
domestic production. A l l  t r ade  should increase ,  T a r i f f  con- 
t r o l  i s  p a r t  of na t iona l  planning, H u l l  f e l t ,  bu t  it i s  not 
necessary t o  keep r a i s i n g  it, it could be lowered, Domestic 
consumption i s  only so  high and there fore  t he re  i s  a danger 
t h a t  I c e r t a i n  per cent  of production can not f i n d  consump- 
2 t l o n  without a b i l i t y  t o  export. For example, i f  farmers '  
a b i l i t y  t o  export is  restricted, t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  buy a t  
home l a  too. Farmere can not r e s t r i c t  production a s  i ndus t ry  
can, Simple reduction f o r  j u s t  na t iona l  needa i s  d i f f i c u l t ;  
f i f t y  per  cen t  of oot ton,  t h i r t y  t h r ee  per cen t  of tobacco 
2 n ~ e t r e a t  from Economic Na t ion~ l i sm,  Nation, 
C X X W I I I  (Maroh 14, 1934 1, 290. 
and twenty per  can t  of wheat production i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  needed 
domestical ly.  1 
The United S t a t ea  could not be  the worldle l a r g e s t  
expor te r  competing with cheap labor  a l l  over t h e  world i f  
d i f f e r ences  i n  wage r a t e s  were t he  dec i s ive  f a c t o r  i n  indus- 
t r y .  Supe r io r i t y  of wage c o s t s  and e f f i c i ency  makes t he  
United S t a t ea  ab l e  t o  compete, Hull's a t t i t u d e  on t h i a  ques- 
t i o n  of a r t i f i c i a l  p ro tec t ion  i s  shown i n  the  following 
atatement which he made when t o l d  t h a t  the  Ca l i fo rn i a  wine 
makers were j i t t e r y  over t h e  prospect  of a  t r a d e  agreement 
with Spain. He a ta ted :  
There a r e  t e n  mi l l ion  unemployed people i n  t h i a  
country, with t h e i r  f ami l i e s  making about t h i r t y  odd 
mil l ion,  uho have a  sure  enough case of t h e  j i t t e r s  
under the  most embargoed high t a r i f f  t h a t  had ever  been 
enacted, and I th ink it  m i g h t  ba well  t o  cure  t h a t  case 
of t h e  j i t t e r a  before we take up some minor phase, Aa 
aoon a s  we g e t  r i d  of t h i a  major case of t h e  j i t t e r s  
we w i l l  take up the  minor ones.2 
H u l l  began t o  p reva i l  over Rooaeveltt  s p r o t e c t i o n i a t  
advisors ,  The main t h r e a t  t o  t he  t r a d e  agreements program, 
George Peek, continued t o  attempt b a r t e r  agreements and con- 
t i n u a l l y  attempted t o  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  the  o ther  government 
departments which were concerned with fo re ign  t r ade ,  A t  no 
l n ~ t  t h e  Observation post ,"  L i t e r a r y  Digeat,  C X V I I  
(May 12, 19341, 10 -  
*,inton, OJ. p. 283. 
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poin t  d id  Roosevelt t r y  t o  s top  th in  a c t i v i t y ,  u n t i l  the  
month of December of 1934, Peek negotiated a  b a r t e r  dea l  
w i t h  Germany a f t e r  the  paasage of the  t rade  agreement a c t ,  
B r a z i l  launched a  complaint t h a t  the b a r t e r  agreement was 
no t  i n  the  s p i r i t  of the  new t rade  a c t  under which B r a z i l  
and the  United S t a t e s  were then negotiat ing a  t r e a t y ,  H u l l  
went t o  extreme ca re  t o  prepare arguments t o  give t o  Rooae- 
v e l t  i n  opposi t ion t o  such b a r t e r  deals ,  Even a f t e r  Roose- 
v e l t  had publ ica l ly  endoraed It, H u l l  continued t o  po in t  out 
t h a t  t h i s  b a r t e r  deal  was the very type of arrangement t h a t  
t h e  new t a r i f f  and t rade  policy hoped t o  el iminate,  Af te r  
long conversationa with H u l l ,  Roosevelt withdrew h i s  support 
from the dea l  and by the  end of the winter, Peek's o f f i c e  a s  
Foreign Trade Coordinator had been eliminated, 1 
Aa H u l l  continued to  f i g h t  agains t  the op?oait ion t o  
a rev i sed  t a r i f f  policy, a  nat ional  magazine s t a t e d  t h a t  
a f t e r  one year of the  adminis t ra t ionf  3 f i g h t  t o  b r i n g  about 
domestic r ev iva l  by a r t i f i c i a l  methods, the p res iden t  had 
been won over t o  the conclueion tha t  permanent domestic re-  
covery depended on the  rev iva l  of fore ign t radem2 Won overn 
expla ins  H u l l t  s r o l e  which was constant ly  one of convincing 
'~~11, 2. e m ,  pp* 373-74- 
2 n ~ e t r e a t  from Economic Nationalism, loc  , c i t e  
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Roosevelt, t h e  Congress, and those opposed t o  the  l i b e r a l  
t r ade  program. Even a f t e r  the new trade a c t  became law i n  
the  spr ing  of 1934, H u l l  faced problems a s  r e f l e c t e d  by t h e  
ac t ions  of George Peek described above, and even f rom Roose- 
v e l t  himself. H u l l  s t a t e s  i n  h i s  memoirs t h a t  by  t h e  f a l l  
of 1934, Roosevelt had l o s t  much of h i e  p ree l ec t ion  i n t e r e s t  
i n  fo re ign  t rade  due t o  concern f o r  domestic a f f a 1 r s . l  In 
t he  f a l l  of t h a t  year Roosevelt wrote t o  H u l l :  "Like moat 
p rob lem with which you and I have been connected during maqy 
years,  t h e r e  a r e  two s ides  t o  the  argument. I n  p u r e  theory 
you and I th ink  a l ike ,  but every once i n  awhile w e  have t o  
modify a p r inc ip l e  t o  meet a hard and disagreeable fact."' 
To Hull t h i s  meant the possible modification of h i s  p r e r a m .  
B u t  u n t i l  the  war t h r e a t  became more and more s e r i o u s  i n  t h e  
l a t e  t h i r t i e a ,  H u l l  was able  t o  r e a l i z e  the implementation 
of h i s  po l ic ies .  The t h r e a t  of war was one of t h o s e  " f a c t s N  
t o  be faced. Roosevelt was under more p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  
than waa H u l l .  This would be another " f ac tn  t h a t  Roosevelt 
had t o  be aware of.  
As i f  winning over the  preaident and hia  a d v i s o r s  was 
not a l a r g e  enough task ,  H u l l  had t o  contend with t h e  Con- 
gross .  The method of determining what t a r i f f  concessions 
would be made and who would be i n  charge of negotiat ing t r ade  
agreements was the main eource of controversy when discussions 
of the  t rade  b i l l  began e a r l y  i n  1934. The adminis t ra t ion 
f e l t  t h a t  f l e x i b i l i t y  was needed i n  t rade  deals .  Any a l t e r -  
a t i o n  which would reduce the pres ident ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  negot ia te  
f r e e l y  would reduce the concept of f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  t he  b i l l . '  
The b i l l  was intended t o  give posi t ive  power t o  take s t eps  
needed t o  increase the  flow of products and i n  H u l l ' s  phi lo-  
sophy, keep the  peace. Flexibility had t o  be insured i n  t he  
a c t  becauae i n  eeal ing with such a  var ie ty  of  count r ies  and 
economies, no general  program could be applied. There were 
h o s t i l e  countr ies ,  planned economies, and high pro tec t ion  
countries. Each of these m u s t  be handled individual ly ,  a l -  
though H u l l  s t ressed  t h a t  no country ahould be given g r e a t e r  
advantages than o ther  countr ies  with whom the Unite& S t a t e s  
had agreements. However, the  Congress had tended t o  be 
jealous of i t s  power over t a r i f f s ,  susceptible t o  protect ion- 
i s t  preaaura, and i s o l a t i o n i s t .  
Af te r  re turning from Montevideo, H u l l  began t o  d r a f t  
the b i l l  which he deeired and which he f e l t  could get  through 
Congress. Ye met with the  newly formed Executive Committee 
l n ~ t  the Observation Post, " Li te ra ry  Digest, C m I I  
(March 17,  19341, 13. 
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on Commercial Policy which was made up of representa t ives  of 
t h e  Treasury, Commerce, Agricul tura l  and S t a t e  Departments. 
Also t he  committee had a s  members t he  Chairman of t he  Tar i f f  
Comiss ion,  MXA, and AAA. The chairman of the committee was 
Under Secre tary  of S t a t e ,  W i l l i a m  Ph i l l i p s .  The committee 
was unanimous t h a t  Congress should pass l e g i s l a t i o n  d i r e c t -  
i ng  the  pres ident  to  en t e r  i n t o  rec iproca l  t rade  agreements. 1 
The a b i l i t y  of t he  president  t o  e n t e r  i n t o  these agreements 
by executfve agreement was deemed most necessary because the  
United S t a t e s  would be deal ing with so many countr ies  fn 
which the executive had t h a t  power, Without i t ,  the  p res i -  
dent  and the negot ia t ing groups would be se r ious ly  l imi ted.  
On February 28, H u l l  met with the presfdent t o  go 
over the  propoeed d r a f t .  Roosevelt agreed with it and agreed 
t o  aubmit it t o  Congress. Most of the  opposi t ion t o  the  pro- 
posed b i l l  came from the Republican Senators who f e l t  t h a t  
it robbed the  Senate of i t s  power. However, i n  hearings 
even the  Chairman of the Tar i f f  Commission argued t h a t  the  
b i l l  did not a c t u a l l y  give the pres ident  enough power i n  
making agreements. 2 
I n  h i s  appearance before t h e  House Ways and Means 
2 w ~  Calendar of C o n t r o ~ e r a y , ~  Forum, CIX (May 19&), 
280. 
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Committee on March 8, H u l l  s t a t ed  t h a t  t h i s  was not a r a d i c a l  
at tempt t o  dea l  with the economic s i t ua t ion ,  but was ". . . 
a n  emergency measure t o  dea l  with a  dangerous and threaten-  
ing emergency condition. H u l l  argued t o  t h e  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  
t h a t  they d i d n ' t  need t o  f e a r  United S t a t e s  Involvement in 
war because of a  t rade  ac t .  Re pointed out t h a t  the re  were 
no wars a t  t he  present  time and t h a t  t he  t rade  b i l l  would be 
a  p o s i t i v e  s t e p  towards peace.* It i s  noteworthy t h a t  the  
only a r ea  i n  which the  i s o l a t i o n i a t s  were wi l l ing t o  consent 
t o  a  breach i n  t h e i r  i s o l a t i o n i s t  pol icy  was Lat in  America. 3 
Since most of the  domestic f e a r  of the  t r ade  a c t  came 
from those t h a t  f e l t  t h a t  they would be adversely a f f ec t ed  
by reduct ion,  g u l l  apent much time attempting t o  paci fy  t h a t  
f e a r ,  He sa id  t h a t  even though negotiat ions f o r  agreements 
would be handled by a spec i a l  group who would be f r e e  from 
preaaure, it would be wrong t o  assume t h a t  spokesmen f o r  
varioua groups would not be heard and t h e i r  arguments con- 
s idered.  He a lao pointed out t h a t  negotiator8 would have a 
very c l e a r  p ic tu re  of the  precise  e f f e c t s  d i f f e r e n t  reduc- 
t i o n s  would have on American commerce because the Commerce 
Department and the  Ta r i f f  Comniasion had such s tud ies  made 
1 
over t h e  years .  The t rade  a c t  would a l s o  p ro t ec t  American 
expor ters  from other  unfai r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  besides the  t a r i f f ,  
such a s  separa te ly  negotiated quotas with other  countr ies ,  
by having a statement i n  the  agreements t o  the  e f f e c t  t h a t  
t h e r e  would be equa l i ty  of treatment i n  a l l  forms.* The 
a c t s  would a l s o  conta in  the prmviously mentioned and d i s -  
cussed "most favored nat ionw clause t o  give American export- 
e r a  t he  f u l l e s t  advantages. H u l l  argued t h a t  t h i s  would 
a c t u a l l y  b e n e f i t  a country with d i v e r s i f i e d  exports ,  such 
a s  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  more than one with one s p e c i a l i t y  be- 
cause count r ies  with a monoculture would automatical ly dom- 
i n a t e  t h e  fo re ign  market anyway because t h e i r  export would 
be a s p e c i a l i t y  i n  which they excel. The f a c t  t h a t  i n  t h e  
e e r l y  t h i r t i e s ,  aaventy one per cen t  of United S t a t e s  im-  
ports were from countriea which spec ia l i zed  i n  one product 
showa t h a t  most t rade  does conais t  of spec ia l i zed  products. 3 
Therefore i f  something i s  dona t o  s t imulate  i n t e rna t iona l  
t rade ,  those countr ies  which export a wide range of goods 
w i l l  r ece ive  the highest  por t ion of the margin of increase .  
After  t h r ee  months, the  Congress f i n a l l y  passed t h e  
Trade Agreements Act l a rge ly  a s  a r e s u l t  of H u l l ' s  Influence. 
Hull was the  only high ranking member of the adminis t ra t ion 
wi th  a  congressional  background. H i s  f r i endsh ip  with t h e  
leading congressmen was a  help i n  ge t t i ng  the  b i l l  enacted. 
The pres iden t  signed the  b i l l  on June 12, 1934. The a c t  
author ized the president  t o  negot ia te ,  over a  th ree  year 
period,  t r ade  agreements with o ther  countr ies  a l t e r i n g  United 
S t a t e s  t a r i f f s  by not more than f i f t y  per  cent  e i t h e r  up o r  
down from present  l eve l s .  H e  could not remove any item from 
t h e  f r e e  l i s t  nor could he add any t o  the  l i s t .  A l l  agree- 
ments t h a t  would be negotiated would be extended t o  a l l  
coun t r i e s  with which the  United S t a t e s  had s imi l a r  t r e a t i e s .  1 
The a c t  was extended i n  1937. 1 
m 
That Congress should have authorized the  H u l l  t r ade  t 
program a t  the  aame time t h a t  i t  was approving measures look- 
ing towarda quotaa and price f i x i n g  may seem incons i s ten t .  
B u t  it may r e f l e c t  Hull1a g rea t  influence i n  Congress i n  the  
midst of t h i a  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  economic sentiment. Also as ex- 
periment a f t e r  experiment was adopted end discardedS2 Aull 'a 
program survived and did r e s u l t  i n  an increase  i n  fo re ign  
commerce.-( I n  addit ion,  the  a c t  d id  not make any se r ious  
2 ~ e v  Deal measures such a s  AAA, NRA, and PYA. 
3 ~ u e l 1 ,  G., pp. 21-2. 
inroads on e a r l y  New Deal domestic po l i c i e s  of recovery be- 
cause t he  e f f e c t s  were not ac tua l ly  important u n t i l  l a t e  
1935 and 1936, by which time recovery was under way. 1 
The t r ade  agreements were t o  be reached pr imar i ly  
through the  S t a t e  Department by a spec ia l  commission working 
with u n i t s  from other  administrat ive departments and the  
business  community, Before negotiat ions t he  country w i t h  
whom negot ia t ions  were t o  be held would be announced, but  
not t h e  items t o  be discussed. H u l l  defended t h i s  a s  more 
e f f i c i e n t  than i f  a l l  items were l i s t e d e 2  The p r inc ip l e  of 
uncondit ional  most favored nat ion treatment gave p r a c t i c a l  
expression t o  the  p r inc ip les  l a i d  down a t  the Montevideo 
Conference because it encouraged wider app l i ca t ion  of t he  
l i b e r a l  agreements t o  be reached i n  t he  b i l a t e r a l  agreeaenta.  
A s  w i l l  be aeen, La t in  countr ies  were among the  very f i r s t  
t o  negot ia te  t rade  agreements with the United S ta tes .  They 
aaw t he  advantage t o  be accrued by receiving most favored 
nat ion treatment which would come a s  the  United S t a t e s  made 
t r ade  t r e a t i e s  with o ther  countr ies  which were p o t e n t i a l  
marketa f o r  Lat in  American products. I n  June of 1934, a f t e r  
t he  t r ade  a c t  was aigned, President Alfonso Lopez of 
l ~ h a r l e s  A. Beard, and George H. E. S s i t h ,  T h e  Old 
Deal and the  New (New York: Macmillan Company, 1 9 4 ? J , T  239. 
----
' ~ u l d ,  9. G., pp. 38-9. 
Columbia s t a t ed :  
The harmony between our democracies and the  United 
S t a t e s  i s  now unmarred by t he  s l i g h t e s t  l a ck  of con- 
f idence .  The po l icy  of the  "Good Neighbor," pursued 
l o y a l l y  and unswervingly by the present  government of 
t he  United S t a t e s ,  has i n  a yea r ' s  time fundamentally 
changed the  atmosphere of anx ie ty  o r  discordance i n  
which our i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  were c a r r i e d  on, 
threatened f o r  many years by t h e  danger of in terven-  
t i o n  o r  the  curtai lment  of the  na t iona l  sovereignty of 
some of the  members of the  Pan Anerican union.1 
This  statement was made a f t e r  a  year  t h a t  had seen r e s t r a i n t  
i n  Cuba, an  e g a l i t a r i a n  s p i r i t  a t  Montevideo, a  pol icy  of 
coopera t ion i n  the  Chaco War, and the  Trade Agreement Act 
H u l l ' s  philosophy of economic recovery a l s o  included 
t h e  po l icy  of not t y ing  debt pap-ent  and t r a d e  agreements 
toge ther .  He f e l t  t h a t  t o  demand repayment of debt  from 
increased fo re ign  commerce would d r a i n  o f f  t he  money t h a t  
coun t r i e s  would earn  and thereby reduce t h e i r  use of the  
income f o r  investment i n  increased production a ~ d  Imports. 2 
This was e spec i a l l y  t r u e  of t he  debtor  nat ions  such a s  t he  
La t in  Amsrican s t a t e s .  They were debtors  t o  p r iva t e  United 
S t a t e s  f i n a n c i a l  sources,  an2 t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  pay these  
aourcea was t i e d  t o  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  produce and export  t h a t  
l n ~ v e n t s  of Pan-American Signif  icance during 1934, 
B u l l e t i n  --- of the  Pan American Union, IXIX (Farch 1935), 232. 
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product ion .  It w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  a  cause  of L a t i n  hog- 
t i l i t y  towards t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  was t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  
cou ld  g e t  l i t t l e  r e l i e f  from t h e i r  d e b t s  and t h a t  t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s  s o  dominated them economical ly  tha t  t h e y  were kep t  i n  
a dep res sed  cond i t ion .  The t r a d e  a c t  had t h e  e f f e c t  of 
g i v i n g  them t h e  oppor tun i ty  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  ou tpu t  and 
make payments on t h e i r  deb t .  
Hu l l  a l s o  opposed any measure which d id  no t  r ecogn ize  
t h e  i d e a l  of m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  such  as b a r t e r i n g ,  b i l a t e r a l  
b a l a n c i n g ,  and expor t  bount iea .  This  was because he f e l t  
t ha t  t h e y  prevented  t h e  f u l l  f u n c t i o n i n g  of t r a d e  and r e -  
coverg.' These types  of t r a d e  d e a l a  o n l y  had t h e  e f f e c t  of 
i n c r e a s i n g  trade between two c o u n t r i e s ,  and t h e y  s e t  l i m i t s  
t o  t h e  volume. They d i d  n o t  encourage e f f i c i e n c y  and the 
t h e o r y  of specialization of  product ion.  Th i s  a g a i n  was i m -  
p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  L a t i n  Americana who ware i n  such  a n  advan- 
t ageous  p o s i t i o n  t o  produce c e r t a i n  types  of products .  With- 
o u t  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  expansion,  t h e  L a t i n  Americans were 
s t i l l  l i m i t e d  i n  t h e  t o t a l  amount of p roduc t ion  t h e y  c o u l d  
s e l l .  
Fo re ign  t r a d e  with  L a t i n  America began t o  r i s e  by t h e  
end of 1934. The volume of t r a d e  r o s e  b y  t u e n t y  seven  p e r  
c e n t ;  Uni ted S t a t e s  imports  roae  by  seven teen  while t h e  
United S t a t e s  exports t o  La t in  America rose f o r t y  three  per 
cent  .' The policy applied t o  the t r o p i c a l  areas  of La t in  
America was t o  keep most items e i t h e r  on a  low t a r i f f  b a s i s  
o r  on the  f r e e  l is t .  Only four  countr ies ,  Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica, Argentina and Columbia, showed a decline i n  s a l e s  t o  
the  United S t a t e s .  2 
The l a r g e s t  suppl iers  i n  La t in  America, Cuba, Braz i l ,  
and Columbia were among the  f i rs t  La t in  American countr ies  
t o  s i g n  agreements. Because of i t s  des i re  t o  s e l l  l a rge  
amounts of sugar i n  the  United S ta t e s ,  Cuba negotiated the  
f i r s t  r ec ip roca l  t rade agreement. Although the  Cuban agree- 
ment d i d  s e t  up a  quota on Cuban augar of two mil l ion tons,  
t he  t a r i f f  was reduced from one and one hal f  cents  a pound 
t o  nine t en ths  of a  cent per T a r i f f s  were a l s o  re -  
duced on tobacco, r u m ,  and winter vegetables. Cuba r ec i -  
procated with reduction8 on l a rd ,  f l o u r ,  and machinery. 4 
During t h e  f i r s t  four teen flonths of t h i s  Cuban agreement, 
t r a d e  rose aeventy th ree  per  cent  between the  two countr ies .  5 
When it i a  r ea l i zed  t h a t  t he  reduction i n  t rade  with Cuba 
l ~ a t i l d a  Phillips, "Trade of t h e  United S t a t e s  with 
Lat in  America i n  1934,'' Bu l l e t in  of the  Pan American Union, 
--- 
LXIX (Apr i l  19351, 323. 
% o r d e l l  H u l l ,  "Hlgh Tarif r vs . Trade, ' Harpers, CLXXII 
(Maroh 1936), 385-92. 
before  t h e  t rade  a c t  could be measured i n  817,000 ac re s  of 
United S t a t e s  farm land being out of production, it i s  not 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  see  t h a t  t he  e f f ec t s  on the  United S t a t e s  econany 
were not a s  adverse a s  some had feared.  1 
An agreement went i n to  e f f e c t  with Braz i l  on January 1, 
1936. It provided t h a t  the  United S t a t e s  would keep coffee  
on t h e  f r e e  l i s t  and give a f i f t y  per  cen t  reduct ion on o the r  
i tems of importance.* Keeping coffee on the  f r e e  l i s t  i n  
t h e  case  of B r a z i l  and other  coffee producing count r ies  was 
i n  e f f e c t  a  favorable a c t  because many o the r  nat ions charged 
a t e n  cen t s  per  pound t a r i f f  on coffee imports. The agree- 
ment a l s o  provided f o r  "most favored nat ionn treatment on ! 
I 
quotas,  taxes,  and exchange controls  i n  add i t i on  t o  t a r i f f s  
unlssa an exception would be made by mutual agreement. 3 
Within t he  marly montha of t h i s  agreement t r ade  began t o  
r i s e .  However, f u r t h e r  events of world c r i a i s  make f i g u r e s  
f o r  t h e  l a t e  t h i r t i e s  mlaleadlng a s  t o  t he  e f f e c t s  of t h e  act. 
Columbia and the  United S t a t e s  s igned t h e i r  agreement 
i n  September of 1935. I n  the t e x t  of t h e  t r e a t y ,  the  Colum- 
bians  expressed concern f o r  t he  dec l ine  i n  t rade  t h a t  had 
' ~ ~ r a d e  Agreement between B r a z i l  and t h e  United S ta tes , '  
B u l l e t i n  --- of t he  Pan American Union, LXX (January 1936), 58-9. 
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t a k e n  p l a c e  and expressed hope t h a t  t h i s  would be preserved. 1 
Columbia gave reduc t ions  of f i f t y  e i g h t  p e r  c e n t  on t h e  
goods imported from the  United S t a t e s ,  and t h e  United S t a t e s  
i n  t u r n  gave reduc t ions  on c e r t a i n  items p l u s  t h e  agreement 
t o  keep coffee  f r e e .  2 
Other  agreements were a l a o  made w i t h  H a i t i ,  Honduras, 
Guatamala, and Nicaragm. They had e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same pro- 
v i a i o n s  ars t h e  ones descr ibed  above. C e r t a i n  i tems were r e -  
duced and o t h e r s  kept  f r e e ,  and a l l  agreements conta ined  t h e  
"most f avored  na t ionn  clause.  
By t h e  end of 1935, a l l  c o u n t r i e s  showed economic Im- 
provement wi th  t h e  e s p e c i a l l y  notable  r i s e  i n  f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  3 
There was a l s o  t h e  accompanying b e n e f i t  of i n c r e a s e d  a b i l i t y  
t o  g e t  l o a n s  and e s t a b l i s h  i n t e r n a l  f i s c a l  a t a b i l i t y . 4  The 
p a r  c e n t  of t r a d e  i n c r e a s e  and amount of t r a d e  v o l u m  was 
h i g h e r  w i t h  nagreementn c o u n t r i e s  than  "non-agreementH coun- 
t r i e s ;  and t h e  Unitad S t a t e s 1  import8 r o s e  above expor t s  
w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e  balance of t r a d e  became a o r e  f avor -  
l u ~ e c i p r o c a l  Trade Agreement between Columbia end t h e  
United S t a t e a ,  B u l l e t i n  --- of t h e  Pan American Union, ml3C 
(November 1935),  860. 
3n~oonornic Progresa i n  t h e  Americas, 1935, B u l l e t i n  
of t h e  Pan American Union, LXX (February 19361, 166. 
--- 
able t o  L a t i n  American countr ies  i n  general ,  often a s  h igh  
a s  a  r a t i o  of two t o  one.' Comparing 1938 t o  1933, L a t i n  
Americana were receiving t h i r t y  th ree  per  cent  of t h e  fo re ign  
t r ade  of t h e  United S t a t e s  i n  1938 a s  opposed t o  a  previous 
twenty nine. 2 
European countr ies  tended t o  keep r e s t r i c t i v e  t r ade  
a t t i t u d e s  towards La t in  America i n  the  l a t e  t h i r t i e s ,  3 
Other count r ies  d id  en t e r  i n t o  t rade  agreements w i t h  t h e  
United S t a t e s ,  however, with the  r e s u l t i n g  bene f i t s  t o  La t in  
America from t h e  nmost favored nat ionn c lauses  which Hull 
had i n s i s t e d  upon. Rates on s i x t y  per cent  of t he  goods 
from t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  Canada were reducedm4 France, 
Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, and t h e  Swiss 
a l l  made agreements and by 1938, America was the  l a r g e s t  ex- 
p o r t e r  i n  t he  world ( p a r t i a l l y  due to  arms  sale^).^ These 
agreemanta genera l ly  s e t  up quotas and reduced t a r i f f s  and 
put  f o r t y  per  cent  of a l l  3n i ted  S t a t e s  fo re ign  t r a d e  under 
r e c i p r o c a l  agreernente.6 I n  nost  of the t r ade  a c t s  t h e r e  was 
3 ~ e n r ~  Chalmera. "Foreign T a r i f f s  and Comerc ia1  
P o l i c i e s  i n  La t in  ~ m e r i c a  during 1935," B u l l e t i n  --- of t h e  Pan 
Amerioan Union, LXX (Apri l  1936), 403-4. 
a  p rov is ion  enabling the contrac t ing p a r t i e s  t o  embargo 
arms, gold,  o r  any mate r ia l s  needed i n  war.' Because of 
t h e i r  con t ro l l ed  economies, agreements were not reached with 
d i c t a t o r  count r ies  except Russia. 2 
Within twenty seven months of the  Pan-American Con- 
f erence a t  Montevideo the re  were eleven r e c i p r o c a l  agree- 
ments of  t h e  type proposed by H u l l .  H u l l t s  d e a i r e  t o  solve 
world commercial problems by lessen ing  economic nat ional ism 
brought slow bu t  constant  succeas. 3 
Norman A. Graebner i n  h i s  s tudy of S e c r e t a r i e s  of 
S t a t e  i n  t he  20th Century s t a t e s :  
If one judges by the immediacy of r e s u l t s  a s  well  
a s  by  t he  n o b i l i t y  of in ten t ion ,  Eu l l  appeared t o  even 
g r e a t e r  advantage i n  h i s  management of r e l a t i o n s  with 
t h e  La t in  American S t a t e s ,  Here h i s  motives were 
s i m i l a r  t o  those underlying the r e c i p r o c a l  t rade  pro- 
gram, f o r  he viewed the "Good Neighbor" po l icy  both a s  
a meana of ex t end iw  the  network of t r a d e  agreements 
and a chance t o  implement Wilaonian i d e a s ,  Re was 
a ided  not only by the  p res iden t ' s  c o n s i s t e n t  approval 
and a o t i v e  sup o r t ,  bu t  a l s o  by many o t h e r  favorable  
circurnstancea. E 
On January 1, 1935, Secre tary  E u l l  i s s u e d  h i s  annual 
'~dwio  Barchard, and William P. Loge. Neut ra l i ty  f o r  
-
t h e  United S t a t e s  (second ed i t ion ;  New Xaven, Ccnnectlcut: 
m e  Vnivers l ty  Preas, 19401, p. 331. 
 orma man A. Grsebner (ed. ) , An Uncer ta in  Tradi t ion ,  
American Sec re t a r i e s  of S t a t e  i n  tG Tuen t i a th  Century ('NOW 
York: Ib!cGraw H i l l ,  l%l= 1 9 7 7  
s ta tement  i n  which he reemphasized t h e  United S t a t e s '  d e s i r e  
t o  mainta in  peace, both p o l i t i c a l l y  and economically. Row- 
ever ,  nothing could be pointed t o  i n  the  p a s t  year t h a t  
would give  hope t o  t h i s  end except events  i n  La t in  America.  
There had been t h e  abrogation of the  P l a t t  Amendment, t h e  
implementation of the Montevideo p r inc ip l e s  of t a r i f f  r e -  
v i s i o n ,  a  new Panamanian t r ea ty ,  t h e  withdrawal of M a r i n e s  
from H a i t i ,  and even some progress on the  Pan-American 
~ i g h w a ~ . ~  There was a l a o  the r ec ip roca l  t r a d e  a c t  just 
mentioned. B u t  throughout the  world events  seemed t o  b e  
moving towards war. H u l l  had even f o r e c a s t  e a r l i e r  that i f  
nothing were done t o  prevent war t h e r e  would be war b y  tha  
early f o r t i e a .  I n  d iscuss ing world events from mid 1935 on, 
H u l l  a t a t ad :  
I n  t h i a  period I could no longer  separa te  them, be- 
cause they refused t o  be separated.  . . . O u r  Wes t e rn  
Hemisphere could no longer be considered by i t s e l f ;  i t  
had a l s o  t o  be considered i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  the  a x i s  
powarla i n t en t ions  here. O u r  domestic l e g i s l a t i o n  r e -  
l a t i n g  t o  fo re ign  a f f a i r s  was inf luenced by t he  g r o w t h  
of t he  war t h r e a t  i n  ~ u r o ~ e  .2 
From t h i s  s tatement  i t  becomes evident  t h a t  H u l l  r e a l i z e d  
t h e  s t r a t e g i c  value of La t in  America t o  United S t a t e s  se- 
c u r i t y .  If h o s t i l e  powers were a b l e  t o  c a p i t a l i z e  o n  a n  
unf r iend ly  a t t i t u d e  towards the United S t a t e s ,  they  mould 
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poss ib ly  f i n d  a  bas i s  f o r  aggression aga ins t  t he  United 
S t a t e s  i n  a  La t in  country. This i a  probably the  reason why 
it sometimes i s  sa id  t h a t  t he  Good Neighbor policy sprang 
from f e a r  of t h i s  very thing. However nothing i n  H u l l 1  a  
e a r l i e r  s tatements would ind ica te  t h a t  t h e  e a r l y  ac t ions  
which c o n s t i t u t e d  the  Good Neighbor po l icy  were founded on 
t h a t  fear .  Instead,  a s  H u l l  s t a ted ,  l e g i s l a t i o n  r e l a t i n g  t o  
f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  was influenced i n  1935 by f e a r  of a  war i n  
Europe. H u l l  opposed the ac t ions  t h a t  Congress would take  
t o  i n s u l a t e  t h e  United S t a t e s  a s  being incons i s ten t  with his 
philosophy of i n t e rna t iona l  cooperation. He continued t o  
a t tempt  t o  influence t h e  Congress t o  move away from i so la t ion ,  1 
I 
but  wi th  on ly  l imi ted  success a s  we s h a l l  see ,  Congressional 
a c t i o n  wea not completely i n  accordance with the  philosophy 
of the  Good Neighbor, and therefore  H u l l ' s  a t tempts t o  modify 
t he  Congreaa' a c t i on  cons t i t u t e s  p a r t  of h i s  r o l e  i n  the  
development of t h a t  policy. 
Unfortunately f o r  E u l l ' s  policy, i s o l a t i o n i s t s  were 
i n  con t ro l1  of Congress and t h e i r  a c t i o n s  i n  1935 and 1936 
would not more the  world c loser  t o  peace.1 The i s o l a t i o n -  
i s t a  f e l t  t h a t  t h e i r  a t t a c k  on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  program such 
aa H u l l ' s  was justified by the  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  world of 1935 
l a in ton ,  loc. c i t .  
- -  
was no t  what it was supposed t o  have been a f t e r  World War I, 
The world waa not 'safe f o r  democracy, H u l l  agreed t h a t  
t h e  world was not what it was supposed t o  be bu t  f e l t  t h a t  
t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  should make an at tempt  t o  prevent  war, 
However t h e  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  world was too  f a r  
gone t o  save. 
Hul l  s t a t e d  i n  h i s  memoirs: 
What most advocates of s t r i n g e n t  n e u t r a l i t y  by l e g i s -  
l a t i o n  f o r g o t ,  moreover, was t h a t  an e n t i r e l y  new s i t u -  
a t i o n  had en te red  i n t o  world a f f a i r s  r i g h t  i n  t h e i r  own 
l i f e t i m e ,  The p r i v a t e  c i t i z e n ,  even i f  he d i d  n o t  wish 
t o  r u n  t h e  r i s k  of i n j u r y  by g e t t i n g  i n t o  t h e  f i g h t  t o  
h e l p  t h e  v ic t im,  could a t  l e a s t  c a l l  t h e  po l i ce ,  and 
when t h e  p o l i c e  came he could he lp  t h e  o f f i c e r s  o f  t h e  
law and c e r t a i n l y  would do nothing t o  impede them, 
P r i o r  t o  t h e  f i r s t  World War t h e r e  had been no s u c h  
p o l i c e  f o r  t h e  world. B u t  a f t e r  t h e  war, t h e r e  came 
i n t o  being the  League of Nations, whose members c o u l d  
a c t  t o g e t h e r  t o  thwart  an aggressor  and h e l p  t h e  v i c t i m .  2 
The type of n e u t r a l i t y  t h a t  B u l l  i s  d e s c r i b i n g  i s  t h a t  which 
was favored  by t h e  seventeenth century  w r i t e r ,  Hugo Gro t ius ,  
who ~ecommanded a code f o r  n e u t r a l  na t ions  t o  observe,  Ha 
had not recommended t h a t  a country at tempt  t o  i s o l a t e  i t s e l f  
i n t o  n e u t r a l i t y ,  but he expected a count ry  t o  examine t h e  
r i g h t  and t h e  wrong of a  war and t o  support  t h e  n a t i o n  i n  
t h e  r i g h t .  Thia I n  e f f e c t  was what t h e  countries a t  t h e  Pan- 
American Conference a t  Montevideo had favored  a s  d e s i r a b l e .  
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It was what the  Peace Conference a t  Buenos Airea i n  1936 
would t ake  s t e p s  t o  insure.  By remaining neu t ra l ,  a country 
renders  the  wicked more powerful and the  r i g h t ' s  cause more 
d i f f i c u l t .  The i s o l a t i o n i s t e  argued t h a t  even i f  people 
f a v o r  one s i d e  o r  another,  the government m u s t  take s t e p s  
t o  keep aloof and r e e t r i c t  the r ightsof  c i t i z e n s  i n  order  
t o  prevent  incidents.' To H u l l ,  t o  go on record  t h a t  the 
United S t a t e s  would s t a y  neu t ra l  waa d e f e a t i s t .  
Col lec t ive  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s  recognized t h a t  the sa fe -  
t y ,  economy, and o ther  i n t e r e s t s  of the  United S t a t e s  were 
t i a d  t o  the  genera l  condit ion of peace and a t a b i l i t y  i n  t he  
world. This had always been pa r t  of American po l icy  and was 1 
not  i n  c o n f l i c t  with continentalism. It was b e s t  expressed 
i n  J e f f e r son ' s  f i r a t  inaugural address. "Peace, comnerce 
and honeat f r iendship  with a l l  nations, entangling a l l i a n c e s  
w i t h  none, "* The be l ievers  In  t h i s  pol icy,  l i k e  H u l l ,  were 
a b l e  t o  get t h e  United S t a t e s  i n t o  tha t h i c k  of world po l i -  
t i c s  and t o  outwit  those i n  the  United S t a t e s  who wanted 
t h i n  country t o  mind i t s  own business, They found people 
w i l l i n g  t o  support non-pol l t ica l  c o n t ~ i b u t i o n s  towards peace, 
b u t  unwil l ing t o  cooperate i n  i n t e rna t i ona l  p o l i t i c a l  ac t ion .3  
l ~ i n t o n ,  OJ. cite, p. 280- 
' ~ e a r d  and Smith, G-, pp. 249-52. 3 ~ b i d .  -
Studen t  exchanges, c u l t u r a l  exchanges and s i m i l a r  a c t i v i t i e s  
* 
were viewed d i f f e r e n t l y  than p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  such as join- 
i n g  t he  League of Nations, 
This  philosophy f i t  well i n t o  the  framework of t h e  
Good Neighbor policy. The La t in  Americans were r e l u c t a n t  t o  
g e t  involved i n  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  might r e s u l t  i n  
domination by t h e  United S t a t e s ,  but they had ahown willing- 
ness a t  Montevideo t o  support m u l t i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n  t o  keep 
peace and f r i endsh ip ,  Willingness t o  consu l t  with e a c h  
o t h e r ,  the  favorable a t t i t u d e  toward the  peace r e s o l u t i o n ,  
and t h e i r  a c t i o n  i n  attempting pos i t i ve  a c t i o n  t o  end t h e  
Chaco War a l l  r e f l e c t e d  the  f a c t  t h a t  the  L a t i n  American 
c o u n t r i e s  favored a c t i o n  t o  su s t a in  peace o r  stop aggression, 
The r e c i p r o c a l  t r ade  a c t  had been i n  accord with the p h i l o s o -  
phy of c o l l e c t i v e  in ternat ional ism i n  t h a t  through m u t u a l  
agreements, c e r t a i n  des i red  r e s u l t s  could be a r r i v e d  at, 
Unfortunately,  t he  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  became very  f i r m  i n  t h e i r  
convic t ions  when the  r e a l  t h r e a t  of war became a p p a r e n t  in 
1935. 
The firmnesa with which the i s o l a t i o n i s t s  became de- 
voted t o  t h e i r  b e l i e f s  was i n  l a rge  measure inc reased  b y  the  
ac  t i v i t i e s  of Senator Gerald Nys's i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of mun i t i ons  
manufacturing. He operated on the theory  t h a t  the  U n i t e d  
S t a t s a  was dragged i n t o  World War I by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b a n k e r s  
who wished t o  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  loana and by m u n i t i o n s  makers 
who wanted t o  s e l l  weapons.' The committee g r a d u a l l y  b r o a d -  
ened  i t s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  t o  many q u e s t i o n s  of U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
involvement  i n  world a f f a i r s .  The i n v e s t i g a t i o n  marked a 
h i g h  p o i n t  i n  t h e  s t i m u l a t i o n  of popula r  i s o l a t i o n i s t  s e n t i -  
ment i n  America, a  s u s p i c i o n  of t h e  conduct  of  f o r e i g n  
a f f a i r s ,  and he lped  l e a d  t o  i n f l e x i b l e  n e u t r a l i t y  l a w s .  2 
H u l l  f e l t  t h e  commit tee t s  view was t h a t  i f  the s a l e  
o f  mun i t i ons  and t h e  g r a n t i n g  of l o a n s  t o  b e l l i g e r e n t s  c o u l d  
b e  p reven ted ,  t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  c o u l d  avoid 
war and  need n o t  coope ra t e  with c o u n t r i e s  t o w a r d  t h a t  end .  3 
H u l l  went f u r t h e r :  
The Nye Commission a roused  a n  i s o l a t i o n i s t  s e n t i m e n t  
t ha t  was t o  t i e  t h e  hands of t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  j u s t  
a t  t h e  v e r y  t ime when o u r  hands should  h a v e  been f r e e  
t o  p l a c e  t h e  weight of ou r  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  s c a l e s  where 
i t  would count .  . . It s t i r r e d  t h e  reseratment  of 
o t h e r  n a t i o n s  with whom we had no q u a r r e l s . 4  
R u l l  wae no t  opposed t o  l e g i s l a t i o n  which would g u i d e  
t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s 1  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  even t  of war. The S t a t e  
Department had begun t o  s t u d y  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of n e u t r a l i t y  
and n e u t r a l  r i g h t s  be fo re  t h e  Nye Commission began .  T h e  
S t a t e  Department wanted a f l e x i b l e  hand i n  n e u t r a l i t y  laws 
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a s  previously  mentioned. H u l l  favored a  p o l i c y  which could 
al low t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  a f f e c t  the  outcome of a war o r  
i t s  durat ion.  T h i s  had been the policy which the  Latins had 
supported a t  the  Pan-American Conf'erence a t  Montevideo. If 
t h e  United S t a t e s  were i n  a  pos i t ion  t o  c o n s u l t  with o ther  
a f f e c t e d  nat ions ,  some procedure could be worked out t o  
accomplish the  above goals .  
When the  Nye hearings had begun, Argent ina  protes ted  
c e r t a i n  a l l e g a t i o n s  Prom the committee concerning an Argentine 
Admiral. Mexico protes ted  a  reference t o  Pres iden t  Abelardo 
Rodriquea which questioned hie character.' Other  La t in  Amer- 
i c a n  governments protes ted  charges of b r i b e r y  involving some 
of t h e i r  hlgh o f f i c l t ~ l s . ~  Obviously the  hear ings  d id  nothing 
t o  promote the Good Neighbor policy, and as g u l l  s t a ted :  
"It i s  doubtful  t h a t  any Congreseional Committee has ever  
had a more unfortunate ef f e o t  on our f o r e i g n  r e l a t i ons ,  un- 
lean it be the  Senate Foreign Relations Comaittee coneider- 
i ng  t h e  Treaty of Versai l les ,  n 3  
Throughout the hearing of t h e  Nys committee, H u l l  
attemptad t o  r e s t r a i n  them. He pointed ou t  t h e  danger of 
a g i t a t i n g  c e r t a i n  countr ies ,  e spec i a l l y  England and France, 
a t  t h i e  c r i t i c a l  time i n  world relations, He appointed a 
S t a t e  Department o f f i c i a l  t o  work con t inua l ly  with t he  com- 
mi t t ee  i n  an attempt t o  r e s t r a i n  them. He constant ly  s en t  
messages t o  Roosevelt asking him t o  use h i s  influence,  and 
he and Roosevelt held meeting8 with the  Nye Committee i n  an  
a t tempt  t o  keep them from fu r the r  diplomatic blunders.' By 
e a r l y  1936, H u l l  was openly iaauing c r i t i c i sms  of t h e  Nye 
inves t iga t iona  as  harmful and cas t ing  se r ious  doubta on the  
2 i n t e g r i t y  of t he  United S t a t e s  government, Nevertheless, 
t he  Committee continued i ts  a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  two years. H u l l ' s  
cons tan t  at tempts t o  r e s t r a i n  and even end the  i nves t iga t ion  
served t o  show the  Lat in  Anerican governments as well  as 
o t h e r  nat lona t h a t  t h e  administrat ion was not i n  sympathy 
with t he  c o m i t t e e l s  f ee l ings  and po l ic ies .  
I n  the  aprlng of 1935, Senator Key Plttman, Chairman 
of t h e  Foreign Relations Cmai t tee ,  was pushing a b i l l  which 
contained a mandatory embargo c lause  i n  case of the  outbreak 
of h o a t i l ~ t l e s . ~  This mandatory embargo would have a bad 
e f f e c t  on the  La t in  Americans. The Lat in  Anrericans do not  
produce arm8 and ooneequently if they a r e  the vic t ims of 
aggress ion and war begins, they need t o  import the  weapons 
l ~ u 1 1 ,  - op. - ci t . ,  pp. 400-5. 
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with which t o  r e s i s t .  A mandatory embargo would have t h e  
e f f e c t  of c u t t i n g  off  mi l i t a ry  supplies.  T h i s  could be one 
of those  s i t u a t i o n s  H u l l  feared when good i n t e n t i o n s  would 
a c t u a l l y  work t o  the advantage of the aggressor .  I n  H u l l ' s  
mind, one s i d e  would be wrong, the  aggrassor,  
H u l l  t r i e d  t o  slow down congressional a c t i o n  on this  
b i l l  dur ing the  summer of 1935. He pointed o u t  t o  the  hear -  
ings  t h e  i s l f l e x i b i l l t y  of the  b i l l .  He r e p o r t e d  t h a t  t h e  
S t a t e  Department was working on a b i l l  which would be f l ex -  
i b l e  enough t o  f i g h t  aggression and yet keep t h e  danger of 
United S t a t e s  involvement a t  a minimum. R e  met  with Roose- 
v e l t  t o  g e t  h i s  support and convince him of t h e  need f o r  
f l e x i b i l i t y .  What if' the  League took a c t i o n  aga ins t  an  
aggreasor? ITow could the United S t a t e s  s i t  back and do 
nothing? Thia would be opposed t o  t he  t h e o r y  of l n t e rna t ion -  
a 1  cooperat ion and aga ins t  the  philosophy o f  t he  Good Neigh- 
bor. 
By Ju ly  20, a b i l l  was completed by t h e  S t a t e  Depart- 
ment which would have givan the president  the power t o  da- 
c l a r a  embargoaa, regula te  munition8 t r a f f i c  and  r egu la t e  
f o r e i g n  vessel8  i n  American waters. Xowever it was qu ick ly  
n ~ p a r e n t  t h a t  the  Congress was not wi l l ing  to give t h e  presi-  
dent  t h a t  f l e x i b l e  d i sc re t ion .  1 
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Hul l  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  war between Ethiopia  and I t a l y  was 
impending and t h a t  some kind of n e u t r a l i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n  was 
needed. He  went t o  Roosevelt e a r l y  i n  August and reques ted  
t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  a s k  Congress t o  pass a  r e s o l u t i o n  g iv ing  
Roosevel t  t h e  power t o  apply d i s c r e t i o n a r y  embargoes if war 
were t o  b reak  out.  This a t tempt  t o  give the  p res iden t  a 
f l e x i b l e  hand a l s o  f a i l e d ,  and on August 20 Senator  Pi t tman 
in t roduced  h i s  n e u t r a l i t y  bi l l . '  
H u l l  met with House l eader s  and they agreed that  t h e  
Pi t tman b i l l  would be passed, bu t  H u l l  was success fu l  i n  
g e t t i n g  t h e  House t o  a t t a c h  an amendment which would make 
t h e  mandatory embargo c lause  expi re  i n  s i x  months. 2 
The Pit tman Resolut ion was then  passed on August 23 
and a e n t  t o  the  pres ident .  Roosevelt then s e n t  H u l l  a  note  
a s k i n g  i f  i t  ahould be signed, H u l l  r e p l i e d  t h a t  he d i d  not  
f a v o r  t h e  r e a o l u t i o n ,  t h a t  it r e s t r i c t e d  the  e x e c u t i v e l s  
a b i l i t y  t o  conduct f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ,  and t h a t  i t  would not  
a l low t h e  United S t a t a s  t o  take  p o s i t i v e  a c t i o a  t o  s t o p  
aggress ion .  However, e lnce t h e  mandatory embargo c lausa  
would e x p i r a  i n  s i x  months and the  b i l l  would have t o  be r e -  
vived,  it would ba b e a t  t o  s i g n  it i n  the  f ace  of t h e  
Etheopian c r i e i a .  3 
The Neut ra l i ty  Act of 1935 con ta ined  the mandatory 
embargo a c t  as described, but a l so  e s t ab l f shed  a  munitions 
c o n t r o l  board which would regula te  and superv i se  the  export 
of munitions by a  r e g i s t r a t i o n  and l i c e n s i n g  system. The 
a c t  t h e r e f o r e  went f u r t h e r  than j u s t  p r e sc r ib ing  a c t i o n  t o  
be t aken  i n  the  event of war, i t  at tempted t o  r e s t r i c t  t he  
s a l e s  of munitions which many feared would draw the  United 
S t a t e s  i n t o  a  war. 
L a t i n  Americans did not receive  t h e  Neut ra l i ty  Act 
w i t h  enthusiasm. Since they were not expor te r s  nor producers 
of war ma te r i a l s ,  and s ince  they opposed t r e a t i n g  b e l l i g e r -  
e n t s  equal ly ,  t h e  a c t  caused some f r i c t i o n  t o  develop. They 
f e a r e d  t h a t  it might work t o  support a p o t e n t i a l  aggressor  
i n  L a t i n  ~ r n e r i c 1 . l  A t  the  Buenos Aires Peace Conference i n  
1936, t he se  disagreement8 were widely discussed. Hull atterupt- 
ed t o  pac i fy  t h e  delegates  on the  ques t ion  of n e u t r a l i t y  a s  
much aa  he was able  i n  l i g h t  of congress ional  a t t i t u d e s .  
The discussion of t h a t  conference w i l l  be taken up l a t e r .  
A s  H u l l  had fo recas t ,  the N e u t r a l i t y  Act was changed 
i n  February of 1936. The new a c t  gave t h e  pres ident  t h e  
a b i l i t y  t o  uae more pressure aga ins t  an aggressor  nat ion,  
The pres iden t  was given t he  power t o  r e s t r i c t  exports  of 
$orchard and Loge, 9. Gm, p. 334. 
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a r t i c l e s  of  war t o  any b e l l i g e r e n t  t o  t h e  pre-war l e v e l ,  1 
Another v e r y  important  provis ion  of t h e  new law was t h a t  t h e  
l a w  did n o t  app ly  t o  a L a t i n  Republic engaged i n  a  war w i t h  
a non-American s t a t e .  T h i s  was a p o s i t i v e  s t e p  towards g iv-  
i n g  concess ions  t o  the  L a t i n  American nat ions,  however i t  
s t i l l  d id  no t  remove t h e i r  opposi t ion t o  t h e  n e u t r a l i t y  p o l i c y  
of t h e  United S t a t e s  even though t h e  N e u t r a l i t y  Act committed 
the United S t a t e s  t o  a  promise of a l l i a n c e  with any American 
s t a t e  a g a i n s t  a f o r e i g n  f o e .  2 
As t h e  year  1935 moved towards i t s  conclusion, it 
s t i l l  was apparent  t h a t  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  of t h e  United 
S t a t e s  was e n t e r i n g  a new phaae which would r e s u l t  i n  a new 
r e l a t l o n a h i p  wi th  L a t i n  America and t h e  world. A f t e r  1936, 
e v e n t s  e laswhere i n  t h e  world would be consumfng much more 
of R u l l t a  ene rg iea  a s  g r e a t e r  immediate dangers had t o  be 
d e a l t  w i t h  i n  t h e  Orient  and Europe. The f i r s t  phase of  New 
Deal  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  had been simple. It involved con t inen t -  
a l i s m  and t h e  United S t a t e a  concent ra t ing  on i t s  own a f f a i r s  
and b e i n g  t h e  Good Neighbor. The period a f t e r  1935 would be 
complex.3 L a t i n  America would rece ive  l e s s  a t t e n t i o n ,  t h e  
t h r e a t  of war and t h e  d e s i r e  t o  i s o l a t e  t h e  United S t a t e s  
- 
b a r c h a r d  and Loge. OJ. e., P. 325. 
a n i d  pa  329. ?Beard and Smith, 9. G., p. 244. 
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f e r ence  was proposed f o r  one purpose, t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  common 
n e u t r a l  po l icy  f o r  t h e  Americas. Lat in  Americans were 
anxious t o  see  i f  t he  United S t a t e s  would adhe re  t o  the  
po l i cy  of non-intervention should war break o u t  i n  La t in  
America, o r  whether the  United S t a t e s  would p l a c e  embargoes 
on b e l l i g e r e n t s  t o  a f f e c t  the outcome of the  war. '  The 
n e u t r a l i t y  law passed i n  1936 p a r t i a l l y  answered some of t he  
L a t i n  American's f e a r s  a s  indicated by s t a t i n g  t h a t  i f  the  
war involved a  non-western hemispheric count ry  a s  one of t he  
b e l l i g e r e n t s ,  the  United S t a t e s  would not embargo the  west- 
e r n  hemispheric country. However, what i f  the war involved 
two American count r ies?  A t  Montevideo the L a t i n  American 
nat iona affirmed t h e i r  des i re  t o  a c t  c o l l e c t i v e l y  t o  s e t t l e  
conflicts within  the  hemisphere. No machinery f o r  consulta-  
t i o n  was e a t  up a t  t h a t  time and the r a t i f i c a t i o n  of peace 
t r e a t i e s  was only suggested. Thus H u l l ,  con t inu ing  hia  
"Interdependencen philosophy, des i red  some machinery which 
would in su re  common ac t ion  t o  keep peace. 
On January 30, 1936, Roosevelt sent  a l e t t e r  t o  a l l  
c h i e f s  of s t a t e  i n  La t in  America t o  suggest a conference on 
mean8 t o  inaure  peace. Portiona of the  l e t t e r  t o  the  
Argentine Pres ident  s t a t e d  f o r  example: 
I Barchard, OJ. g., p. 332. 
. . . I would therefore  deeply apprecia te  such views 
aa  your excellency may care  t o  express t o  me . . . con- 
ce rn ing  means t o  keep peace. . . . These s teps ,  f u r -  
thermore, would advance the cauae of world peace i n  a s  
much a s  t h e  agreements which might be reached would 
supplement and re in force  the e f f o r t s  of the  League of 
Nations and a l l  o the r  ex i s t i ng  peace agencies i n  s e e k i n g  
t o  prevent  war .l 
La te r  i n  a  speech ce lebra t ing  Pan-American Day i n  
1936, Hull  s t a t ed :  
The f orthcorning Inter-American Conference which is 
t o  meet a t  Buenos Aires  i n  accordance with t h e  sugges t ion  
made by Pres ident  Roosevelt t o  the Pres idents  of the 
o t h e r  American Republics, o f fe rs ,  I bel ieve ,  a promis ing 
oppor tuni ty  f o r  the  American nations t o  s e t  an example t o  
t he  world of f r i e n d l y  cooperation and enlightened i n t e r -  
nationalism.2 
These two statements by R u l l  and Roosevelt r e f l e c t  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  they both  were beginning t o  view La t in  Ameri- 
can r e l a t i o n s  i n  more of a  world r e l a t i o n s  perspect ive ,  No 
longer  would the r e l a t i o n s  with t he  La t in  Americans b e  
s epa ra t ed  from the  r e s t  of' world diplomacy. For t h i s  r e a s o n  
i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  t r ace  the f u r t h e r  development of the Good 
Neighbor po l icy  i n  i t s  r e l a t i onsh ip  t o  La t in  America a lone .  
What ia done a f t e r  1936, i s  highly influenced by e v e n t s  i n  
Europe and Aaia. The Buenos Aires Conference a c t u a l l y  marks 
L n ~ n t a r - ~ m e r i c a n  Conference on Maintenance of' Peace. 
B u l l e t i n  --- of the  Pan American Union, LXX (;.!arch 1936). 246-47. 
2 ~ o r d e l l  R u l l .  "Address a t  the Pan-American Dav 
Celebra t ion ,  It ~ u l l e t l n  --- of the Pan ~ m e r i c a n  Union, LXX- (May 
19361, 379. 
t h e  l a s t  phase i n  t h e  d i r e c t  development of new r e l a t i o n s  
with L a t i n  America before World War 11. 
The Uni ted S t a t e s  de lega t ion  t o  t h e  Buenos Ai re s  Con- 
f e r e n c e  was a8 follows: Secre ta ry  H u l l  a s  chairman; Assis- 
t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  Wumer Welles; Ambassador t o  Argentina,  
Alexander  WedCell; Adolf Ber le ;  Alexander Whitney; Char les  
1 Fenwick; Michael Doyle; and Mrs. E l i s e  Musser. Hul l  i n -  
s t r u c t e d  t h e  d e l e g a t i o n  i n  t h e  same manner as he had f o r  t h e  
I fontevideo Conference. They would v i s i t  o the r  de l ega t ions  
f i r s t ,  a v o i d  assuming a dominant r o l e ,  and a c t  i n  a s p i r i t  
of e q u a l i t y  and cooperat ion.  A t  one p o r t  of c a l l  Hull  made 
t h e  s ta tement :  
It i s  no ord inary  occasion t h a t  draws toge the r  t h e  
representatives of t h e  twenty one American i tepublics 
a t  Buenos Ai res .  . . . Wa a r e  impelled by the  wish t o  
make known and e f f e c t i v e  the  b e l i e f s  and d e s i r e s  which 
we have i n  com-on. We a r e  responding t o  our needs of 
d e c l a r i n g  and ca r ry ing  forward i n  unison our common 
i d e a l s . 2  
I n  h i a  welcoming apeech t o  t h e  de lega t ions ,  P re s iden t  
Aguat in  P. Juato  DP Argentina echoed the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  tone 
which Hu l l  had g e t  by  s t a t i n g :  
'united S t a t e s  Department of S t a t e ,  R p o r t  of t h e  
Dele a t i o n  of the United S t a t e s  t o  the I n t e r  ~ m e r i c a n  =- 
~ O P ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ j ~ e o  em be^^, - 19% 
l - a t i o h m .  Conferonce Series 33. Wsshilgton: 
Sovernment P r i n % i n g  O f f  i c e ,  19371, 9. 73. 
I n  a  world d iv ided  by ha t e  and animosity,  which 
opens g u l f s  between count r ies ,  t he  a t t i t u d e s  of t h e  
n a t i o n 8  of t h i s  con t inen t  s tand out  on c o n t r a s t ,  f o r  
t h e y  have come toge the r  i n  a c o r d i a l  reunion the  b e t t e r  
t o  c o o r d i n a t e  t h e  l i f e  of t h e  American C mmunity i n  
t h e  s imple  concept of t h e  Good Neighbor. ? 
I n  t h e  f a l l  be fo re  t h e  conference opened, Roosevelt  
had dec ided  t o  a t t e n d .  H i s  presence would add p r e s t i g e  t o  
t h e  con fe rence  and f u r t h e r  enforce  t he  imgortance with which 
t h e  C n i t e d  S t a t e s  viewed r e l a t i o n s  with L a t i n  America. It 
a l s o  showed tha t  Rooaevelt f e l t  t h a t  he had more time f o r  
f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  now t h a t  recovery was underway, and was j u s t  
a  g l impse  of h i s  growing p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  diplomacy. 
Rooseve l t  began his address  t o  t he  conference: 
Members of t h e  American family  of nat ions;  on t h e  
happy occas ion  of t h e  convening of this conference,  
I addreaa  you thus ,  because members of a fami ly  need 
no introc!uction o r  f o m a l l t i e s  when, i n  pursuance of 
e x c e l l e n t  custom, they meet t oge the r  f o r  t h e i r  common 
good. 2 
Roosevel t  f u r t h e r  s t a t e d  t o  t h e  delegates :  
. . . through t h e i r  des ignated r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
seate2,  ~t a common counc i l  t ab l e ,  should s e i z e  this 
a l t o g e t h e r  f avo rab le  opportuni ty  t o  cons ider  t h e i r  
j o i n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and t h e i r  conmon need of render ing  
l e s s  l i k e l y  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  t h e  outbreak o r  t he  continu- 
a t i o n  of h o s t i l i t i e s  between them; and by doing so, 
s e r v e  i n  a n  eminently p r a c t i c a l  manner t he  cause of 
permanent peace of t h i s  western cont inen t .  3 
'united S t a t e a  Department of S t a t e ,  9. G., p. 73. 
These s t a t emen t s  conta in  the  very fundamentals of t h e  
~ o o d  Neighbor; t hey  can be cont ras ted  with the  more ominous 
a t t i t u d e s  t h a t  Roosevelt  had displayed before  the  conference 
a t  Montevideo t h r e e  years  e a r l i e r .  The s ta tements  sound 
much l i k e  t h o s e  made by  Secre ta ry  H u l l  a s  e a r l y  as 1933, 
t a l k i n g  abou t  cooperat ion,  equa l i ty ,  and common e f f o r t s  f o r  
peace 0 
Roosevel t  continued t o  give desc r ip t ion  t o  t h a t  p o l i c y  
which t h e  Uni ted S t a t e a  had now c rea t ed  r e l a t i v e  t o  L a t i n  
America. "Three c e n t u r i e s  of h i s t o r y  sowed t h e  seed which 
grew i n t o  ou r  na t ions ;  t he  f o u r t h  saw those nat ions  become 
e q u a l  and f r e e ;  t h e  f i f t h  century i s  giving t o  us a common 
1 
meeting ground of mutual he lp  and understanding." In 
conc lua lon  Rooaevelt  sa id :  
F i n a l l y  In expressing our f a i t h  of t h e  Western World 
l e t  ua affirm: That we maintain and defend the  demo- 
c r a t i c  form of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  government; That through 
auch government we can more g r e a t l y  provide a wider d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  of c u l t u r e ,  of education, of thought, and of 
f r e e  expreaaion;  That through i t  we can ob ta in  a g r e a t e r  
s e c u r i t y  of l i f e  f o r  our c i t i z e n s  and a more equal  
o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  them t o  prosper;  That through i t  we can 
b e a t  f o a t e r  comnerce and t h e  exchange of a r t  and sc ience  
between na t ions ;  That through i t  us can avoid the  
r i v a l r y  of armaments, a v e r t  hatred,  and encourage 
l ~ d w a r d  0 .  Guerrant ,  Roosevelt s - Good Neighbor Po l i cy  
(Albuquerque,  New I~Iaxico: Univers i ty  of :iew ; exico Press,  
19501, p.  74, 
good w i l l  and t r u e  j u s t i c e ;  That through it  we o f f e r  
hope f o r  peace and a  more abundant l i f e  t o  t he  peoples 
of t h e  whole world.' 
On December 5,  H u l l  addressed t h e  conference f o r  the  
f i r s t  t ime  and  l i s t e d  h i s  "Eight P i l l a r s  of Peace. They 
were b a s i c a l l y  t h e  same p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  he had always 
fo l lowed  i n  diplomacy. 
1. Peop le s  must be educated f o r  peace. Each na t ion  
must make i t s e l f  s a f e  f o r  peace. 
2. Frequent  conferences between r ep re sen ta t ives  of 
n a t i o n s  and i n t e r c o u r s e  between t h e i r  people 
a r e  e s s e n t i a l .  
3. The consumation of t he  f i v e  wel l  known peace 
agreements  w i l l  provide adequate peace machinery. 
4. I n  t h e  event  of war i n  t h i s  hemisphere, t h e r e  
should  b e  a common p o l i c y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y .  
5. The n a t i o n s  should adopt commercial p o l i c i e s  t o  
b r i n g  each t h a t  p r o s p e r i t y  upon which enduring 
peace i s  founded. 
6. P r a c t i c a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  cooperat ion is  e s s e n t i a l  
t o  r e a t o r e  many indispensable  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  be- 
tween n a t i o n s  and prevent t he  demoral izat ion with 
which n a t i o n a l  cha rac t e r  and conduct a r e  threatened.  
7. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law should be r ee s t ab l i shed ,  r e -  
v i t a l i z e d  and strengthened.  Armies and navies  
a r e  no permanent s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  i t s  g r e a t  p r in -  
c i p l e ~ .  
8. F a i t h f u l  observance of undertakings between n a t i o n s  
i a  t h e  foundat ion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  order ,  and 
p e s t s  upon moral law, the  h ighes t  of a l l  law.2 
The agenda f o r  t h e  conference took c a r e f u l  note of 
t h e s e  p i l l a r s  of peace even though i t  had prev ious ly  been 
a r r anged .  It was a s  followa: Organizations f o r  peace, d l s -  
k n i t e d  S t a t e s  Department of S t a t e ,  2. G., 
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cussion of po~siblc3 causes of controversy, methods of pre- 
venting it, ratif l c a t i o n  of peace t r e a t i e s ,  and the  c rea t ion  
of an 1 ntsr-American Court of Just ice;  Neut ra l i ty ;  Limitation 
of arms; Juridf c a l  problems ; Economic problems, t a r i f f  and 
trade; f n t e l l e c k u a l  cooperation. 1 
Theaa items t h a t  were to be discussed r e f l e c t  what 
the natfons felt were the bas f s  for good r e l a t i o n s  and peace. 
They quite closely r ep resen t  Hull ' s  phflosophy and ape the  
ideaIs of the Good llelghbor. 
The f irst  t h i n g  on the  agenda a t  Busnos Aires was 
ksapf ng the peace, The delegates  decided t o  add t o  e x i s t i n g  
machinery r a t h e r  t h a n  c r e a t e  new machinery. Means f o r  media- 
t i o n  and a r b i t r a t i o n  had always exis ted.  Therefore they 
s t r eng thened  them by accept ing H u l l  s resolu t ion  t h a t  every- 
one ratify all f i v e  e x i s t i n g  inter-American peace t r e a t i e s .  2 
Both t h e  Gondre Treaty and l a t e r  a r b i t r a t i o n  t r e a t i e s  had 
one f a u l t ,  no independent nat ion wishes to  agree t o  any 
l i m i t a t i o n  of i t s  sovereignty. Unfortunately f o r  the pro- 
ponents of peaoe b y  t r e a t y ,  nine count r ies  had f a i l e d  t o  
r a t i f y  a l l  of t h e  f i v e  e x i s t i n g  t r e a t i e s  and one country had 
r a t i f i e d  none. 3 
'united S t a t e s  Department of S ta te ,  9. em, pp. 7-8. 
'1bid pp. 16-17. 
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The conference was able t o  s e t  up machinery f o r  con- 
s u l t a t i o n  i n  t h e  event of a  th rea t  t o  peace, but  was only 
ab le  t o  encourage jo in t  consideration of mediation and con- 
c i l i a t i o n  i n  a  c o n f l i c t  a r i s i ng  i n  the ~inericas. '  However 
~ u l l  was de f ea t ed  i n  his attempts a t  neu t ra l i ty .  The con- 
f e rence  r e fu sed  t o  encourage proposals f o r  ac t ion  by neut ra ls  
t o  s t a r v e  o u t  a b e l l i g e r e n t  deemed g u i l t y  of unfriendly ac t s .  
The L a t i n  Americans objected t o  t r ea t ing  be l l i ge r en t s  equal ly  
because some of them might have a  League commitment t o  enact  
sanc t ions .  
Hull  sympathized with this a t t i t ude ,  but congressional 
opin ion  t i e d  h i s  hands from departing from the o f f i c i a l  
United S t a t e s  n e u t r a l  ~ o w e i e r  the proposal which 
t he  United S t a t e s  made included a  clause t h a t  would have 
allowed League obl iga t ions  t o  be exceptions, B u t  this d i d  
not s a t i a f y  t he  La t in  American leaders.  The f e a r  remained 
t h a t  t hey  would be a t  a  grea t  disadvantage i f  they became a 
b e l l i g e r e n t  because o r  i n a b i l i t y  t o  ge t  arms regardless  of 
the  j u s t i o e  of t h e i r  gtosition." The Lat in  Americans a l so  
s t a t e d  t h a t  no embargoes should include food, 
United S t a t e s  proposals f o r  no loans t o  be l l i ge r en t s  
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were a l s o  de fea ted  because the  Lat in Americans do not loan 
money and t h e r e f o r e  could only be hu r t  by t h i s  type of pol icy 
which might  prevent  them from ge t t ing  monej.l It is  diff i- 
c u l t  to say how H u l l  f e l t  i n  the  face  of these setbacks. He 
makes no mention of h i s  f e e l i ngs  in h i s  writings. Cer ta in ly  
he wanted a po l i cy  which would prevent war by mutual ac t ion ,  
but on t h e  o t h e r  hand H u l l ' s  philosophy toward neutralism a s  
d iacuased e a r l i e r  was not  i n  accord with the congressional 
l e g i s l a t i o n .  Therefore he may have been s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t he  
t i g h t  measures contained i n  the  congressional a t t i t u d e  were 
r e j e c t e d  by t h e  La t in  Americans even though he desired some 
common po l i cy .  
I n  a s tatement  iaaued i n  response t o  the re fusa l s  t o  
agree  w i t h  United S t a t e s  pol icy on ce r t a i n  matters,  Hull t o l d  
t h e  L a t i n  Amerlcens: 
We recognize t he  r i g h t  of a l l  nations t o  handle t h e i r  
a f f a i r 8  i n  any way they choose, and t h i s  qu i t e  i r r e -  
a p e c t i v e  of the  f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  way may be d i f f e r en t  
from our  way o r  even repugnant t o  our ideas. B u t  we 
can not f a l l  t o  take  cognizance of the in te rna t iona l  
aspect  of t h e i r  po l i c i e s  when and t o  the  extent  t h a t  
t h e y  may r e a c t  upon u s ,  I myself am unalterably of the  
v i e u  that a po l i cy  leading t o  war may reac t  upon us. 
I n  t h e  f a c e  of any s i t u a t i o n  d i r e c t l y  l e a d i  
can  w e  the re fo re  be o ther  than apprehensive 
 a arc hard, 9. G., p. 333. 
' ~ n i t s d  S t a t e s  Department of  S ta te ,  2. e., p. 83. 
p o s i t i v e  s t e p s  were t aken  by the  delegat ions ,  however. 
  he c o n f e r e n c e  d i d  p a s s  a "Convention f o r  t h e  Maintenance, 
p r e s e r v a t i o n ,  and  Reestablishment of Peace." A l l  twenty one 
n a t i o n s  s i g n e d  it. The convention provided f o r  ob l iga to ry  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  and c o l l a b o r a t i o n  of t he  nat ions  i n  t h e  event 
of: Menace t o  t h e  peace of t h e  American Republics from any 
s o u r c e ;  Menace t o  peace on t h e  cont inen t  i n  event of war o r  
v i r t u a l  s t a t e  o f  war between American s t a t e s ;  Menace from 
a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  war o u t s i d e  of America which might t h r e a t e n  
t h e  peace  o f  t h e  American Republics.  1 
H u l l  s t a t e d :  
The twen ty  one American Republics have by t h e  con- 
vention adopted a t  this  conference, coordinated and 
made e f f e c t i v e  t h e  e x i s t i n g  machinery f o r  t he  m i n t e n -  
a n c e  of peace.  Such agreements a s  t he  Kellogg Briand 
P a c t  have  been handicapped by l ack  of implementation; 
o t h e r  agreements  have c r e a t e d  the  i n i t i a l  machinery of 
p e a c e  b u t  have f a i l e d  t o  provide weys and means t o  a s su re  
ita ~ u c c e a s f  u 1  opera t ion .2  
g u l l  n t a t e d  f u r t h e r  a t  t h e  conference: 
I n  a broad  way t h e  program conteleplates t he  mobil i-  
zation of t h e  p u b l i c  op in ion  of a l l  t h e  peoples of th i s  
hemisphere  i n  t h e  e f f o r t  t o  b r ing  t h e i r  combined moral 
i n f l u e n c e  t o  bear upon t h e  ao lu t ion  of con t rovers ies ,  
upon t h e  defense  of t h e i r  common i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  peace 
of t h e  c o n t i n e n t . 3  
'uni ted S t a t e s  Department of S t a t e ,  9. G., p. 17. 
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The above s t a t emen t s  r e f l e c t  H u l l 1  s disappointment 
t h a t  no common p l a n  of a c t i o n  was e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  Buenos 
Aires, o r  more s p e c i f i c a l l y  a  means t o  br ing about act ion.  
But f rom t h e  good w i l l  shown, each country  f e l t  secure i n  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  was a common f r o n t  i n  opposi t ion t o  un- 
j u a t  a g g r e s s i o n .  Hu l l  a l s o  r e i t e r a t e s  h i s  philosophy of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  as descr ibed  i n  the  In t roduc t ion  
t o  t h i s  t h e s i s .  He a g a i n  confirms h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  t he  
people  1s d e s i r e  f o r  war o r  peace based on t h e i r  s a t i s f a c -  
t i o n  w i t h  l i f e  w i l l  be the common f a c t  which w i l l  determine 
what a c t i o n  would be taken.  
There uere a l a o  f u r t h e r  pro tocols  aga ins t  in terven-  
t i o n  and t h e  recommendation o r  consu l t a t ion  i n  case  of t h e  
t h r e a t  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  The Good Neighbor was represen ted  
by f a r  more t h a n  ideea  of non-intervention and consul ta t ion ;  
n o n - p o l i t i c a l  r e s o l u t i o n s  dea l ing  with  a tudent  exchanges and 
increased l n t e r n e t i o n a l  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  wlthin the  hemisphere 
were also  agreed on. 
Under t h e  chairmanahip of Sumner Welles, the  Committee 
on Economia Problema passed a  r e s o l u t i o n  c a l l i n g  f o r  e q u a l i t y  
of t r e a t m e n t  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t rade .  The passage of t h e  
resolution thus ahowing t h e  s t rong  support  t h a t  t h e  La t in  
Americana ware w i l l i n g  t o  g ive  t o  that phase of H u l l ' s  pb i lo-  
aophy wna a n o t h e r  i n d i c a t i o n  of H u l l  f a  in f luence  on the  Good 
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Neighbor. The committee repor ted  the  f a c t  that t h e  American 
Repub l i c s  were convinced t h a t  growth of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r ade  
can s e r v e  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  foundations of peace by improv- 
i n g  t h e  m a t e r i a l  we l f a re  and contentment of nations.' Thia 
committee f u r t h e r  s t a t e d  a n  a t t a c k  on t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s  and 
trade r e a t r l c t i o n s  . Commenting on t h i s  pos i t i on  H u l l  f u r t h e r  
e x p r e s s e d  h is  t r a d e  pol icy:  
A t h r i v i n g  c o m u n i t y ,  well  adjust06 t o  the  resources  
a n d  t a l e n t s  of each  count ry  br ings  benef i t s  t o  a l l .  . . . 
It l e a d s  e a c h  count ry  t o  look upon others  a s  he lp fu l  
c o u n t e r p a r t s  t o  i t s e l f  r a t h e r  than a s  antagonis ts .  
P r o s p e r i t y  and peace a r e  not separa te  e n t i t l e s . 2  
From t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  can be seen t h e  f a c t  t h a t  H u l l  had not  
l o s t  h i a  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  use of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a c e  a s  a  s t i m u -  
l a n t  t o  world  peace and had convinced the  La t in  American 
c o u n t r i a a  o f  t h e  eame. 
The Buenoa Al re s  Conference ne i the r  met t he  expecta- 
t i o n a  o r  t h e  pes s lmis t a  o r  extreme opt imis t s ,  i n s t ead  it 
d e a l t  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  with  a l l  mat te rs  before it concerning 
t h e  p r e a s r v a t i o n  of peace and c o r d i a l  r e l a t i o n s .  The con- 
f e r e n c e  r e c o g n i z e d  t h e  dangaroua problems t h a t  ex i s t ed  i n  
t h e  wor ld  and t h a t  whet t hey  a t  t h e  conference were doing 
c o u l d  o n l y  supplement what o ther  nat ions  would agree t o  do 
'uni ted S t a t e s  Department of S t a t e ,  OJ. 
PP. 29-30. 
t o  keep peace, As a n  example, they recognized. t he  r e l a t i o n s  
of the  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  the League and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  
a c t i o n s  might be aff s c t e d  by League commitments o r  sovereign 
interests,  Each n a t i o n ' s  sovere ign ty  was recognized along 
with i n d i v i d u a l  requirernants t h a t  were pecu l i a r  t o  them. 1 
Although the agreements  that were adopted were not e x a c t l y  
what H u l l  d e a l r e d ,  he had recognized both  the  hinderances 
which the L a t i n  Americans had and the f a c t  t h a t  congress ional  
attitudes r e s t r i c t e d  his a b i l i t y  t o  compromise, 
In February of  1931, R u l l  reviewed t h e  accomplish- 
ments o f  the Buenos Aires Conference f o r  Bew Pork business-  
The re  was g e n e r a l  and emphatic agreement t h a t  a l l  
c o u n t r i e s  work toward a system of f r e e r  economic 
i n t e r c h a n g e ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  standards of l i v i n g  i n  t h e  
v a r i o u s  c o u n t r i e s  may be gradua l ly  r a i sed  and the  com- 
m e r c i a l  necessities of each country adequately recog- 
n i zed .2  
R u l l  waa a g a i n  a t r e a s i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  economic peace and 
p r o s p e r i t y  would ach ieve  t h e  most co rd ia l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e l a t l o n a .  
I n  t h e  I n t r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e  t h e s i s  began with a descr ip-  
t i o n  of t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the  proposed philosophy of 
H u l l  and  t h e  Good Neighbor. By 1937 the  Good Neighbor was 
'un i ted  S t a t e s  Department of S t a t e ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 13. 
an accompl i~ lhed  f a c t ,  a new f e e l i n g  e x i s t e d  i n  La t in  America. 
This f e e l i n g  i s  b e s t  descr ibed by  a  La t in  American. A t  
Buenos A i r e s  t h e  B r a z i l i a n  Foreign Nin i s t e r ,  D r .  Macedo Soarea 
s t a t e d :  
Peace i n  America i s  a  super ior  s t a t e  i n  human 
c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  i t  i s  one which we begin t o  c a l l  "policy 
of  good neighbors ,"  i t  i s  a  t r u e  and f r i e n d l y  under- 
t a k i n g ,  it i s  t h e  con t inen t s1  copossession of the  
v a l u e s  l i n k e d  t o  peace, t h a t  i s  t o  say, t he  change 
f rom n a t i o n a l  f r a t e r n i t y  t o  the  conf ra t e rn i ty  of t he  
peop le  .l 
The s t a t e m e n t  c l e a r l y  recognizes  t h e  ideal ism of H u l l  by 
r e c o g n i z i n g  t h e  "super ior  s t a t e  i n  human c i v i l i z a t i o n .  
It i s  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  of H u l l ' s  b e l i e f  t h a t  t he  value of 
p r o s p e r i t y  knows no border ,  and t h a t  cooperation w i l l  r e s u l t  
In peace. 
'united S t a t e s  Department of  S t a t e ,  x. - c i t . ,  p. 99. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
I n  t h e  I n t r o d u c t i o n  the  ques t ion  was r a i s e d  a s  t o  
C o r d e l l  H u l l ' s  r o l e  i n  t h e  development of t h e  Good Neighbor 
p o l i c y .  T h i s  s t u d y  s e e k s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  c e r t a i n  conclusions 
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  r o l e  of  Corde l l  Hul l  i n  t he  development of 
t h e  Good Neighbor po l icy .  It was a l s o  s t a t e d  t h a t  when an 
o b s e r v e r  v iews  t h e  s u b j e c t  of f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  during the  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of F r a n k l i n  Roosevelt ,  X u 1 1  s r o l e  does not 
seem t o  s t a n d  o u t  i n  importance. This s tudy has sought t o  
e s t a b l i s h  c e r t a i n  conc lus ions  concerning these  items, The 
f i r s t  i s  t h a t  C o r d e l l  Y u l l f s  r o l e  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  ro l e .  
The aecond i s  t h a t  t h e  reason i t  has been neglected was that 
dorneatic problema overshadowed fo re ign  a f f a i r s  u n t i l  a f t e r  
1936. Except for t h e  formulat ion of the  Good Neighbor 
p o l i c y ,  no s p e o t a c u l e r  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  development occured 
t o  puah C o r d e l l  X u 1 1  i n t o  the  news u n t i l  the  l a t e  t h i r t i e s .  
R y  t h a t  t ime  t h e  Good Neighbor had been developed. There- 
f o r e  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  has  been given t o  f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s  
i n  t h e  f i r s t  f o u r  years  of the  Roosevelt adminis t ra t ion.  
However t h e  v a r y  fact  t h a t  Roosevelt was concentra t ing his 
e f f o r t *  o n  domeetio recovery r e f l e c t s  t he  f a c t  t h a t  ! l u l l  was 
given more freedom i n  running t h e  S t a t e  Department* 
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A f t e r  1936, when f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  became more s i g n i f i -  
c a n t ,  5 u l l  I s  r o l e  became l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n t .  The depression 
was l i f t i n g  and  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  were becoming c r i t i c a l .  
O t h e r s  began t o  dorninate t h e  f i e l d  of fo re ign  a f f a i r s  a s  t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  moved toward t h e  war years.  Harry Ropkins, 
Sumner Wel les ,  and even Roosevelt himself tend t o  p lay  a 
much l a r g e r  r o l e .  
However, the  very  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of 9 u l l t s  Wilsonian 
p h i l o s o p h y  which prevented  h i s  e f f e c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in 
t h e  power p o l i t i c s  of t h e  immediate pre-war years and t h e  
war y e a r s  themselves  became t h e  a c t u a l  foundation on which 
t h e  Good Neighbor po l i cy  was b u i l t .  xu11 found much g r e a t e r  
succeas I n  a p ~ l y i n g  blileonian i d e a l s  t o  La t in  America than  
he dic! i n  a p p l y i n g  them t o  Esrope and A s i a .  The Idea l s  of 
aovoro ign tp ,  a s l f  de te rmina t ion ,  e q u a l i t y  and mul t i l a5era l  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  could  e x i s t  in the env i romen t  of t he  Wester3 
Hemlaphere which was no t  plagued by the  long heritage of i n -  
t a r n a t i o n a l  power p o l i t i c s  t h a t  t h e  r e s t  of t he  world knew. 
The e a r l y  t h i r t i e s  when t h e  Good Neighbor pol icy was being 
deve loped  was a pe r iod  f r e e  from i n t e r n ~ t i o n a l  t h r e a t  and a 
t ime when i n t e r n a t i o n a l  coopera t ion  was needed t o  improve 
domeet ic  c o n d i t i o n s .  L a t i n  Americans were e s p e c i a l l y  i n t e r -  
e s t e d  In improving r e l a t i o n e  due t o  t h e i r  g r e a t  r e l i ance  on 
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fore ign  commerce. L a t e r  on i n  t h e  t h i r t i e s  t h i s  environment 
was a l t e r e d .  There  was a European t h r e a t  and H u l l f s  r o l e  
became l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  a s  he  was unable t o  stem t h e  growth of 
h o s t i l i t y  i n  Europe and i n  Asia. However, even during t h e  
y e a r s  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c r i s i s ,  Roosevelt tended t o  leave 
L a t i n  American a f f a i r s  t o  H u l l  even though he had become 
more a c t i v e  i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  himself.  1 
The Good Neighbor p o l i c y  i s  i n  one sense simply the  
enactment o f  Wilsonian philosophy. It i s  extremely important  
t o  r e c o g n i z e  this f a c t  i n  answering the  ques t ion  which t h e  
t h e s i s  p roposes .  R u l l  was a Wilsonian, t h e  o thers  who were 
a c t i v e  i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  were not. Perhaps t h a t  i s  what 
made t h e  l a t t e r  more important  during the  c r i a i s  years and 
9 u l l  l e a s  impor t an t .  Yevertheless,  when inves t iga t ing  t h e  
l i n e  of developments wMch formulate the  Good Xeighbor po l i cy  
i n t o  an accompl i shad  f a c t ,  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of Wilsonian 
print i p l s s  i s  seen. These developments were p o l i f  i c a l  and 
diploma t i c .  
A a u m a r g  of t h o s e  diplomat ic  and p o l i t i c a l  develop- 
m e n t ~  which ~ n k e  up t h e  Sood Neighbor po l i cy  w i l l  put  T I u l l t s  
r o l e  i n  t he  p e r s p e c t i v e  necessary t o  r e f l e c t  h i s  a c t u a l  r o l e .  
l ~ o m p n  A. Grasbner (sd.  ) , & U n c e r t ~ f n  T r ~ d i t i o n ,  
American S e c r e t a r i a s  of S t a t e  -- i n  t he  Twentieth Cent.urg_ 
(k: ' - 'cJmu , ' i f l ,m) ,  p. 201. 
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It w i l l  be  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  throughout h i s  congressional career ,  
~ u l l  had fought  f o r  those  economic p r i n c i p l e s  which were a 
b a s i s  of t h e  Good Neighbor pol icy,  namely a  reduct ion of 
t r a d e  b a r r i e r s .  During these  years h i s  inf luence i n  h i s  
p a r t y  grew, H i s  a t tempts  t o  move h i s  pa r ty  towards these 
p r i n c i p l e s  f i n a l l y  came t o  f r u i t i o n  i n  1932 when the  power 
of t h e  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  wing of the  pa r ty  was broken and the  
Democratic Convention adopted h i s  p r inc ip les  i n  i ts p l a t f  om.' 
I n  t h e  yea r s  l ead ing  up t o  the nomination of Frankl in Roose- 
v e l t ,  R u l l  had made Roosevelt f a m i l i a r  with the  ideas  of  un- 
r e s t r i c t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t rade .  Roosevelt supported t h e  
p r i n c i p l e s  t o  t h e  extent  t h a t  he was p o l i t i c a l l y  able  i n  the  
campaign of 1932. 2 
One of H u l l ' s  b igges t  handicapa when he became Secre- 
t a r y  of S t a t e  was the  f a c t  t h a t  hi2 philosophies of i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  coopera t ion  found s o  much competition from the  pro- 
t e c t i o n i s t  phi losophies  of the advisors  i n  Roosevel t rs  
" 9 r a i n  d rust."^ Man l i k e  Raymond Moley and George Peek took 
s t e p s  which e i t h e r  damaged o r  endangered H u l l l s  at tempts a t  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  cooperation. Examples were Moleyls ac t ions  a t  
'see page 25. 2 ~ e e  psgsa 25-26. 
3 ~ e e  pagoa 29-30, 70-71. 
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t h e  London Economic Conference o r  Peek's b a r t e r  negot ia t ions  
i n  1934. The protectionist philosophy of t h e  New Deal was 
not compa t ib l e  with Hul l  Is philosophy of economic cooperation, 
and y e t  H u l l  survived a l l  of t h e  New Deal acvisors ,  and 
f o r c e d  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  the  d i r e c t i o n  of measures such 
a s  the  R e c i p r o c a l  Trade Act. Roosevelt himself o f t e n  was 
p e s s i m i s t i c  abou t  H u l l ' s  d e s i r e  f o r  economic measures t o  
improve f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s .  But H u l l t  a determinat ion t o  put  
his p o l i c i e s  i n t o  a c t i o n  p reva i l ed  e e p e c i a l l y  I n  t h e  e a r l y  
years of the development of t h e  new policy.  Roosevelt was 
w i l l i n g  t o  l e t  Hu l l  have a f r e e  hand in t h e  e a r l y  years,  
even though he was pess imis t i c ,  simply because he was more 
concerned a b o u t  domestic matters. Only when t h e  f o r e i g n  
a f f a i r s  a f f e c t e d  domestic a f f a i r s  was t h e r e  any f r i c t i o n .  
An axampla would be the  exchange of notes p r i o r  t o  and dur- 
Ing t h e  Fon tev idao  Conference i n  which Roosevelt and H u l l  
a rgued  o v e r  the quaa t ion  of p ro t ec t ing  c e r t a i n  domestic 
economic Here aga in  H u l l  p reva i led .  
H u l l  urns a l s o  faced  with  the  i s o l a t i c n i s t  s e n t i n e n t  
of Congress.  This ahould no t  be minimized. Fo r tuna te ly  Hull 
had a beokground in Congress, and even though many congres- 
a i o n a l  a c t i o n 8  did not always support  t h e  i d e a l s  of t h e  Good 
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Neighbor p o l i c y ,  such a s  n e u t r a l i t y  laws, nevertheless ~ u i i  
more i n f l e x i b l e  1 e g i s l a t i o n . l  Hul l  was a b l e  t o  
b r i n g  t o  comple t ion  h i s  dream of t h e  reduc t ion  of t r a d e  
b a r r i e r s  with t h e  enactment of the  Reciprocal  Trade Act. 
The passage of t h i s  a c t  a l s o  had t o  overcome much p r i v a t e  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  t a r i f f  reduction.  
The re fo re  i t  i s  seen t h a t  H u l l  d i d  f ace  much opposi- 
t i o n  t o  c e r t a i n  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n s  necessary t o  the  bu i ld ing  
of t h e  Good Neighbor p o l i c y  from within  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
New Deal  a d v i s o r s ,  t h e  Congress, p r i v a t e  sources, and even 
t h e  p r e s i d e n t  himself had t o  be convinced of t h e  n e c e s s i t y  
of  c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s .  I n  a l l  of t h i s  H u l l  remained f i r m  i n  
his p o l l c i e a .  Perhaps he was ab le  t o  do t h i a  with such 
aucceaa because t h e  o t h e r s  were more occupied with domestic 
m a t t e r s ,  But it a t i l l  remains a f a c t  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  
sconomiats  and i s o l a t i o n i s t s  presented a very r e a l  obstacle .  
B u t  if t h e  domestic handicaps t o  t h e  development of 
t h e  Good Neighbor p o l i c y  seem great, t he  h o s t i l i t y  of t he  
L a t i n  Americana was a much g r e a t e r  obs tac le  t o  overcome and 
r e q u i r e d  t h e  most ou ts tanding  implementation of Wilsonian 
p r i n c i p l e s .  The implementation had t o  be such as t o  show 
r e a l  sincerity r a t h e r  than draw susp ic ion .  The s i n g l e  most 
'see pages 75, 96-98. 
impoptant s t e p  towards t h i s  goal was the United S t a t e s  
1 
approach a t  t h e  Montevideo Conference i n  1933. The impor- 
t a n c e  wi th  which H u l l  viewed the conference was shown when 
~ u l l  dec ided  t o  l e a d  t h e  U. S. delegat ion t o  Montevideo. Re 
had s e t  a n  e g a l i t a r i a n  tone by c a l l i n g  on the o the r  delega- 
t i o n e  b e f o r e  t h e y  c a l l e d  on t h e  United Sta tes .  H u l l  showed 
t h e  United S t a t e s  was w i l l i n g  t o  support t h e  idea of i n t e r -  
dependence among nat ions.  The pol icy  of non-intervention 
was renounced f o r  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  purposes. The United S t a t e s  
had shown i t s e l f  w i l l i n g  t o  a c t  i n  a  m u l t i l a t e r a l  manner 
when H u l l  cooperated i n  gaining an armis t ice  i n  the  Chaco 
War. All of t h i s  c r e a t e d  g r e a t  optimism a t  Montevideo. 
Evan t h e  a t rongea t  opponents of the  Gnited S ta tes ,  such as 
Argent ina,  were won over by H u l l ' s  personal diplomacy. 
The wi l l ingness  of P u l l  t o  exerciae r e s t r a i n t  i n  1933 
and 1934 i n  t h e  f a c e  of unrest  i n  Cuba gave a c t u a l  substance 
t o  t h e  promiaea of Montevideo, Againat t h e  advice of Ambas- 
sador  Wellea, H u l l  followed a pol icy of non-intervention 
throughout  t h e  c r i a i s  period. Thin policy f i n a l l y  reached 
It8 climax when R u l l  asked f o r  the  abrogation of the  P l a t t  
Amendment which had allowed l e g a l  in te rven t  ion. When t h i s  
ab roga t ion  m3 coupled with a l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  of the  United 
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S t a t e s  t r e a t y  w i t h  Panama, a f u r t h e r  con t r ibu t ion  was mace 
t o  t h e  growth of  t h e  Good Neighbor policy.  
A s i g n i f i c a n t  ques t ion  r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  study concerns 
t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  Reciprocal  Trade Act on the  development of 
t h e  Good Neighbor pol icy .  There i s  l i t t l e  quest ion t h a t  the  
a c t  was one of  t h e  con t r ibu t ing  f a c t o r s  t o  the  Good Neighbor 
po l i cy ,  but t o  what degree is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  say. Qne can not 
h e l p  b u t  r e a d  H u l l f s  wr i t ings  and r e a l i z e  t h a t  h i s  fo re ign  
p o l i c y  r e s t e d  fundamental ly  on the  philosophy of u n r e s t r i c t e d  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s .  Bowever, i t  would be d i f -  
f i c u l t  t o  Bay e x a c t l y  what p a r t  the  a c t  played. The n a t u r a l  
economic r e c o v e r y  from depression along with na tu ra l  economic 
erowth compl ica te s  the  measurement of t h e  exact economic 
b e n e f i t  t o  L a t i n  America from !fullf  s t r a d e  pol icy.  However, 
b e a i d e s  t h e  n a t u r a l  economic b e n e f i t s  t h a t  do accrue, the  
psycho log ica l  e f f e c t  of t h e  a c t  on the  La t in  Americans can 
be added t o  g a t  8 p o s i t i v e  con t r ibu t ion  t o  the  developnent 
of t h e  Good Neighbor pol icy.  Regardless of what the  a c t u a l  
economic b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  La t in  Americans were, t he  a c t  i t s e l f  
d i d  show t h e  L a t i n s  t h a t  the  United S t a t e s  was i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
making tan a t t empt  t o  he lp  the  Lat in  economy. 
The olirnax t o  t h e  development of t h e  Good Neighbor 
p o l i c y  came a t  t h e  Ruenos Airea Conference. Again Eu l l  
fo l lowed h i s  p o l i c y  of  e s t a b l i s h i n g  an atmosphere of e q u a l i t y  
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and c o o p e r a t i o n .  F u r t h e r  importance was a t t ached  t o  the con- 
f e r e n c e  by t h e  v i s i t  of Pres ident  Roosevelt who uas becoming 
more a c t i v e  i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  by l a t e  1936. A t  t h i s  con- 
f e r e n c e  R o o s e v e l t t s  a t t i t u d e  was much more s i m i l a r  t o  H u l l l s  
ph i lo sophy  a f t e r  he had viewed t h e  success of H u l l t s  p o l i c i e s  
i n  L a t i n  America. H u l l  a t tempted t o  s t rengthen  t h e  f r i e n d l y  
unde r s t and ings  of Xontevideo i n t o  a c t u a l  machinery of co- 
o p e r a t i o n .  He c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of the  peace pac t s  
and the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of machinery f o r  consu l t a t ion  i n  the  
even t  o f  a t h r e a t  t o  peace. H i s  "Eight P i l l a r s  of Peacen 
c o n t a i n e d  t h e  v e r y  philosophy of the  Good Neighbor. The 
confe rence  d i d  t a k e  t h e  unprecedented s t e p  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  
machinery f o r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  when t h e r e  was a t h r e a t  t o  peace. 
H u l l  waa no t  always successful .  I n  t h e  a t tempts  t o  
c r e a t e  a new atmosphere between the  United S t a t e s  and Lat in  
Amarica he was n o t  a b l e  t o  go a s  f a r  a s  he wished. 3 
f a i l e d  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  type of neu t r a l  po l i cy  he des i red ,  bu t  
p a r t i a l l y  because of congress ional  r e s t r i c t i o n .  He could 
no t  convince  t h e  L a t i n  Americans t o  s e t  UP mandatory m d i a -  
t i o n  machinery t o  meet t h r e a t s  t o  peace. However these  a r e  
n e g a t i v e s  no t  p o s i t i v e s .  I n  o t h e r  words, what H u l l  was not  
a b l e  t o  implement does not d e t r a c t  from the  f a c t  t h a t  t h ings  
were done t o  c r e a t e  a  new pol icy.  These th ings  had great 
acoeptance  i n  L a t i n  Amarica and r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  bu i ld ing  of 
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a new r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the United S t a t e s  and Lat in Am- 
e r i c a  i n  a p e r i o d  of e l i g h t l y  l e s s  than f o u r  years. D u r i n g  
t h e se  f o u r  yea r s ,  Hu l l  was the symbol of foreign re la t ions  
i n  t h i s  country. '  He was i n  charge. The philosophy of the 
Good Neighbor was H u l l ' s  philosophy, a philosophy which he 
had implemented with l i t t l e  success i n  other par ts  of the 
world. However, i n  L a t i n  America H u l l ' s  development of the  
p r i n c i p l e s  of  t h e  Good Neighbor was successful. 
- - -- 
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